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8  CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
It has been recognized for many decades that a person’s behavior is a 
function of their likes and dislikes (Allport, 1935). The study of evaluation 
therefore constitutes an essential part of psychological research. The term 
“evaluation” can be used to refer to a behavioral phenomenon, that is, the 
impact of stimuli on evaluative responses (De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2013). As Zajonc (1980) argued in his seminal paper, evaluations can 
sometimes arise in a spontaneous manner. For instance, the sight of a stimulus 
(e.g., a kitten or a chocolate-chip cookie) may automatically evoke a smile. 
Evaluations that occur under certain conditions of automaticity (e.g., 
unintentional, uncontrolled, unconscious, or fast; see Moors & De Houwer, 2006) 
are typically referred to as implicit evaluations whereas evaluations that arise in 
a more deliberate and controlled manner (e.g., self-reported ratings of liking) are 
referred to as explicit evaluations. 
Previous studies have indicated that indices of implicit evaluations are 
often better than explicit evaluations at predicting automatic or spontaneous 
behavior (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Friese, Hofmann, & 
Schmitt, 2009; Perugini, Richetin, & Zogmaister, 2010). Moreover, some research 
suggests that implicit evaluations are an important determinant of certain 
spontaneous behaviors (Fazio, 1990; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 
2009) and play a crucial role in a number of important psychological phenomena 
including psychopathology (Roefs et al., 2011), addiction (Wiers & Stacy, 2006), 
and social interactions (Fazio & Olson, 2003). It is therefore of particular 
importance to understand how implicit evaluations are acquired and can be 
changed.  
Interestingly, whereas many studies have investigated how explicit 
evaluations can be influenced by a variety of different manipulations (see Petty 
& Wegener, 2010 for an overview), only a limited number of studies have 
examined the acquisition and change of implicit evaluations, employing only a 
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small number of paradigms (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Moreover, most 
of the paradigms that have been used to change implicit evaluations involve 
some kind of repeated presentations or training. An important reason for this 
state of affairs is that most early models that accounted for the impact of 
evaluations on behavior considered implicit evaluations to result from 
representations in memory that are highly stable across time and context (see 
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000 for an example of such a model). The mental 
representations that underlie implicit evaluations are typically thought to consist 
of associations links that develop gradually over many experiences. In line with 
this idea, it is often assumed that implicit stimulus evaluations arise exclusively 
as the result of repeated pairings of events (Rydell & McConnell, 2006). For 
instance, evaluative conditioning (EC) research provides ample evidence that 
changes in the implicit evaluation of a stimulus (conditioned stimulus; CS) occur 
when it is repeatedly paired with a valenced stimulus (unconditioned stimulus; 
US; for a review see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). 
Moreover, recent studies have shown that changes in implicit evaluations can 
also be obtained by pairing a stimulus with a valenced action (i.e., approach or 
avoidance). Typically, the repeated approaching of one stimulus and avoiding of 
another stimulus leads to more positive implicit evaluations for the former 
stimuli (e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Woud, Maas, Becker, & 
Rinck, 2013). It is generally assumed that effects of approach-avoidance (AA) 
training on implicit evaluations arise as a result of automatic processes (i.e., the 
automatic formation of mental associations, see for instance Phills, Kawakami, 
Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011). However, certain attempts to find AA training 
effects have failed (see Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011) and there is little 
evidence that informs us about the processes underlying the effects that have 
been observed. 
In the present dissertation, we focus on the learning of implicit evaluation 
through AA training. We examine the conditions under which AA procedures 
lead to changes in implicit evaluations with the aim to learn more about the 
processes underlying these effects and the processes that determine implicit 
10  CHAPTER 1  
evaluation. In the current chapter, we first provide an overview of current 
mental-process accounts of implicit evaluation. Second, we describe research on 
the acquisition and change of implicit evaluation and discuss mental process 
accounts of AA training effects. Finally, we specify the aims and research 
questions of the present thesis. 
Mental Process Accounts of Implicit Evaluation 
As an effect, implicit evaluation can in principle be due to a variety of 
mental processes. Cognitive theories of evaluation have traditionally assumed 
that implicit evaluations reflect the automatic activation of associations in 
memory (for a review, see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). 
Associations can be defined as simple links between mental representations that 
form whenever two representations simultaneously become active (Shanks, 
2007). One can conceptualize an evaluative association as an association 
between a representation of a target concept (e.g., a stimulus) and a 
representation of positive or negative valence. Implicit evaluation can then be 
explained in the following manner: Upon presentation of a certain stimulus, 
activation of its corresponding representation in memory will spread to a 
valenced representation through acquired evaluative associations. Once this 
valenced representation becomes active, it may influence the evaluative 
response to the stimulus.  
Broadly speaking, one can distinguish two different classes of evaluation 
models that have adopted the assumption that associations underlie implicit 
evaluation. First, single-process associative models postulate that both implicit 
and explicit evaluations are based on the formation and activation of 
associations (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992, Fazio, 
2007). Implicit evaluations are assumed to reflect the automatic activation of 
particularly strong associations (i.e., associations that have built up sufficient 
strength to operate automatically). In contrast, explicit evaluations may also 
depend on the more effortful activation of other associations (when a person has 
the opportunity and motivation to consider additional information; Fazio & 
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Olson, 2014). 
Second, in contrast to those purely associative models, dual-process 
models propose that two separate processes are responsible for evaluation. 
These models are based on dual-system models which assume that people 
process information through two qualitatively distinct cognitive systems (e.g., 
Sloman, 1996, Smith & DeCoster, 2000, Strack & Deutsch, 2004). One system is 
slow-learning and operates through automatic association formation processes 
whereas the other system is fast-learning and entails the rule-based formation of 
propositional representations. Contrary to associations, propositions are 
structured representations that include information not only about the strength 
of the relationship between concepts but also about the nature of the relation 
(e.g., ‘A causes B’ or ‘A is a consequence of B’; see Lagnado, Waldmann, 
Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007). It is often assumed that explicit evaluations reflect 
the operation of propositional processes such as the activation and validation of 
propositions whereas implicit evaluations are determined only by the activation 
of associations (Strack & Deutsch). Consistent with this idea, some studies have 
found that explicit evaluations are particularly sensitive to the acquisition of 
propositional information via instructions, whereas implicit evaluations are more 
sensitive to repeated evaluative pairings (Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & Strain, 
2006; Rydell &McConnell, 2006). 
However, some contemporary dual-process models have argued against a 
strict separation of associative and propositional processes in evaluation. These 
models assume that associative processes interact with propositional processes 
to explain implicit and explicit evaluation. The currently most extensive 
theoretical account of how these two distinct processes interact and cause 
changes in implicit and explicit evaluations in different contexts is the 
Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006, 2011, 2014). The APE model posits that implicit evaluations can form not 
only as the result of a pairing between events (i.e., associative learning, see De 
Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013) but also as the result of the acquisition 
of propositional information (i.e., propositional learning). More specifically, 
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implicit evaluations may form when externally provided or internally generated 
propositions are considered valid, thereby creating new (strong) associations in 
memory (see Whitfield & Jordan, 2009). Several recent studies seem to support 
this idea. First, it has been shown that changes in implicit evaluations can occur 
when participants are provided with a single instance of new propositional 
information via instructions (Castelli, Zogmaister, Smith, & Arcuri, 2003; De 
Houwer, 2006; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). For instance, when participants are 
informed that the members of one fictitious social group have positive traits and 
the members of another fictitious social group have negative traits, an implicit 
preference for the former group is typically observed (Gregg et al.). Second, 
some studies recently provided evidence that instruction effects on implicit 
evaluation depend on qualities of the information other than the (one-time) 
pairing of stimulus and valenced event that are part of the instructions (e.g., the 
instruction “Bob is good” entails a paring of “Bob” and “good”), such as the 
perceived validity of the acquired information (Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Peters & 
Gawronski, 2011; Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, Brass, & Kalisch, 2014). Because 
these findings indicate that propositional processes play an important role in the 
learning of implicit evaluations, they pose a challenge to associative and dual-
process models of evaluation which assume that implicit evaluations result only 
from the gradual formation of associations in memory as the result of actual 
pairings (Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).  
Recently, a third class of evaluation models has emerged that can also 
explain the effects of instructions on implicit evaluation. These models do not 
adopt the assumption that implicit evaluation reflects association activation. 
Rather, they argue that implicit and explicit evaluation is determined entirely by 
propositional processes (De Houwer, 2009, 2014; Mandelbaum, 2015; Mitchell, 
De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Proponents of these single-process propositional 
models believe that evaluations depend on the formation and activation of 
propositions. Whereas explicit evaluations may reflect the subjective validity of 
activated propositions, implicit evaluation may reflect the automatic activation 
of propositions that are easily retrieved (De Houwer, 2014). For instance, the 
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sight of a cookie (i.e., an evaluative stimulus) could allow for the retrieval of 
memories in which the proposition “cookies are tasty” was encoded. The 
activation of this proposition may automatically evoke a positive evaluative 
response such as a smile (i.e., implicit evaluation). A person’s deliberate 
response to the question whether they like the cookie (i.e., explicit evaluation) 
may more strongly reflect whether participants also consider this proposition to 
be valid and/or the importance of this belief in comparison to other beliefs about 
cookies (e.g., “cookies are unhealthy”). 
Associative learning of Implicit Evaluations 
Learning that involves a regularity in the presence of two events can be 
defined as associative learning (De Houwer et al., 2013). Traditionally, it was 
assumed that all instances of associative learning result from the automatic 
formation of mental associations (see Mitchell et al., 2009). A popular 
assumption of association formation theories of learning is that observed spatio-
temporal contiguities (or co-occurrences) of events lead to a co-activation of 
their corresponding mental representations which automatically creates an 
associative link between the two representations (Shanks, 2007). Repeatedly 
observing the same co-occurrences strengthens this link, which facilitates the 
spread of activation from one concept to the other when one of the two events 
occurs. Given that most evaluation models assume that mental associations 
underlie implicit evaluations, it is not surprising that most research on the 
acquisition and change of implicit evaluations has employed paradigms that 
involve repeated co-occurrences.  
The most extensively used procedure to induce changes in implicit 
evaluations is the EC procedure. EC refers to the change in liking of a stimulus 
(CS) that results from the pairing of that stimulus with a positive or negative 
stimulus (US; De Houwer, 2007). In line with the idea that automatic association 
formation mechanisms underlie these effects (Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van 
den Bergh, 1992), several studies have provided evidence that EC can occur 
under certain conditions of automaticity. For instance, some research suggests 
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that EC is not impeded by attentional load (Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001), is not 
susceptible to intentional control (Gawronski, Balas, & Creighton, 2014; 
Gawronski, Mitchell, & Balas, 2015) and can occur in the absence of conscious 
awareness of the contingency between CS and US (Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & 
Van den Bergh, 1992; Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012; Olson 
& Fazio, 2001). 
However, recent studies have provided evidence that the processes 
underlying EC may be less automatic than is often assumed. For instance, some 
research has shown that EC depends on the availability of cognitive resources 
(Davies, El-Deredy, Zandstra, & Blanchette, 2012; Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & 
Luminet, 2009), and momentary processing goals (Corneille, Yzerbyt, Pleyers, & 
Mussweiler, 2009; Gast & Rothermund, 2011). Moreover, recent evidence has 
challenged the idea that EC can occur in the absence of contingency awareness 
and suggested that EC occurs only after participants become aware of CS-US 
contingencies (e.g., Bar-Anan, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2010; Pleyers, Corneille, 
Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Stahl, Unkelbach, & Corneille, 2009). Though the 
question whether EC can occur without contingency awareness is still strongly 
debated (see Sweldens, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2014 for an overview), there is now 
general consensus that contingency awareness is at least an important 
moderator of EC (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). 
Evidence that EC, at least partly, depends on controlled processes, has 
important theoretical implications. It implies that (stimulus) pairings do not 
(always) automatically produce changes in implicit evaluations and therefore 
contrasts with the idea that EC is (exclusively) the result of the automatic 
formation of associations. In accordance with propositional theories of 
evaluation, it has recently been suggested that EC results entirely from 
propositional processes (De Houwer, 2009; Hughes et al., 2011; Mitchell, De 
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). According to these propositional accounts, the 
acquisition of propositional knowledge about the relation between the CS and 
US causes changes in implicit and explicit evaluation. Supporting this idea, some 
recent studies have shown that changes in the implicit evaluation of a CS occur 
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when verbal instructions link a CS with a valenced US in the absence of actual CS-
US pairings (De Houwer, 2006; Gast & De Houwer, 2012). For instance, when 
participants are instructed that one nonword will always be followed by positive 
pictures and another nonword will be followed by negative pictures, they exhibit 
more positive implicit evaluations of the former nonword than of the latter 
nonword (De Houwer). 
AA Training Effects on Implicit Evaluation 
Recent research has shown that implicit evaluations can form also as the 
result of the repeated pairing of stimuli and approach or avoidance actions. The 
first demonstration of this effect was provided by Kawakami et al. (2007). They 
found that participants who repeatedly approached photographs of Black people 
and avoided photographs of White people exhibited more positive evaluations of 
Black relative to White people on the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). AA training effects have been observed for a variety 
of stimuli, such as pictures of unfamiliar faces (Woud, Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 
2013), alcoholic drinks (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011), 
unhealthy foods (Zogmaister, Perugini, & Richetin, in press), insects and spiders 
(Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, & Fazio, 2013), or contamination-related objects (Amir, 
Kuckertz, & Najmi, 2013). 
AA training effects resemble EC in that a change in liking occurs as the 
result of a contiguous relation between a neutral stimulus and a valenced event. 
In AA studies the valenced event corresponds to the execution of a valenced 
action (i.e., an approach or avoidance action) rather than the presentation of a 
valenced US. Approach and avoidance are typically considered primitive 
behavioral tendencies that must have come into place very early on in evolution. 
As a result, these actions are often assumed to be tightly linked with an 
impulsive, associative system (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The processes underlying 
AA training effects might thus differ from those involved in EC in that they 
provide a more low-level route to changing stimulus evaluations. That is, AA 
training might change implicit evaluations in a way that circumvents 
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propositional processes and relies entirely on automatic association formation 
processes. In line with this idea, Kawakami and colleagues (2007) observed 
changes in implicit evaluations when participants performed AA training under 
conditions that seriously limited conscious detection of the approached and 
avoided stimuli (i.e., presentation in between two masking stimuli and for a 
duration of 23 ms). The authors concluded that “these effects can occur in a 
largely automatic fashion, outside of participants’ awareness and beyond their 
conscious control” (p. 968).  
Mental Process Accounts of AA Training Effects 
Though the investigation of AA training effects is a recent phenomenon, a 
number of explanations for these effects have been described. First, motivational 
accounts suggest that motivational systems of approach and avoidance mediate 
the relation between AA behavior and stimulus evaluations (Cacioppo, Priester, 
& Berntson, 1993). Theorists have argued that behavior is driven by two distinct 
motivational circuits that direct the deployment of primitive approach and 
withdrawal behavior (Elliot, 2006; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). Because AA 
actions are wired into these motivational systems, performing these actions may 
lead to the activation of these motivational systems which, in turn, may bias the 
evaluative processing of stimuli. Specifically, the processing of positive qualities 
of a stimulus may be facilitated when the approach system is triggered and the 
processing of negative qualities may be facilitated when the avoidance system is 
triggered (Neumann & Strack, 2000). Support for this account has primarily come 
from studies that used a motivation induction procedure such as the enduring 
performance of a specific approach behavior (e.g., arm flexion) or avoidance 
behavior (e.g., arm extension) during stimulus evaluation. For instance, Cacioppo 
and colleagues demonstrated that stimuli are evaluated more positively during 
arm flexion (established by pressing upwards on a table) than during arm 
extension (established by pressing downward on a table). Note that, in contrast 
with typical AA training studies, these studies involved the evaluation of stimuli 
during the long-during performance of specific AA actions (i.e., the performance 
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of arm movements that were assumed to be intrinsically an approach action or 
an avoidance action, but see Eder & Rothermund, 2008). Though AA training 
effects result from repeated pairings of AA actions and stimuli, they can also be 
accounted for from a motivational perspective. For instance, each time a 
stimulus is approached or avoided, this may lead to the co-activation of the 
corresponding stimulus representation and approach or avoidance motivational 
system. Associations may form such that the subsequent presentation of an 
approached stimulus will now trigger the approach system and the presentation 
of an avoided stimulus will trigger the avoidance system, which may facilitate the 
automatic evaluation of the stimulus as positive or negative (Neumann, Förster, 
& Strack, 2003). 
Second, according to the associative self-anchoring account of AA training 
effects, approach behaviors are fundamentally related to pulling objects closer to 
the self (Förster, 2001). As a result, the repeated performance of approach 
behavior in response to a stimulus may allow for the gradual formation of an 
association between positively valenced representations of the self and the to-
be-approached stimulus (Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011). Once 
these associations are established, positive valence may spread to the to-be-
approached stimulus, thereby influencing implicit evaluations of this stimulus 
(Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007).  
Third, some have argued that representations of AA behaviors have 
become associated with representations of positive or negative valence because 
they usually lead to positive or negative outcomes (Woud, Becker, & Rinck, 2008; 
Woud, Maas, et al., 2013). The repeated performance of AA behavior in response 
to a stimulus will lead to co-activation of the positively or negatively valenced 
action representations and representations of the stimulus. As a result, 
associations between these representations are formed and these associations 
will influence implicit evaluation. This explanation accords with typical 
associative explanations of EC to the extent that the repeated presentation of a 
stimulus and a valenced event allows for the gradual formation of evaluative 
associations in memory which drive implicit evaluation (Baeyens et al., 1992).  
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Finally, Eder and Klauer (2009) described a common-coding account of AA 
training effects. This account builds on the assumption that sensory events and 
action events are represented in memory by means of structurally identical 
event codes (Hommel, 2004). During the performance of valenced actions, codes 
of positive or negative valence may be activated. These codes are bound to 
stimulus representations when they are activated at the same time. As a result, 
presentation of an approached or avoided stimulus may lead to the activation of 
valenced codes and evoke an evaluative response in line with the valence of the 
performed action. Similar to the account described by Woud and colleagues the 
common-coding account thus explains AA training effects on the basis of the 
automatic activation of valenced representations during the performance of 
valenced actions and the formation of an association between these 
representation and stimulus representations.   
The other described accounts differ in a number of important ways. For 
instance, whereas the account proposed by Woud and colleagues and the 
common-coding account both assume that the repeated performance of any 
valenced action should produce similar effects, motivational accounts assume 
that effects are restricted to approach and avoidance actions. The self-anchoring 
account, on the other hand, assumes that only the approach actions determine 
AA training effects. Importantly, all described accounts ascribe to one key 
assumption, that automatic association formation processes underlie AA training 
effects. 
The Associative Assumption In Accounts of AA Training Effects 
The assumption that AA training effects arise exclusively as a result of the 
automatic formation of associations in memory is widely present in current 
theorizing but has never been explicitly tested. Moreover, some findings seem to 
provide evidence that contrasts with this assumption. First, several studies have 
failed to show effects of AA training on evaluations of well-known stimuli 
(Becker, Jostmann, Wiers, & Holland, 2015) or even novel stimuli (Vandenbosch 
& De Houwer, 2011). Other studies have found that AA training effects were 
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restricted to certain stimuli (e.g., for face stimuli with neutral but not angry or 
smiling expressions, Woud, Becker, Lange, & Rinck, 2013) or found effects on 
explicit but not implicit evaluation (Huijding, Muris, Lester, Field, & Joosse, 2011). 
These findings contrast with the idea that AA training effects depend on the 
automatic installation of associations. Rather, AA training effects seem to 
depend on subtle boundary conditions that yet have to be specified. For 
instance, whereas Woud et al. (2008) reported that participants who repeatedly 
performed AA movements in response to pictures of faces with neutral 
emotional expressions exhibited an implicit preference for approached faces, 
Vandenbosch and De Houwer (2011) failed to find any evidence for AA training 
effects on evaluations of novel faces in five experiments with similar methods.  
Second, Laham, Kashima, Dix, Wheeler, and Levis (2014) recently provided 
evidence that AA training effects depend on the motivational framing of AA 
actions. When participants repeatedly performed approach or avoidance 
movements in response to novel stimuli, this led to the development of implicit 
evaluations when the actions were contextually framed as collect and discard 
actions within a foraging context. Importantly, no AA training effects were 
observed when contextual framing of AA actions was not elaborated. This 
suggests that it is not the pairing of AA action and stimulus per se that produces 
the effects. Rather, AA training effects may critically depend on certain 
moderators that indicate the involvement of high-level controlled processes. 
Importantly, however, this question has received little or no attention in AA 
training research. 
THE CURRENT PHD THESIS 
In the present project, we aim to learn more about the conditions under 
which AA training causes changes in implicit evaluations. This question is 
relevant for a number of reasons. First, as we previously described, it is often 
assumed that AA training might provide a special, low-level route to changing 
implicit evaluations that circumvents propositional processes and relies entirely 
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on automatic associative processes. The idea that repeatedly approaching or 
avoiding stimuli changes implicit evaluations, fits well with the commonly held 
assumption that associations can be altered only gradually as the result of many 
different experiences. However, it has never been tested whether propositional 
processes play a role in these effects. By studying the effects of AA training on 
implicit evaluations, we could obtain unique information about the scope of 
propositional processes or the nature of associative processes. Second, at 
present, only a handful of studies inform us about whether propositional 
processes can directly influence implicit evaluations, that is, without the 
involvement of associative processes (Hughes et al., 2011). By examining the role 
of propositional and associative processes in the formation of implicit 
evaluations via AA training, we may learn more about the processes underlying 
implicit evaluation in general. Third, because implicit evaluations have such a 
profound impact on behavior, this new information could have important 
practical implications. For example, studies have already provided evidence that 
AA training can be effective in reducing unwanted behaviors such as racial 
prejudice (Kawakami et al., 2007) or can be used in the treatment of pathological 
conditions such as social anxiety (Taylor & Amir, 2012), contamination anxiety 
(Amir et al., 2013), alcohol-dependence (Wiers, Gladwin, & Rinck, 2013), or 
smoking addiction (Wittekind, Feist, Schneider, Moritz, & Fritzsche, 2015). 
In the present project, we focus on two specific questions about when and 
how AA training changes implicit evaluations. First, we examine if and under 
what circumstances AA instructions can influence implicit (and explicit) 
evaluation. Second, we examine the role of contingency awareness in the effects 
of AA training. 
Effects of AA instructions 
The first question we address is whether the acquisition of propositional 
knowledge about stimulus-response contingencies via instructions (i.e., about 
which stimulus is approached and which stimulus is avoided) can lead to typical 
AA training effects. To the extent that propositional processes underlie AA 
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training effects, the acquisition of propositional contingency knowledge may be 
crucial. For instance, participants who acquire stimulus-action contingency 
information may elaborate on this information and infer that the approached 
stimulus is positive and the avoided stimulus is negative. Such inference could 
arise because of the fact that often during their lifetime, good things were 
approached and bad things were avoided. Once participants make this inference 
and form the proposition that the approached stimulus is positive (or that the 
avoided stimulus is negative), this may influence implicit stimulus evaluation, 
either directly (see De Houwer, 2014) or via its influence on explicit evaluations 
(see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  
It is typically assumed that propositions about events can be formed not 
only on the basis of the repeated experience of those events (e.g., the pairing of 
AA action and stimulus) but also as the result of a single instruction or inference 
concerning those events (see De Houwer, 2009; Lagnado et al., 2007; Mitchell et 
al., 2009). Therefore, effects that result from the acquisition of propositional 
contingency information should occur also via mere instructions (see Gast & De 
Houwer, 2012 for a similar reasoning in the context of EC instruction effects). By 
examining to what extent instructions that specify stimulus-action contingencies 
(i.e., AA instructions) may also cause effects on stimulus evaluations we may gain 
important information about the role of propositional processes in AA effects.  
The role of contingency awareness in AA training effects 
The second question we address is whether conscious propositional 
knowledge about stimulus-response contingencies moderates AA training 
effects. Given the important role of contingency awareness for EC and the strong 
resemblance between EC and AA training procedures, contingency awareness 
may be an important factor also for AA training effects. Laham and colleagues 
(2014) recently alluded to this possibility when they suggested that AA training 
effects may depend on the motivational framing of AA actions because 
elaborated framing instructions increase the likelihood that participants become 
aware of the stimulus-action contingencies.  
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The question of (contingency) awareness in AA training effects, however, 
has already been addressed in studies that examined whether subliminal AA 
training causes changes in evaluations (Jones et al., 2013; Kawakami et al., 2007). 
The results of these studies provided evidence that AA training effects can occur 
outside of participants’ awareness of the contingencies in the training task. This 
is an important conclusion because it implies that AA training effects depend on 
processes that do not necessitate awareness (e.g., automatic association 
formation processes). Moreover, such unambiguous evidence in favor of 
unconscious associative learning is scarce (see Mitchell et al., 2009). However, 
given that only few studies have investigated this matter, more research is 
warranted to establish if and under what circumstances AA training causes 
changes in evaluations in the absence of conscious knowledge of stimulus-action 
contingencies. Also, even if contingency awareness might not prove to be 
necessary for AA training effects, it may still be an important moderator. By 
examining the role of contingency awareness in AA training effects we aim to 
learn more about the propositional or associative processes that underlie these 
effects.  
Overview of the empirical chapters 
The current thesis contains four empirical chapters, each of which aims at 
shedding light on the conditions under which AA training and AA instructions can 
produce changes in implicit evaluations. In the first two chapters we focused on 
the question whether implicit evaluations can change as the result of AA 
instructions. The next two chapters investigated to what extent AA training 
effects are moderated by awareness of stimulus-action contingencies. 
In Chapter 2, we examined whether merely instructing participants to 
approach a certain stimulus and to avoid a second stimulus could influence 
implicit (and explicit) evaluations of these stimuli. First, we examined whether 
AA instructions cause changes in implicit evaluations of novel stimuli. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, we informed participants that they would perform a task in 
which they would encounter specific stimuli (novel non-words: Experiment 1, or 
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names of members of two fictitious social groups: Experiment 2). We instructed 
participants to approach one stimulus (e.g., the nonword UDIBNON) by pulling a 
lever towards them and to avoid another stimulus (e.g., the nonword BAYRAM) 
by pushing a joystick away from them. After receiving these instructions, 
participants performed an IAT that was designed to measure implicit evaluations 
of the stimuli they were instructed to approach and the stimuli they were 
instructed to avoid. Experiment 2 also examined effects of AA instructions on 
explicit stimulus evaluations (i.e., self-reported ratings of warmth and liking). In a 
second set of studies we examined whether AA instructions cause changes in 
implicit (and explicit) evaluations of well-known stimuli. More specifically, 
Experiment 3 investigated AA instruction effects on the relative evaluation of a 
social group that participants belonged to (i.e., Flemish people) and a social 
group that Flemish people are prejudiced towards (i.e., Turkish people; see 
Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009). Experiment 4 examined AA instruction effects on White 
people’s evaluations of White people and Black people, in accordance with the 
training-based AA studies by Kawakami et al. (2007). This experiment also 
compared AA instruction effects on evaluations of these well-known social 
groups with effects on evaluations of fictitious social groups. Finally, Experiment 
5 was a replication of Experiment 4 with the exception that a different task was 
used to measure implicit evaluations (i.e., the evaluative priming task, Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). 
Chapter 3 examined whether effects of AA instructions and AA training on 
implicit evaluations are mediated by changes in explicit evaluations. This is an 
important question because it may provide essential information about the 
processes underlying these effects and may constrain mental process models of 
evaluation. For instance, according to dual-process models such as the APE 
model, changes in implicit evaluation as the result of instructions (but not 
training) should necessarily be mediated by changes in explicit evaluation 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). We used two different approaches to 
examine whether instructions to approach or avoid members of fictitious social 
groups and actual AA training can cause a direct effect on implicit evaluation 
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(i.e., unmediated by changes in explicit evaluation). First, we employed statistical 
mediation analyses to test the extent to which the impact of AA instruction and 
AA training on implicit evaluation is mediated by changes in explicit evaluation. 
Second, we took an experimental approach to test the question of mediation by 
manipulating the proposed mediating variable (i.e., changes in explicit 
evaluation). To this end, we provided participants with ‘trait instructions’ that 
should prevent an impact of AA instructions on explicit evaluation. Specifically, 
we asked participants to imagine that the members of one fictitious social group 
had very positive traits and the members of another fictitious social group had 
very negative traits. We expected that participants who received trait 
instructions would not take the AA instructions into account when explicitly 
evaluating the stimuli. We examined whether, under these circumstances, AA 
instructions and AA training would still cause changes in implicit evaluation.  
Chapter 4 investigated the relationship between, on the one hand, effects 
of AA training and, on the other hand, contingency awareness. This study 
employed generally the same procedures as the studies by Woud et al. (2008) 
and Vandenbosch and De Houwer (2011) that provided mixed evidence for 
effects of AA training on evaluations of novel face stimuli. In these studies, 
participants did not receive any information about the stimulus-action 
contingencies. Rather, faces had a subtle brown or red filter placed over them 
and participants were instructed to approach or avoid on the basis of the color of 
the presented face. Unbeknownst to the participants, some stimuli were always 
presented in the to-be-approached color whereas other stimuli were always 
presented in the to-be-avoided color. We examined whether the effects of AA 
training on implicit and explicit evaluations of novel faces that are produced in 
this paradigm depend on participants’ awareness of the contingency between 
face stimulus and AA action. We took both a correlational and an experimental 
approach to address the role of contingency awareness in AA training effects. 
First, we tried to capture participants’ awareness of the experienced face-action 
contingencies by measuring participants’ memory of the relation between faces 
and actions. We compared AA training effects for faces that were correctly linked 
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to the action they were paired with, faces that were linked to the incorrect 
action, and faces for which participants did not remember the correct action. 
Second, we manipulated contingency awareness by providing one group of 
participants with instructions that specified the face-action contingencies 
whereas a second group did not receive these instructions. We examined 
whether this manipulation caused changes in contingency awareness and 
whether these changes affected AA training effects on implicit and explicit 
evaluation. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, we examined whether reliable AA training effects can 
be observed with subliminal stimulus presentations. Experiment 1 was a direct 
replication of the experiment by Kawakami et al. (2007, Exp. 2) that found effects 
of subliminal AA training on implicit evaluations of well-known social groups. In 
Experiment 2, participants received subliminal training to approach or avoid 
novel faces. Before the training, however, participants received either correct or 
incorrect face-action contingency information (i.e., information about which face 
stimulus would be presented with which action during the subliminal AA training 
task). This experimental set-up allowed us to compare effects that are the result 
of subliminal AA training with effects that result from AA instructions. In 
Experiment 3, participants performed an AA training task with supraliminal 
stimulus presentations of two novel non-existing words prior to the performance 
of an AA training task with subliminal presentations of two other non-existing 
words. We compared effects of subliminal and supraliminal AA training and 
examined whether participants’ awareness of the contingencies fuelled the 
effects. 
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Prior research suggests that repeatedly approaching or avoiding a certain 
stimulus changes the liking of this stimulus. We investigated whether these 
effects of approach and avoidance training occur also when participants do not 
perform these actions but are merely instructed about the stimulus–action 
contingencies. Stimulus evaluations were registered using both implicit (Implicit 
Association Test and evaluative priming) and explicit measures (valence ratings). 
In Experiment 1, typical approach and avoidance effects were observed when 
participants were merely instructed to approach or avoid nonwords. In 
Experiments 2 through 5, instruction-based approach-avoidance effects were 
observed also for fictitious social groups, but not for well-known social groups. 
We conclude that instructions to approach or avoid stimuli provide sufficient 
bases for establishing both implicit and explicit evaluations of novel stimuli. We 
discuss several possible reasons for why similar instruction-based approach-
avoidance effects were not found for well-known stimuli. 
                                                      
1
 Based on Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., Gast, A., & Smith, C.T. (2015). Instruction-Based 
Approach-Avoidance Effects: Changing Stimulus Evaluation via the Mere Instruction to Approach 
or Avoid Stimuli. Experimental Psychology, 62, 161–169. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000282. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, it has been argued that there is a bi-directional link 
between attitudes and approach-avoidance motor actions (Neumann, Förster, & 
Strack, 2003). On the one hand, attitudes are thought to determine the speed 
with which people perform approach and avoidance motor actions (Solarz, 1960, 
Chen & Bargh, 1999). On the other hand, the execution of approach and 
avoidance actions during stimulus processing is said to influence attitude 
formation and change (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993). As a result, 
repeatedly approaching a stimulus leads to more positive evaluations of this 
stimulus whereas repeated avoidance leads to more negative evaluations. 
Approach and avoidance (AA) training has been found to influence not only 
explicit (i.e., non-automatic) evaluations of stimuli but also implicit (i.e., 
automatic) evaluations (e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007). In this 
paper, we extend earlier work by exploring the possibility that instructions about 
AA training can impact implicit evaluations without necessitating the actual 
execution of these AA actions. 
A number of studies have provided evidence that AA training influences 
implicit evaluations of novel stimuli such as unknown persons or fictitious social 
groups (e.g., Woud, Becker, & Rinck, 2008; Huijding, Muris, Lester, Field, & 
Joosse, 2011; Slepian, Young, Rule, Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2012; Woud, Maas, 
Becker, & Rinck, 2013; Laham et al., in press). Additionally, Kawakami and 
colleagues (2007) observed effects of AA training on implicit evaluations of well-
known social groups. In a series of studies, they found significant reductions in 
White people’s implicit preference for faces of White people over Black people 
after they had responded with approach actions to photos of Black faces and 
with avoidance actions to photos of White faces. In line with these results, 
typical AA training effects have been reported in studies with other well-known 
stimuli, such as pictures of familiar alcoholic drinks (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, 
& Lindenmeyer, 2011), insects and spiders (Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, & Fazio, 
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2013), or contamination-related objects (Amir, Kuckertz, & Najmi, 2013). Not all 
attempts to find effects of AA training, however, have been successful (e.g., 
Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011), suggesting that there are as yet undiscovered 
boundary conditions (Laham et al., in press; Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011). 
At a mental process level, AA training effects are typically interpreted 
within the framework of embodied cognition. From this perspective, mental 
representations are assumed to be grounded in modality specific systems of 
perception and motor action (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, 
& Ric, 2005). AA processes are given a special status as they are considered 
essential for successful adaptation to the environment. AA behavior supplies 
humans with an adaptive response when encountering stimuli that are 
potentially beneficial or harmful (Elliot, 2006). Embodiment theories assume 
that, as a result of this evolutionary benefit, evaluative processing is closely tied 
to representations of AA behavior. More specifically, they postulate that 
motivational systems of AA mediate the relation between AA behavior and 
stimulus evaluations (Cacioppo et al., 1993). Motivational systems of AA are 
activated automatically during the processing of positive or negative stimuli, 
thereby triggering AA actions (Chen & Bargh, 1999). In turn, because AA actions 
are wired into these motivational systems, performing AA actions also leads to 
the activation of these motivational systems, which can bias the automatic 
evaluative processing of stimuli (Neumann & Strack, 2000). Most important for 
the purposes of our paper, approaching or avoiding a stimulus is assumed to 
have long term effects on the evaluation of that stimulus via the formation of 
associations in memory (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Each time that the stimulus is 
approached or avoided, the corresponding stimulus representation and 
motivational representation are both activated, thereby gradually strengthening 
the association between those representations. Consequently, AA training 
effects are assumed to necessitate a large number of trials in which the AA 
behavior is performed in response to the stimulus (Woud et al., 2008, Phills, 
Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011).  
There are, however, reasons to believe that the standard embodiment 
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theory of AA training is incomplete at best. First, it has been argued that AA 
behavior is not simply hard-wired into motivational systems. Instead, the 
motivational implication of AA responses seems to depend on how these 
responses are coded cognitively (e.g., Eder and Klauer, 2009). For instance, the 
same AA action (e.g., pushing a lever toward a stimulus) can be activated both by 
positive and by negative stimuli depending on how the action is framed (e.g., as 
moving toward the stimulus or as pushing the stimulus away; e.g., Eder & 
Rothermund, 2008). Even the mere planning or anticipation of the AA response 
might result in the activation of motivational representations (e.g., Eder & 
Klauer, 2009; Hommel, 2004). Second, contrary to the standard view that 
associations are formed in a slow, gradual manner, some have argued that 
associations in memory can emerge very quickly, even as the result of mere 
instructions or propositional reasoning (e.g., Fazio, 2007, p. 609; Field, 2006, pp. 
867-868). Likewise, recent non-associative accounts of learning allow for learning 
via the rapid formation of propositions via instructions or inferences (De 
Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Once acquired, these 
propositions might even be activated automatically and hence underlie not only 
explicit but also implicit evaluations (see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes & De Houwer, 
2011). 
Based on these theoretical considerations, we put forward the hypothesis 
that a stimulus does not actually have to be physically approached or avoided in 
order for AA training effects to arise. Instead, the mere instruction to approach 
or avoid a stimulus might suffice to produce changes in the evaluation of that 
stimulus, even its implicit evaluations. 
Although we are the first to examine AA training via instructions, it has 
already been demonstrated that mere instructions about future events can 
influence both implicit and explicit evaluations. For instance, in studies on 
evaluative conditioning (EC) via instructions, De Houwer (2006) told participants 
that they would see trials on which a first neutral stimulus is paired with positive 
pictures and trials on which a second neutral stimulus is paired with negative 
pictures. Despite the fact that the participants never actually saw the stimulus 
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pairings, the instructions did result in a preference for the first neutral stimulus 
over the second one, even on measures of implicit evaluation. Following up on 
this finding, a study by Gast and De Houwer (2013) provided evidence that 
instruction-based EC is moderated by variables that also moderate practice-
based EC. Of course, these findings do not imply that instructions about stimulus-
action contingencies also induce changes in liking, especially because of the 
special motivational significance of actually performing AA responses. 
Nevertheless, if mere instructions about stimulus-stimulus relation can produce 
changes in liking, than it is at least plausible that mere instructions about 
stimulus-action relations also produce changes in liking. 
In our studies, we therefore adapted the instruction-based EC procedure of 
De Houwer (2006) in such a way that participants received instructions about a 
later phase in which they would be asked to approach or avoid stimuli. If we 
could demonstrate instructed AA effects on (implicit) evaluations, it would raise 
a number of interesting issues. Most importantly, it would highlight the 
possibility that at least some instances of AA training effects with actual practice 
are due (in part) to the instructions that participants receive about the stimulus-
action mappings rather than the AA training itself. Hence, demonstrating AA 
effects on the basis of mere instructions would set the stage for a range of new 
questions about whether, when, and how instructions and actual AA practice 
influence evaluation. Examining these questions is bound to have important 
implications for theories of AA training effects, most importantly the relative role 
of the top-down and bottom-up processes that mediate these effects. Note that 
similar issues would need to be addressed also in studies in which instructions do 
not directly link attitude objects with AA responses, such as studies in which 
participants approach or avoid stimuli based on an arbitrary stimulus features 
(e.g., the color or orientation of pictures; see Wiers et al., 2011). Even in these 
studies, participants might gain conscious knowledge about the stimulus-action 
relations and hence effectively instruct themselves about these contingencies. 
Studies in which AA training effects occur in the absence of conscious knowledge 
of the stimulus-action relations would not be affected (e.g., Kawakami et al., 
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2007, Exp. 2) but currently the evidence for such unconscious AA training effects 
is limited at best. 
Demonstrating instruction-based AA effects could also have practical 
implications. If mere AA instructions prove to be effective in changing the 
implicit evaluation of stimuli under certain conditions, they could replace or 
complement actual AA training as an efficient means of inducing implicit 
evaluations (e.g., of novel products) or changing existing implicit evaluations 
(e.g., toward Black people; Kawakami et al., 2007) or addictive behaviors (Wiers 
et al., 2011) or social anxiety (Taylor & Amir, 2012). Of course, much of the 
applied value of AA instructions will depend on how strong and general these 
effects are, but this can be established only by actually examining the power and 
limitations of instruction-based AA effects.  
Although the main aim of our work was to examine whether AA instruction 
can influence implicit and explicit evaluations, we already looked at a first 
potential boundary condition of these effects, being the type of attitude object. 
More specifically, in Experiment 1, we investigated effects on unfamiliar 
nonwords whereas in Experiments 2 through 5 we investigated effects on 
fictitious and well-known social groups. Previous studies suggest that instructions 
might be more effective in changing the implicit evaluations of novel, affectively 
neutral attitude objects than in altering the existing evaluations of known, 
affectively laden attitude objects. For instance, Gregg, Seibt, and Banaji (2006) 
observed that implicit evaluations of novel social groups could be induced quite 
easily on the basis of instructions about the behavior and traits of those groups, 
but could not be undone by giving additional instructions about those groups. 
Although Gregg and colleagues did not manipulate directly whether the attitude 
objects were novel or affect-laden, their results are in line with the common 
sense idea that instructions might not be powerful enough to change existing 
(implicit) evaluations of well-known attitude objects.  




Forty native Dutch-speaking undergraduates (31 women) participated in 
exchange for 4 euros. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and were naive to the purpose of the experiment. 
Apparatus and Materials 
Two nonwords were used as evaluation stimuli, namely ‘BAYRAM’ and 
‘UDIBNON’. These were two of the four stimuli used in the study by De Houwer 
(2006, Exp. 1). We decided to use only two stimuli, in order to reduce the 
possibility that participants would be unable to correctly memorize the 
instructions for all stimuli. During the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998), four positive words (the Dutch words for HAPPY, 
HONEST, NICE, and SINCERE) and four negative words (the Dutch words for 
MEAN, BRUTAL, AGGRESSIVE, and FAKE) were presented as attribute stimuli, in 
addition to the two nonwords, which were used as target stimuli. All words were 
presented in uppercase letters in Arial Black font with font size 36. The 
experiment was programmed and presented using the INQUISIT Millisecond 
Software package (Inquisit 3.0, 2011) on a Tori PC with a 19-inch monitor (120 Hz 
refresh rate), which had a keyboard and a joystick (Wingman attack 2) attached 
to it. 
Procedure  
After participants had given informed consent, they were seated in front of 
a computer screen. Half of the participants read the following instructions 
(translated from Dutch): 
In this experiment, you will see two non-existing words. It is your task to make a 
certain action with the joystick each time you see one of these words. 
If you see the word BAYRAM, you will have to approach it by pulling the joystick 
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towards you each time this word is presented. 
If you see the word UDIBNON, you will have to avoid it by pushing the joystick 
away from you each time this word is presented. 
It is very important that you remember which action you will have to perform 
with each word. You need this information to complete the task successfully. 
Note that this information will not be presented again later on, so remember well 
which word goes together with which action.  
Before we will present the words, you need to complete a reaction time task. This 
will last approximately 10 minutes. Make sure that you do not forget which 
action you will have to perform later on with which word. 
The other participants received identical instructions except that they were 
told that they would have to approach UDIBNON and avoid BAYRAM. 
Participants then pressed the space bar to proceed to the next screen where the 
instructions for the IAT were presented. 
In the IAT, participants categorized positive words, negative words, and 
both nonwords into one of four categories: positive, negative, BAYRAM, or 
UDIBNON by pressing a left (Q) or right (M) key depending on the category of the 
presented word. The name of the categories assigned to the left key in any 
particular phase would always be presented in the left top corner of the screen 
and the name of the categories assigned to the right key would always appear in 
the right top corner. It was counterbalanced across participants which categories 
were assigned to which response in which phase. Half of the participants always 
pressed the left key for positive and the right key for negative words whereas the 
other participants pressed the left key for negative words and the right key for 
positive words. Orthogonal to this manipulation, half of the participants started 
by pressing the left key for the nonword UDIBNON and the right key for the 
nonwords BAYRAM, whereas the other half started with the opposite 
assignment. All participants started with a practice block of 16 trials during which 
both nonwords were each presented eight times. Next came a practice block of 
32 trials during which four positive and four negative words were each presented 
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four times. The practice blocks were followed by two test blocks of 32 trials. 
During each test block, each of the nonwords was presented on eight trials, and 
each of the positive and negative words was presented on two trials. The 
practice block with nonwords was then repeated but the response assignments 
were reversed. Finally, the two test blocks were repeated but this time with the 
reversed response assignment for the nonwords. The order of the trials was 
determined randomly for each block and each participant separately. On each 
trial, a word or nonword was presented in the center of the screen until the 
participant pressed one of the two valid keys (i.e., Q or M). If the response was 
correct, the word disappeared and the next word was presented 400 ms later. If 
the response was incorrect, the word was replaced by a red “X” for 400 ms. The 
next word appeared 400 ms after the red “X” was removed from the screen. 
After the IAT, we assessed whether participants had correctly remembered 
which actions they had to perform with which nonword. They were asked two 
questions: (1) “According to the instructions, what will you have to do when the 
word BAYRAM is presented?”, and (2) “According to the instructions, what will 
you have to do when the word UDIBNON is presented?” Participants chose 
between the words ‘approach’ or ‘avoid’ for each question. The order in which 
the questions were presented was determined randomly for each participant. 
Finally, even though performance on this task was irrelevant for our 
hypotheses, participants performed twenty trials of an AA training task in which 
they were instructed to act as stated in the instructions they had received at the 
start of the experiment. Each of the two nonwords was presented ten times in 
the center of the screen until participants responded by pushing the joystick 
forward or by pulling it backward. This task was included in order not to deceive 
participants in the earlier instructions. 
Results 
The data of two participants were discarded because they did not correctly 
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answer the memory questions.
2
 The IAT score was calculated using the D4 
procedure outlined by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) in a way that 
positive values indicate an implicit preference for BAYRAM over UDIBNON and 
negative values indicate an implicit preference for UDIBNON over BAYRAM. Split-
half reliability of the IAT, computed by correlating IAT D scores from the first half 
of the blocks with scores from the second half, was r(38) = .57. Across groups, 
participants did not display an implicit preference for any of the nonwords (M = 
0.07, SD =0.43), t(37) = 1.02, p = .31. Crucially, a between-groups t-test indicated 
a successful effect of the instructions, t(36) = 2.10, p = .043, d = 0.36 (Figure 1). 
Participants who had been instructed to approach BAYRAM and avoid UDIBNON 
showed a stronger implicit preference for BAYRAM (M = 0.21, SD = 0.50) than 
participants who had been instructed to avoid BAYRAM and approach UDIBNON 
(M = -0.07, SD = 0.30). 
 
Figure 1. Mean IAT D scores indicating an implicit preference for nonword BAYRAM 
over UDIBNON, Niffites names over Luupites names or Flemish names over Turkish 
names, respectively, as a function of instructions, in Experiments 1, 2, and 3.  
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
                                                      
2
 Across all five experiments we observed that, when participants did not correctly 
remember the instructions, they did not show any effects of AA instructions. This suggests that 
knowledge of the stimulus–action contingencies is a necessary condition for instruction-based AA 
effects. This is in line with evidence showing that EC effects are stronger or only existent if 
participants know which US was paired with which CS (see Gast, De Houwer & De Schryver, 
2012). Note that the lack of memory could result from processes involved in the encoding, 
storage, or recall of the contingencies. Importantly, including the data from these participants in 
the analyses did not result in any shift in significance for the effects of AA instructions on novel or 
well-known stimuli. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 1 showed that merely instructing participants to approach or 
avoid certain nonwords leads to more positive evaluations of the nonword they 
were instructed to approach than of the nonword that they were instructed to 
avoid. This effect is in line with typical AA training effects, but it occurred even 
though participants performed the AA training task only after their evaluations 
were probed. Hence, our results demonstrate that the actual execution of AA 
responses is not necessary for AA effects. 
There are important limitations to this study. First, evaluations were only 
probed using an implicit measure. We have no information on whether the 
instructions were also sufficient to change evaluations when probed with explicit 
measures. Second, in previous AA training studies, stimuli were used for which 
AA behavior is more relevant, such as pictures of spiders (Jones et al., 2013) or 
human faces (Taylor & Amir, 2012). Moreover, AA training effects have also been 
observed for evaluations of well-known stimuli. For example, in the study by 
Kawakami and colleagues (2007), participants approached photos of faces that 
could be categorized as belonging to White or Black people and evaluations 
towards these groups were measured. 
EXPERIMENT 2 AND 3 
To deal with the limitations of Experiment 1, we performed two 
experiments investigating effects of AA instructions on implicit and explicit 
evaluations of both novel and well-known stimuli. In Experiment 2, we replicated 
the first experiment with names of fictitious social groups (i.e., names of Niffites 
and Luupites, see Gregg et al., 2006). In Experiment 3, we used a similar 
approach to change evaluations of well-known social groups. In accordance with 
Kawakami and colleagues (2007), we measured changes in the relative 
evaluation of two social groups, namely a social group that participants belonged 
to (i.e., Flemish people) and a social group that Flemish people are prejudiced 
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towards (i.e., Turkish people; see Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were eighty native Dutch-speaking undergraduates. Forty 
participants took part in Experiment 2 (33 women) and forty participants took 
part in Experiment 3 (32 women). None of the participants performed both 
experiments or had previously participated in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except for the following points. 
First, participants were instructed that they would be presented with the names 
of two groups, called Luupites and Niffites. They were told that all the names of 
Luupites have two consecutive vowels in them and end with “lup”. They were 
then shown two examples of Luupites’ names (i.e., Loomalup, Ageelup). 
Subsequently, participants were told that all the names of Niffites would contain 
two consecutive consonants and end with “nif.” Again, this statement was 
followed by two Niffites names (i.e., Borrinif, Kennunif). Next, half of the 
participants were told that they would have to approach each name of a Luupite 
and avoid each name of a Niffite by respectively pulling a joystick towards them 
or pushing a joystick away from them. The other participants were given the 
opposite instruction. Second, in the IAT, the labels LUUPITES, NIFFITES, POSITIVE, 
and NEGATIVE were used. During the practice blocks with names, four Luupites 
names (i.e., Meesolup, Naanolup, Omeelup, Wenaalup) and four Niffites names 
(i.e., Cellanif, Eskannif, Lebbunif, Zallunif) were categorized, each on four 
occasions (i.e., 32 trials in total). During the test blocks, each of the eight names 
and each of the positive and negative words were presented twice (i.e., 32 trials 
in each block). Third, the memory questions were directed at assessing memory 
for whether the instructions linked Niffites or Luupites to either an approach or 
avoidance action. Finally, before the AA training task was performed, 
participants completed two self-report measures tapping into their evaluations 
of Niffites and Luupites (Iyengar, Messing, Hahn, Banaji, & Dial, 2011). 
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Participants completed thermometer ratings of self-reported warmth or cold 
feelings towards Niffites and Luupites on a 9-point Likert scale (1= not 
warm/liked at all; 9 = completely warm/liked). Additionally, participants 
completed two trait ratings. They indicated whether they thought Niffites and 
Luupites were aggressive and friendly on two seven-point Likert scales (1: not 
friendly/aggressive, 7: very friendly/aggressive). 
Experiment 3 followed the same procedure as Experiment 2 with the 
following exceptions. First, participants were instructed that they would be 
presented with names of Turkish and Flemish people. Half of the participants 
were instructed to approach the names of Turkish people and avoid the names 
of Flemish people. The other participants were given the opposite instructions. 
Second, in the IAT, four traditionally Flemish (i.e., Pieter, Bruno, Mark, Steven) 
and four traditionally Turkish names (i.e., Ali, Mohammed, Moustafa, Achmed) 
were used as stimuli in addition to the positive and negative words. Third, as 
explicit measures we used the warmth thermometer measure as well as the 
Overt Racism Scale (ORS). This measure of explicit racial attitudes consists of 
three trait ratings and has been shown to successfully predict prejudiced 
behavior (Iyengar et al., 2011). Participants completed this measure by indicating 
whether they thought Flemish and Turkish people were aggressive, friendly and 
lazy on seven-point Likert scales. 
Results 
Experiment 2 
The data of four participants who did not correctly answer the memory 
questions were discarded. The IAT difference score (i.e., the D4-score) was 
calculated in a way that positive values indicated an implicit preference for 
Niffites over Luupites and negative values indicated an implicit preference for 
Luupites over Niffites. Split-half reliability was r(36) = .17. The IAT scores 
indicated that overall participants did not display a significant implicit preference 
for either Niffites or Luupites (M = -0.07, SD =0.35), t(35) = -1.14, p = .26. 
Crucially, a between-groups t-test revealed a significant effect of the instructions, 
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t(34) = 2.06, p = .047, d = 0.33 (Figure 1). Participants who had been instructed to 
approach Niffites and avoid Luupites had a stronger implicit preference for 
Niffites (M = 0.06, SD = 0.39) than participants who had been instructed to avoid 
Niffites and approach Luupites (M = -0.17, SD = 0.27). 
The explicit evaluations were collapsed into two scores. The warmth score 
signified the difference in warmth feelings for Niffites and Luupites and was 
calculated by subtracting each participants’ warmth score rating for Luupites 
from the score for Niffites. The trait rating score was calculated by subtracting 
the ratings for friendliness and the inverted ratings for aggressiveness of 
Luupites from the corresponding ratings for Niffites and averaging the resulting 
difference scores. The internal consistency of this measure was moderate 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .58). Positive values for the warmth and trait rating scores 
indicate a preference for Niffites over Luupites and negative scores indicate a 
preference for Luupites. Both measures revealed a significant preference for 
Luupites (warmth score: M = -1.58, SD = 2.49, t[35] = -3.82, p = .001; trait rating: 
M = -0.60, SD =1.40, t[35] = -2.56, p = .015). Importantly, we found a significant 
instruction effect for both the warmth score (approach Niffites: M = -0.19, SD = 
2.14; approach Luupites: M = -2.70, SD = 2.20), t(34) = 3.45, p = .002, d = 1.16, 
and the trait rating score (approach Niffites: M = 0.03, SD = 1.53; approach 
Luupites: M = -1.10, SD = 1.08), t(34) = 2.59, p = .014, d = 0.85. That is, 
participants who had been instructed to approach Luupites and avoid Niffites 
preferred Luupites more than participants who were instructed to approach 
Niffites and avoid Luupites. 
Experiment 3 
All participants correctly remembered which action they had to perform 
with names from each group. The IAT score was calculated in a way that positive 
values indicated a preference for Flemish over Turkish names. In line with earlier 
prejudice literature (e.g., Kawakami et al., 2007) positive values indicate an 
implicit prejudice towards the prejudiced group (i.e., Turkish people). Split-half 
reliability of the IAT was r(40) = .43. An analysis of the IAT performance 
demonstrated that participants displayed a strong implicit preference for Flemish 
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names over Turkish names (M = 0.65, SD = 0.43), t(39) = 9.60, p < .001. Crucially, 
an independent-samples t-test did not indicate a significant effect of the 
instructions, t(38) = -0.84, p = .41, d = -0.26 (Figure 1). Participants who had been 
instructed to approach Flemish names (M = 0.59, SD = 0.50) did not prefer 
Flemish people more than participants who were instructed to approach Turkish 
names (M = 0.71, SD = 0.35). 
The explicit evaluations were collapsed into two scores, a warmth score 
and a trait rating (ORS) score. The internal consistency of the ORS score was 
moderate (Cronbach’s Alpha = .55). For the ORS and warmth score, positive 
numbers indicate an explicit preference for Flemish people. As expected, both 
scores revealed a preference for Flemish people (warmth score: M = 1.53, SD = 
1.81, t[39] = 5.32, p < .001; ORS score: M = 0.73, SD = 0.93, t[39] = 5.00, p < .001). 
However, we found no significant difference due to the instructions that 
participants had received, neither on the warmth score (approach Flemish: M = 
1.90, SD = 1.92; approach Turkish: M = 1.15, SD = 1.66, t[38] = 1.32, p = .19, d 
=0.42), nor on the ORS score (approach Flemish: M = 0.95, SD = 1.01; approach 
Turkish: M = 0.52, SD = 0.81, t[38] = 1.50, p = .14, d = 0.47). 
Discussion 
The data of Experiment 2 show that evaluations towards fictitious social 
groups can be readily induced by instructing participants to approach or avoid 
members of the group. Whereas Experiment 1 examined an AA instruction effect 
only on implicit but not explicit evaluations of novel stimuli, in Experiment 2, the 
results showed that both implicit and explicit evaluations of fictitious social 
groups were influenced by the instructions to approach or avoid names of group 
members. This is an important extension from Experiment 1, because it indicates 
that instructions to approach or avoid novel stimuli operate similarly when 
participants consider novel social groups as when they consider novel words. In 
contrast, in Experiment 3 we did not observe an instruction effect for implicit or 
explicit evaluations of well-known social groups. That is, no evidence was found 
that participants who were instructed to approach or avoid names of Turkish or 
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Flemish people had changed their prejudice towards Turkish people as a result of 
these instructions. In fact the direction of the non-effect was opposite for 
implicit as compared to explicit measures. 
There are a number of possible explanations for not observing an 
instruction effect on evaluations of well-known social groups in Experiment 3. 
First, evaluations of these groups might be more resistant to change due to the 
prior knowledge people have about these stimuli (e.g., Cacioppo, Marshall-
Goodell, Tassinary, & Petty, 1992; Priester, Cacioppo, & Petty, 1996). In line with 
this, EC effects are generally larger for neutral CSs than for valenced CSs 
(Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). Second, it is 
possible that an effect of evaluations was not observed due to a lack of power in 
this experiment. Indeed, performing a power analysis revealed that the achieved 
power for revealing a medium or small effect was low (i.e., for a medium effect: 
power = 0.46; for a small effect: power = 0.15). This is important because in 
practice-based AA training studies, the observed effects are typically of small or 
medium size (e.g., Kawakami et al., 2007; Phills et al., 2011). Moreover, these 
studies have provided evidence that implicit prejudice is changed only when 
participants are trained to approach members of the prejudiced group and avoid 
members of the group that participants belong to, and not when participants are 
trained to avoid members of the prejudiced group and approach members of the 
group that participants belong to (Kawakami et al.). Additionally, Wennekers 
(2013) observed that only highly prejudiced people are influenced by approach 
training. It is possible that the number of strongly prejudiced participants in the 
approach Turkish condition might have been too small to observe any effect in 
Experiment 3. 
EXPERIMENT 4 
In order to obtain more power and directly compare the effect of AA 
instructions on the evaluation of novel and well-known socials groups, we ran a 
new study that involved a large number of participants who were assigned to 
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either a condition with novel socials groups or well-known social groups. A priori 
power analyses indicated that, to detect a small effect (i.e., effect size d = 0.20; 
see Cohen, 1992) with sufficient power (power > .75) approximately 270 
participants needed to be included in each between-subjects condition. We were 
able to recruit this high number of participants by implementing our study on the 
internet. Performing this study in a larger sample also allowed us to subdivide 
the sample based on different kind of criteria to gain additional information 
about the scope of instruction-based AA effects. To this end, we asked 
participants to indicate whether they had inferred that the purpose of the 
experiment was to change their attitudes and to what extent they believed that 
performing this experiment might have changed their attitudes. This allowed us 
to investigate whether, in line with AA training studies (e.g., Kawakami et al., 
2007), effects can be observed even in subgroups of participants who do not 




Participants were 949 visitors of the Project Implicit research website (618 
women, mean age = 34.44, SD = 13.84). Participation was restricted to United 
States citizens. 91 participants (9.6%) were either African American or of mixed 
Black-White race. In line with the study by Kawakami and colleagues (2007), their 




All participants were randomly assigned to either the condition with 
fictitious social groups (i.e., Niffites and Luupites) or the condition with well-
known social groups (i.e., Whites and Blacks). Similar to Experiment 2, in the 
                                                      
3
 In both Experiments 4 and 5, including the data of participants who were Black or of 
mixed White-Black race did not significantly change the data pattern. Including a ‘race’ variable in 
the ANOVA’s did reveal an additional effect of race on implicit and explicit evaluations for 
participants in the Whites/Blacks condition, Fs > 11, ps < .002. That is, participants of Black or 
mixed White-Black race had less implicit and explicit preference for White names. 
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Niffites/Luupites condition one group of participants was instructed to approach 
names of Niffites and avoid names of Luupites and a second group was 
instructed to approach names of Luupites and avoid names of Niffites. Similar to 
Experiment 3, in the Whites/Blacks condition one group was instructed to 
approach typical names of members of a social group they belong to (i.e., White 
people) and avoid typical names of members of a group that people of the group 
participants belong to are known to be prejudiced towards (i.e., Black people). 
The second group received reversed instructions (i.e., to approach names of 
Black people and avoid names of White people). 
In comparison to the previous experiments, a number of adaptations were 
made to the procedure. First, the IAT procedure was altered in two ways. If 
participants made an error, a red “X” appeared on the screen and the participant 
had to correct their mistake in order to continue. Latencies were recorded until a 
correct response was made. Also, in the Whites/Blacks condition the names that 
were used in the IAT were five prototypical names of Black people (i.e., Darnell, 
Leroy, Terrence, Tyrone, Jerome) and five prototypical names of White people 
(i.e., Alfred, Hank, Edmund, Wilbur, Marty). These names were matched on word 
familiarity in a US-sample and have been used in previous studies on implicit 
prejudice (Ottaway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001). Second, the explicit measure that 
participants completed consisted of four ratings. Participants in the 
Niffites/Luupites condition indicated the extent to which they liked and had 
warm feelings for Niffites and Luupites, and participants in the Whites/Blacks 
condition completed these ratings for Black and White people. Third, after 
completing the memory test, participants answered three additional questions. 
Specifically, participants indicated whether they thought that the purpose of the 
experiment was to change their attitude towards the social groups. 
Subsequently, participants indicated when they first started thinking that this 
was a purpose of the experiment (i.e., when reading the AA instructions, when 
performing the IAT, or when completing the explicit measure). Finally, 
participants indicated to what extent they believed that performing this 
experiment could have changed their attitude towards the social groups on a 5-
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point Likert scale. Fourth, the approach and avoidance training task was adapted 
to ensure that also participants who did not possess a joystick would be able to 
participate. During this task participants pushed away names by pressing the up 
arrow on the keyboard (i.e., avoided) and pulled names towards them by 
pressing the down arrow on the keyboard (i.e., approached). A zoom effect 
enhanced the visual experience of approaching or avoiding. 
Results 
Data preparation 
Data from 83 participants (10.7%) who did not fully complete all questions 
and tasks were not included in the analysis. Additionally, in line with our previous 
experiments, the data of 171 participants (Niffites/Luupites: 19.0 %, 
Blacks/Whites: 22.2 %) who did not correctly answer the memory questions 
were discarded. 
The IAT-scores were calculated using the D2-algorithm (Greenwald et al., 
2003). This procedure is very similar to the D4-algorithm with the distinction that 
the D2-algorithm takes into account that participants had to self-correct their 
errors. In line with standard analyses of Project Implicit IAT scores (e.g., Smith, 
De Houwer, & Nosek, 2013), data from 25 participants (3.9%) were dropped 
because of error rates above 30% across the entire task, or above 40% for any 
one of the four critical blocks. After removing participants based on the previous 
two criteria, there were no additional participants who needed to be removed 
because of completing more than 10% of trials faster than 400ms. The analyses 
were performed on the data of 625 participants (i.e., 271 in the Niffites/Luupites 
condition and 352 in the Whites/Blacks condition). Split-half reliability of the IAT 
score was r(271) = .63 for participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition and 
r(352) = .53 for participants in the Whites/Blacks condition. 
The responses on the explicit measures were collapsed into two scores. 
The rating scores (i.e., warmth score and liking score) were calculated by 
subtracting the score rating for Luupites/Blacks from the corresponding score 
rating for Niffites/Whites. Positive scores indicate a preference for 
56  CHAPTER 2  
Niffites/Whites. 
Performance on implicit and explicit measure in Niffite/Luupite condition 
Analysis of the IAT scores indicated that participants preferred Luupites 
over Niffites (M = -0.14, SD =0.52), t(270) = -4.29, p < .001. Crucially, a between-
groups t-test revealed a significant effect of the instructions, t(269) = 7.98, p < 
.001, d = 0.97 (Figure 2). When participants had been instructed to approach 
Niffites and avoid Luupites, the former was preferred (M = 0.08, SD = 0.51), 
t(139) = 1.98, p = .050, and when participants had been instructed to avoid 
Niffites and approach Luupites, the latter was preferred (M = -0.37, SD = 0.43) , 
t(130) = -9.90, p < .001. 
 
Figure 2. Mean IAT D scores indicating an implicit preference for Niffites names over 
Luupites names or names of Whites over names of Blacks, respectively, as a function of 
instructions, for participants who correctly remembered instructions in Experiment 4. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
The explicit liking score revealed a significant preference for Luupites (M = -
0.31, SD = 2.34, t[270] = -2.18, p = .03), whereas no significant difference was 
observed on the warmth score (M = -0.22, SD = 2.47, t[270] = -1.47, p = .14). 
Between-groups t-tests revealed a significant instruction effect both on the 
warmth score (approach Niffites: M = 0.66, SD = 2.21; approach Luupites: M = -
1.16, SD = 2.40), t(269) = 6.49, p < .001, d = 0.79, and the liking score (approach 
Niffites: M = 0.51, SD = 2.06; approach Luupites: M = -1.19, SD = 2.31), t(269) = 
6.42, p < .001, d = 0.78). 
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Performance on implicit and explicit measure in Whites/Blacks condition 
Analysis of the IAT performance replicated previous research on implicit 
prejudice (e.g., Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000), demonstrating 
that participants displayed a strong implicit preference for Whites (M = 0.42, SD 
= 0.40) , t(353) = 20.14, p < .001. Crucially, a significant main effect of 
instructions could not be observed, t(352) = 0.01, p = .99, d < 0.01 (Figure 2). 
Participants who had been instructed to approach Whites and avoid Blacks did 
not have a significantly different degree of implicit prejudice (M = 0.42, SD = 
0.36) compared with participants who had been instructed to avoid Whites and 
approach Blacks (M = 0.42, SD = 0.43). 
The warmth score revealed a preference for Whites (warmth score: M = 
0.25, SD = 1.51), t(353) = 3.18, p = .002, whereas the liking score did not reveal 
such a preference (M = 0.08, SD = 1.27), t(353) = 1.13, p = .26. Importantly, a t-
test did not reveal a significant main effect of instructions for the liking score 
(approach Whites: M = 0.08, SD = 1.33; approach Blacks: M = 0.06, SD = 1.22) or 
the warmth score (approach Whites: M = 0.27, SD = 1.52; approach Blacks: M = 
0.24, SD = 1.50), ps > .87, ds < 0.02. 
Additional analyses 
First, additional analyses corroborated that the instruction effect for 
participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition was significantly larger compared 
with participants in the Blacks/Whites condition. Second, correlational analyses 
indicated that the scores on the explicit and implicit measures were significantly 
correlated for participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition as well as for 
participants in the Whites/Blacks condition. Third, analyses including 
participants’ answers on the hypothesis awareness questions indicated no 
impact of hypothesis awareness. A large effect of AA instructions in the 
Niffites/Luupites condition was observed even if participants did not think that a 
purpose of the experiment was to change their attitudes. More details on these 
analyses are available in Appendix. 
Discussion 
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Despite an increased power for detecting also small effects (i.e., power = 
.60 to detect an effect size of d = 0.20), we found no evidence that AA 
instructions changed evaluations of well-known social groups. In contrast, the 
data provide convincing further evidence that being instructed to approach or 
avoid fictitious social groups influences evaluative responses towards members 
of these groups. 
Experiment 4 also provided evidence that the instruction-based AA effect 
for evaluations of fictitious groups is not dependent on whether people correctly 
identify the purpose of the experiment. This indicates that, in line with practice-
based AA training (e.g., Kawakami et al., 2007), participants do not need to be 
aware that the manipulation (i.e., the task to approach or avoid stimuli) was 
supposed to have an impact on their evaluations (i.e., impact awareness; see 
Gawronski, Hofmann & Wilbur, 2006) for the effect to arise. 
EXPERIMENT 5 
Most studies investigating AA training effects on implicit evaluations have 
used the IAT as the measurement tool of implicit evaluations (e.g., Kawakami et 
al., 2007; Phills et al., 2011). However, when other tasks are used, AA training 
has not always produced clear effects (e.g., Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011). 
Therefore, it can be argued that AA training effects on implicit evaluations and 
instruction-based effects in particular, are due to specific properties of the IAT. In 
Experiment 5, we investigated instruction-based AA effects by using a different 
task to measure implicit evaluations, namely the evaluative priming task (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 773 visitors (519 women, mean age = 39.53, SD = 14.38) 
to the Project Implicit research website. Participation was restricted to United 
States citizens. Seventy participants (9.1%) were either African American or of 
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mixed Black-White race. Their data were not included in the analyses. 
Procedure 
The procedure of this experiment was identical to that of Experiment 4, 
with the only exception that participants performed an evaluative priming task 
instead of an IAT. Before the start of the evaluative priming task, participants 
were told that words would appear one after the other on the screen. They were 
instructed that their task was to categorize the words they saw as either "Good" 
or "Bad" using the ‘E’ and ‘I keys of a computer keyboard and to try to do this as 
quickly as possible, while making as few mistakes as possible. Participants were 
instructed that they would see names presented before the words and told that 
they can watch the names, but that their task was simply to respond to the good 
and bad words. Then participants were shown a list of the 14 positive and 14 
negative words that they would have to categorize. During all trials, the labels 
‘”bad” and “good” appeared in the left and right upper corners of the screen, 
respectively. A single trial consisted of a fixation cross presented in white for 500 
ms, a blank screen for 500 ms, a prime for 200 ms, a post-prime pause for 50 ms 
and the presentation of a target word in white font for 1500 ms. The inter-trial 
interval was set to vary randomly between 500 ms and 1500 ms. There were four 
types of trials in both conditions. Each type of trials was presented on 1/4
th
 of 
the trials. In the Niffites/Luupites condition the types of trials were trials with the 
word Niffite as prime and a positive word as target, trials with the word Niffite 
and a negative target, trials with the word Luupite and a positive target, or trials 
with the word Luupite and a negative target. In the Blacks/Whites condition the 
primes were the five prototypical names of Black people and the five 
prototypical names of White people that were used in the previous study. Note 
that in the Niffites/Luupites condition the prime was always either the word 
‘Niffite’ or the word ‘Luupite’ and not the exemplars that were used in the 
previous experiment. We expected that, if participants would not be able to 
learn the categorization rule from the first instruction, participants would not 
categorize the exemplar primes as Niffites/ Luupites in the evaluative priming 
task. As this would make the task an invalid measure of implicit evaluations of 
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the groups Niffites and Luupites, we decided to use the category labels as 
primes. In contrast, in the Blacks/Whites condition, names of Black people and 
White people were used as primes. We expected that participants would have no 
difficulty categorizing these names due to previous experience with these 
names. We did not use the words ‘Black’ and ‘White’ as prime (i.e., the category 
labels) because the names ‘Black’ and ‘White’ are very familiar last names in the 
US that can apply to both Black and White people (e.g., Barry White).  
The types of trials consisted of trials with a typical White name as prime 
and a positive word as target, trials with a White name and a negative target, 
trials with a Black name and a positive target, or trials with a Black name and a 
negative target. Participants first completed eight practice trials (two of each of 
the four types of trials) and then completed 120 trials separated into three 




In line with Experiment 4, data from 22 participants (3.2 %) who did not 
fully complete all tasks and questions were discarded as well as the data of 100 
participants (Niffites/Luupites: 13.0 %, Blacks/Whites: 16.6 %) who did not 
correctly answer the memory questions. 
To calculate the evaluative priming score, trials with an incorrect response 
were dropped (7.7 %) as well as any trials on which reaction times were at least 
2.5 standard deviations removed from an individual’s mean for that type of trial. 
A first difference score was created for each participant in the Niffites/Luupites 
condition by subtracting mean latencies for Niffites-positive trials from mean 
latencies for Niffites-negative trials. A second difference score was created in the 
same way for Luupites-trials such that, in both cases, higher scores indicate more 
positive evaluations for the group. Finally, the evaluative priming score was 
constructed by subtracting the difference score for Luupites-trials from the 
difference score for Niffites trials. A positive score indicates a preference for 
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Niffites. For participants in the Whites/Blacks condition the same procedure was 
used to construct an evaluative priming score that indicates a preference for 
Whites. Data from 37 participants (6.5 %) who made a substantial number of 
errors (i.e., more than 2.5 standard deviations over the population mean) in the 
evaluative priming task were dropped. The analyses were performed on the data 
of 533 participants (i.e., 257 in the Niffites/Luupites condition and 286 in the 
Whites/Blacks condition). A correlation between the priming scores for the first 
and second block of 60 trials indicated a split-half reliability of r(257) = .38 for 
participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition and r(286) = .29 for participants in 
the Whites/Blacks condition. 
Performance on implicit and explicit measure in Niffite/Luupite condition 
Analysis of the evaluative priming scores indicated no significant 
preference for either Niffites or Luupites (M = 3.14, SD =72.61), t(256) = 0.69, p = 
.49. A between-subjects t-test revealed an effect of instructions, t(255) = 4.26, p 
< .001, d = 0.59 (Figure 3). When participants had been instructed to approach 
Niffites and avoid Luupites, the former was preferred (M = 22.03, SD = 62.77), 
t(126) = 3.96, p < .001, and when participants had been instructed to avoid 
Niffites and approach Luupites, the latter was preferred (M = -15.32, SD = 76.94), 
t(129) = -2.27, p = .025. 
 
Figure 3. Mean evaluative priming scores indicating an implicit preference for Niffites 
names over Luupites names or names of Whites over names of Blacks, respectively, as 
a function of instructions, for participants who correctly remembered instructions in 
Experiment 5. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Both the warmth score and the liking score did not reveal a significant 
preference for any of the two groups (warmth score: M = -0.05, SD = 2.92, t[256] 
= -0.26, p = .80; liking score: M = -0.08, SD =2.86, t[256] = -0.46, p = .65). 
However, both the warmth score and the liking score indicated a significant 
instruction effect (warmth score: approach Niffites: M = 1.13, SD = 2.89; 
approach Luupites: M = -1.19, SD = 2.46, t[255] = 6.94, p < .001, d = 0.86; liking 
score: approach Niffites: M = 1.01, SD = 2.76; approach Luupites: M = -1.15, SD = 
2.53, t[255] = 6.51, p < .001, d = 0.81). 
Performance on implicit and explicit measure in Whites/Blacks condition 
Analysis of the evaluative priming task indicated a preference for Whites 
(M = 16.21, SD = 58.57), t(275) = 4.60, p < .001. The between-subjects t-test did 
not reveal a significant main effect of instructions, t(274) = 0.69, p = .49, d = 0.08 
(Figure 3). Participants who had been instructed to approach Whites and avoid 
Blacks did not have a significantly different degree of implicit prejudice (M = 
18.51, SD = 58.83), compared with participants who had been instructed to avoid 
Whites and approach Blacks (M = 13.67, SD = 58.39). 
The warmth score and liking score did not reveal a significant preference 
for Whites (warmth score: M = 0.04, SD = 1.32, t[275] = 0.46, p = .65; liking score: 
M = 0.02, SD = 1.09, t[275] = 0.28, p = .78). Also, a t-test did not reveal a 
significant main effect of instructions for the liking score (approach Whites: M = 
0.09, SD = 1.08; approach Blacks: M = -0.06, SD = 1.10) or the warmth score 
(approach Whites: M = 0.06, SD = 1.19; approach Blacks: M = 0.01, SD = 1.45), ps 
> .25, ds < 0.14. 
Additional analyses 
Correlational analyses and analyses on the impact of hypothesis awareness 
revealed a similar data pattern as observed in Experiment 4 (see Appendix). 
Discussion 
The data of this experiment provide evidence that instruction-based AA 
changes are not restricted to explicit measures and performance on the IAT. As 
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shown in the previous experiments on explicit measures and on IAT data, 
Experiment 5 shows that also effects in the priming data critically depend on the 
type of stimulus that was used. Effects were clearly present in evaluations of 
fictitious groups but not in evaluations of well-known social groups. To further 
corroborate this conclusion, we conducted a combined MANOVA on implicit and 
explicit measures of both Experiments 4 and 5, providing us with sufficient 
power for detecting small effects (i.e., power = .85 to detect an effect size of d = 
0.20). This analysis revealed the significant instruction effect on implicit 
measures and explicit measures in the Niffites/Luupites group, F(3,576) = 36.93, 
p < .001, whereas an instruction effect was not observed in the Blacks/Whites 
group, F(3,720) = 0.26, p = .85. We conclude that AA instructions influence 
evaluations of fictitious social groups, but not of well-known social groups. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In five experiments, we compared evaluations of stimuli that participants 
were instructed to either approach or avoid. Our data show that typical AA 
training effects (i.e., a preference for approached stimuli over avoided stimuli) 
can be observed even if participants do not have to perform the AA actions. 
Specifically, when participants were instructed to approach nonwords or the 
names of members of fictitious social groups, their evaluations of these 
nonwords or social groups were more positive than evaluations of stimuli they 
were instructed to avoid. These findings were consistently observed across five 
experiments when evaluations were measured with an explicit self-report 
measure as well as when two different implicit measures were used (IAT and 
evaluative priming), suggesting that these effects were not due to measurement-
related factors or demand compliance. In addition, our data revealed a clear 
boundary condition for effects of AA instructions. That is, consistent evidence 
was found that AA instructions are not sufficient to change evaluations of well-
known social groups. 
As we noted in the introduction, demonstrating instruction-based AA 
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effects raises a number of issues for future research. Most notably, it highlights 
the need to carefully separate the effects of instructions and actual practice and 
to document when and how both instructions and practice exert an impact on 
stimulus evaluations. However, we believe that the current results already have 
a number of theoretical and practical implications. In the remainder of this 
section, we first discuss both the implications of our finding that AA instructions 
do influence the (implicit) evaluation of novel attitude objects. Afterwards, we 
discuss the implications of the fact that AA instructions do not seem to influence 
the evaluation of well-known attitude objects. 
The presence of instruction-based AA effects for novel stimuli 
Implications for theories of approach-avoidance training 
From an embodiment perspective, it has been argued that performing AA 
actions activates congruent motivational orientations. As such, repeatedly 
approaching or avoiding a stimulus is assumed to result in the gradual formation 
of an association between the activated motivational state and the stimulus 
representation, which leads to a change in the evaluation of the stimulus 
(Cacioppo et al., 1993). Whereas early motivational accounts assumed that AA 
behavior activates motivational systems of AA via the proprioceptive feedback 
that this behavior produces, this strong embodiment view (i.e., the view that 
embodiment effects require actual proprioceptive feedback from motor 
behavior) has been largely abandoned (see Neumann & Strack, 2000). Theories 
of embodied cognition currently assume that AA effects result from an interplay 
between perceptual and motor representations and representations of the self 
(Markman & Brendl, 2005). This is in line with recent evidence suggesting that 
the automatic link from evaluation to AA behavior crucially involves 
representations that encode distance change (see Krieglmeyer, De Houwer & 
Deutsch, 2013), rather than the activation of specific muscle groups and that AA 
training effects have been observed when the AA training task involved 
repeatedly pressing a button to increase or decrease the distance between a 
stick figure and the stimulus (e.g., Huijding et al., 2013; Woud et al., 2013). 
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Performing these distance change responses is assumed to activate the 
motivational state of approach or avoidance, resulting in associative transfer of 
valence to the stimulus (Woud et al., 2013). In contrast to this view, our data 
suggest that AA effects do not necessitate performing any distance change 
responses nor perceiving distance change. Rather, merely telling participants 
that they will somehow have to approach or avoid a (type of) stimulus is 
sufficient to immediately change the evaluation of this stimulus. To account for 
instruction-based AA effects it seems necessary for motivational accounts to 
postulate that the mere thought of the action (i.e., the anticipation of the 
responses’ sensory consequences) activates similar representations as the 
movement itself, thereby triggering the motivational system of AA and causing 
immediate changes in evaluation. 
The most prominent alternative explanation for AA training effects is the 
common-coding account (Eder & Klauer, 2009; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben 
& Prinz, 2001), which implies that affective features of objects and actions are 
cognitively represented by means of identical affective codes. When actions are 
construed as having a specific evaluative meaning, affective codes are activated, 
and these affective codes can be transferred to stimuli that are processed in 
relation to this action. Though there is extensive evidence suggesting that the 
movement compatibility effect (i.e., the finding that participants perform AA 
movements faster in response to a stimulus with congruent valence) depends on 
cognitive representations of the action rather than on actual behavior (e.g., Eder 
& Rothermund, 2008), our results extend this research by providing evidence 
that AA training effects might also critically depend on action representations 
rather than the actual performance of behavior. Thus, finding instruction-based 
AA effects is compatible with the common-coding account because this theory 
assumes that affective action codes are activated also during action planning. As 
a result, merely receiving instructions about the action-stimulus link might lead 
to similar effects as AA training (i.e., biased affective processing of stimuli). 
On the other hand, our findings also put important constraints on a 
common-coding account. First, our results suggest that typical AA effects can be 
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observed even when there are no repeated occasions on which action and 
stimulus are presented concurrently. From the common-coding perspective, 
merely being instructed to approach a certain group would only briefly lead to 
shared codes between action and stimulus. To explain instruction-based AA 
effects this account needs to stipulate how these short-term overlaps can 
transfer to a completely new task. Second, because participants were not 
informed how they would have to perform this approach and avoidance 
behavior it is less likely that effects resulted from mentally simulated action (i.e., 
mental practice). This suggests that, if effects originate from shared valence 
codes, these valence codes must have been activated via the activation of task 
representations at an abstract level, rather than via representations of specific 
actions.  
In sum, the observation of instruction-based AA effects challenges current 
views on AA training and puts important constraints on these theories. It 
highlights the possibility that (a) motivational or evaluative representations can 
be activated by the mere anticipation of an AA response rather than the actual 
execution of the response and (b) associations involving motivational or 
evaluative representations can be formed instantly as the result of instructions. 
Implications for theories of attitude formation 
Our results confirm that, in line with instruction-based EC effects, implicit 
and explicit evaluations can result not only from extended training but also from 
mere instructions about relations in the environment (e.g., Gast & De Houwer, 
2012). These results cannot be easily explained by single-process association 
formation models or dual-process models that assume that (a) associations 
underlie implicit evaluations and (b) that these associations can only form 
gradually as the result of repeated experiences (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez & 
Van den Bergh, 1992; Baeyens, Eelen & Crombez, 1995). Our findings are 
especially striking given that effects of AA training on implicit evaluations are 
typically interpreted as stemming from gradual changes in associations (e.g., 
Phills et al., 2011) that necessitate a substantial amount of training. Our data 
provide evidence that propositional information (at least partially) influences 
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these effects that are considered prototypical examples of effects that result 
from automatic processing in an associative system (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
We propose that our results fit best with single-process propositional 
models of attitude formation (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Hughes et al., 2011). In 
these models, the impact of stimulus pairings on evaluative responses is 
mediated by the formation of propositions. It is assumed that propositions can 
be formed not only on the basis of experience, but also on the basis of 
instructions or inferences (De Houwer, 2009). Again, our findings constrain these 
models. Most importantly, we observed that AA instructions influenced not only 
explicit but also implicit evaluation. The latter finding can be explained only by 
single-process propositional models that allow for the automatic retrieval of 
propositional knowledge from memory (see Hughes et al., 2011, for a 
discussion). 
Note, however, that our data do not fully exclude the possibility that 
associations underlie instruction-based AA effects. Some have argued that such a 
single pairing could induce an association between the stimulus on the one hand 
and a representation of the action and its evaluative meaning on the other hand 
(e.g., Fazio, 2007; Field, 2006). Likewise, dual-process models which claim that 
both associations and propositions underlie evaluations could explain 
instruction-based AA effects provided that propositional knowledge (as gained 
via instructions) can lead to the formation of associations (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2011). 
In sum, the fact that AA instructions can lead to changes in explicit and 
implicit evaluation contradicts a significant subset of all possible single-process 
associative and dual-process models (i.e., those models which postulate that 
implicit evaluation is mediated by associations that form gradually as the result 
of many experiences). Our findings also put important constrains on any current 
or future model of attitude formation. 
Implications for the role of impact awareness in attitude change 
Our studies provide the first demonstration that instructions about a 
behavior-stimulus link can impact implicit and explicit evaluations. Importantly, 
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in contrast with EC instructions, which contain clear information that stimuli will 
be paired with valenced stimuli (De Houwer, 2006), in AA instructions, valence is 
not explicitly mentioned. In practice-based AA training studies, participants 
typically state that they were unaware that approaching or avoiding a stimulus 
was designed to change their evaluation (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1993; Kawakami 
et al., 2007). In line with this, in Experiments 4 and 5, we found that only a small 
number of participants (i.e., less than 21%) identified the link between the 
instructions and evaluation change. Moreover, when participants did not believe 
that the experiment was designed to change their attitudes, a robust instruction-
based AA effect could still be observed. These data provide evidence that an 
instruction-based influence on liking does not necessitate impact awareness (i.e., 
knowledge of the impact that the instructions are supposed to have on their 
attitude). This is an important addition to previous research on effects of 
instructions. 
The absence of instruction-based AA effects for well-known stimuli 
An important limitation of AA instructions seems to be that changes in 
evaluations of well-known social groups cannot be readily induced through this 
procedure. In contrast, a number of practice-based AA training studies have 
demonstrated an effect on implicit evaluations of well-known stimuli (Amir, et 
al., 2013; Phills et al., 2011; Wiers et al., 2011; Kawakami et al., 2007, Jones et al., 
2013). If instructions are indeed insufficient to change established evaluations 
this would seriously constrain practical implications (e.g., the possibility of 
changing maladaptive evaluations) of AA instructions. However, to account for 
this apparent difference between instruction-based and practice-based AA 
effects, a number of explanations can be proposed. First, the difference could 
result from procedural details that differed between the current study and 
practice-based AA training studies, other than that the AA behavior was not 
performed. For example, in comparison with the study by Kawakami and 
colleagues, we instructed participants to approach or avoid more abstract 
stimuli, that is, the names of group members. This type of stimulus might be less 
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relevant for the motivational circuit of AA behavior than the more concrete 
stimuli that were used in Kawakami’s study (i.e., faces of members of the social 
groups). Note, however, that this explanation is at odds with our observation of 
large instruction effects for abstract novel stimuli across five experiments. 
Second, changes in evaluations of well-known stimuli might be more 
difficult to obtain than changes in evaluations of novel stimuli (see also Hofmann 
et al., 2010), and AA instructions might simply not be potent to produce such 
changes. Association formation models typically suggest that changing 
evaluations of well-known stimuli is more difficult because association formation 
is easier than changing previous associations (Gregg et al., 2006). Alternatively, in 
line with a propositional point of view, it has been argued that adding new 
propositions to an existing set of propositions might result in less attitude change 
than creating new propositions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Therefore, it 
is possible that practice-based AA training does produce effects on evaluations of 
well-known stimuli because, in addition to propositional knowledge about 
stimulus-action contingencies, it adds something to the effects (e.g., it gives the 
new association or proposition more power due to the repeated experience). 
However, two types of evidence go against this explanation. First, the effect size 
of instruction-based AA effects on novel stimuli was larger than typical practice-
based AA training effects, suggesting that, at least for this type of stimulus, 
practice-based AA training is not more potent to produce effects. Second, we 
observed that participants’ implicit evaluations were more positive for Luupites’ 
than for Niffites’ names in Experiment 4. This observation is consistent with 
previous evidence suggesting that humans tend to evaluate stimuli automatically 
and as a result, novel stimuli are very often initially valenced (Perugini, Richetin 
& Zogmaister, 2012). Consequently, these findings propose that instruction-
based AA effects do not necessitate novel stimuli that are fully neutral. 
Third, for stimuli that have already acquired a specific valence, such as 
names of Black and White people, AA instructions might lead to changes in 
evaluations that are opposite to typical AA training effects, in addition to typical 
effects of AA training. Indeed, AA training can sometimes produce atypical 
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effects (i.e., increased liking for avoided stimuli and reduced liking for 
approached stimuli), depending on the type of stimuli that participants approach 
or avoid (see Centerbar & Clore, 2006). These effects have been explained by 
postulating that approaching a disliked object can result in aversive motivational 
incongruity, thereby exacerbating the dislike. In the present study, participants 
who were instructed to approach names of Black people might experience this 
incongruity, resulting in increased prejudice. Compared with practice-based AA 
training this process might have been stimulated to a larger extent because 
participants were explicitly instructed to remember the instructions carefully, 
thereby making the stimulus-action relation more salient (Jones et al. ,2013). The 
instruction based manipulation might thus have (partially) counteracted the 
effect that is typically observed in AA training studies on prejudice, namely that 
participants who approach the prejudiced group display less prejudice 
(Kawakami et al., 2007; Phills et al., 2011). This account can also provide an 
explanation for the observation that, in Experiments 4 and 5, implicit and explicit 
evaluations had significantly lower correlations for participants instructed to 
approach Blacks than for participants instructed to approach Whites. Such a 
pattern could be expected if evaluations were changed in the approach Blacks 
group in line with their prejudice for some participants, but contrary to their 
prejudice for other people, and if implicit and explicit measures detect these 
changes to a different extent. Interestingly, in Experiment 4, a similar 
correlational pattern was observed for participants in the Niffites/Luupites 
condition. That is, correlations between implicit and explicit evaluations were 
non-significant only for participants who were instructed to approach the group 
that is liked less (i.e., the Niffites). This raises further questions about the 
boundary conditions of AA training and AA instructions in particular that should 
be addressed in future studies. 
Concluding remarks 
In this study we found evidence that instructions to approach or avoid can 
influence both implicit and explicit evaluations. These findings provide insight 
INSTRUCTION-BASED APPROACH-AVOIDANCE EFFECTS  71 
into the mechanisms underlying effects of AA training and open up important 
new questions about when and how avenues for understanding how evaluations 
can be formed and changed by means of instructions and actual AA training. Our 
results already reveal an important boundary condition of AA instruction effects, 
namely that AA instructions seem to have little effect on the evaluation of verbal 
information. However, explanations for this effect need to take into account that 
changes in liking for well-known groups were not easily induced with AA 
instructions in this study. Future research should investigate effects for 
evaluations of other well-known stimuli and provide a direct comparison 
between instruction-based and practice-based AA effects to distinguish the 
mechanisms that underlie effects of AA training. 
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APPENDIX  
Additional Analyses for Experiment 4 
First, we examined whether the instruction effect that we observed for 
participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition was significantly larger compared 
with participants in the Blacks/Whites condition. We performed an Instructions 
(approach Niffites/Whites vs approach Luupites/Blacks) x Condition 
(Niffites/Luupites vs Whites/Blacks) Multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) on IAT and 
explicit measure scores. In addition to the main effect of Instructions, F(3,619) = 
23.39, p < .001, and Condition, F(3,619) = 88.87, p < .001, we observed a 
significant interaction effect, F(3,619) = 22.96, p < .001. This interaction effect 
indicated a larger instruction effect for participants in the Niffites/Luupites 
condition than for participants in the Whites/Blacks condition and was observed 
on the IAT score and on both explicit measures, ps < .001. 
Second, we performed a correlational analysis for participants in both 
conditions. The scores on the explicit and implicit measures were significantly 
correlated for participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition (i.e., warmth and 
liking score: r[271] = .84, p < .001; IAT score and warmth score: r[271] = .35, p < 
.001 ; IAT score and liking score: r[271] = .39, p < .001) as well as for participants 
in the Whites/Blacks condition (i.e., explicit measures: r[354] = .55, p < .001; IAT 
score and warmth score: r[354] = .16, p = .002 ; IAT score and liking score: r[354] 
= .15, p = .006). Additional analyses revealed that correlations between implicit 
and explicit measures were significantly larger for participants who were 
instructed to approach Whites than for participants who were instructed to 
approach Blacks and that correlations were significantly larger for participants 
who were instructed to approach Luupites than participants who were instructed 
to approach Niffites. Because evidence suggests that AA training impacts implicit 
prejudice to a different degree for participants who approach the prejudiced 
group compared to participants who approach the group that participants 
belong to (e.g., Kawakami et al., 2007; Wennekers, 2013), we performed 
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separate correlations for the participants who had been instructed to approach 
Whites and participants who had been instructed to approach Blacks. This 
analysis revealed that implicit and explicit prejudice measures were correlated in 
the approach Whites condition (i.e., IAT score and warmth score: r[176] = .23, p = 
.002 ; IAT score and liking score: r[176] = .26, p = .001), but not in the approach 
Blacks condition (i.e., IAT score and warmth score: r[178] = .11, p = .16 ; IAT score 
and liking score: r[178] = .04, p = .56). We subsequently compared the 
correlational coefficients for the two groups (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The 
difference between the two groups’ correlational coefficients of IAT and liking 
score was statistically significant, Z = 2.11, p = .035. The difference between the 
correlational coefficients of IAT and warmth score was not significant, Z = 1.15, p 
= .25. Performing separate correlations for participants instructed to approach 
Niffites and participants instructed to approach Luupites also revealed a different 
pattern. Implicit and explicit measures were correlated in the approach Luupites 
condition (i.e., IAT score and warmth score: r[131] = .36, p < .001 ; IAT score and 
liking score: r[131] = .40, p < .001), but in the approach Niffites condition only IAT 
score and liking score were significantly correlated (r[140] = .18, p = .037), 
whereas IAT score and warmth score were not (r[140] = .10, p = .23). The 
difference between the two groups’ correlational coefficients was statistically 
significant (IAT and warmth score: Z = 2.25, p = .024; IAT and liking score: Z = 
1.97, p = .049). 
Third, we compared the instruction effect for participants who indicated 
that they thought that a purpose of the experiment was to change their attitudes 
towards the social groups (Niffites/Luupites: 57.6%, Whites/Blacks: 31.9%) and 
participants who did not indicate this. Additionally, we included the time when 
participants first believed that a purpose of the experiment was to change their 
attitudes (Niffites/Luupites: during the AA instructions: 20.7%, during the IAT: 
31.4%, after the IAT or never: 47.9%; Whites/Blacks: during the AA instructions: 
16.1%, during the IAT: 12.4%, after the IAT or never: 71.5%) in the analysis as 
well as participants’ ratings about their belief that the experiment could have 
changed their attitudes (Niffites/Luupites: M = 2.2, SD = 1.1; Whites/Blacks: M = 
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1.6, SD = 0.9). Most importantly, these analyses revealed no impact of the first 
and second hypothesis awareness factor. For participants in both the 
Niffites/Luupites and Blacks/Whites conditions, main and interaction effects of 
the first hypothesis awareness factor (i.e., whether participants thought that a 
purpose of the experiment was to change their attitudes towards the social 
groups) and timing factor were not significant, ps > .44. Participants in the 
Niffites/Luupites condition still displayed an instruction effect if they did not 
think that a purpose of the experiment was to change their attitudes on the IAT 
score, t(113) = 5.00, p < .001, d = 0.97, and on both explicit measures, ps < .001. 
However, participants’ belief ratings (i.e., rating about whether the experiment 
changed their attitude) were related to the instruction effect, such that the 
preference for the approached group was larger for participants who had higher 
belief ratings. This effect was observed only for participants in the Niffites/ 
Luupites condition, and only on liking ratings, F(1,268) = 9.42, p = .002, and 
warmth ratings, F(1,268) = 6.85, p = .009, but not IAT scores, F(1,268) = 0.02, p = 
.88. 
Finally, we performed mediational analyses with the lavaan package 
(version 0.5-16; Rosseel, 2012) to investigate the relationship between implicit 
and explicit evaluative change. In the Niffites/Luupites condition we observed 
that changes in implicit evaluations were partly mediated by corresponding 
changes in explicit evaluations, Z = 3.55, p < .001. However, the effect of AA 
instructions on implicit evaluations remained significant after controlling for 
explicit evaluations, Z = 6.17, p < .001. Similarly, changes in explicit evaluations 
were partly mediated by corresponding changes in implicit evaluations, Z = 3.81, 
p < .001, yet the effect of AA instructions on explicit evaluations remained 
significant after controlling for implicit evaluations, Z = 3.98, p < .001. In the 
Whites/Blacks condition no direct or indirect effects of instructions were 
observed, Zs < 1.06, ps > .27. 
Additional Analyses for Experiment 5 
First, we performed an instructions (approach Niffites/Whites vs. approach 
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Luupites/Blacks) x condition (Niffites/Luupites vs. Whites/Blacks) MANOVA on 
evaluative priming and explicit measure scores. In addition to the main effect of 
instructions, F(3,527) = 19.26, p < .001, we observed a significant interaction 
effect, F(3,527) = 15.32, p < .001. This interaction effect indicated a larger 
instruction effect for participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition than for 
participants in the Whites/Blacks condition and was observed on the evaluative 
priming score and on both explicit measures, ps < .005. 
 Second, a correlational analysis of the implicit and explicit measures 
revealed that the scores on the implicit and explicit measures were significantly 
correlated for participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition (i.e., warmth and 
liking score: r[257] = .95, p < .001; evaluative priming score and warmth score: 
r[257] = .15, p = .018 ; evaluative priming score and liking score: r[257] = .13, p = 
.039). For participants in the Whites/Blacks condition correlations were 
significant, except for the correlation between warmth score and the implicit 
measure score (i.e., explicit measures: r[276] = .57, p < .001; evaluative priming 
score and warmth score: r[276] = .06, p = .34; evaluative priming score and liking 
score: r[276] = .14, p = .023). In line with Experiment 1, implicit evaluations were 
significantly correlated with explicit evaluations in the approach Whites 
condition (i.e., evaluative priming score and warmth score: r[145] = .22, p = .007; 
evaluative priming score and liking score: r[145] = .19, p = .021), but not in the 
approach Blacks condition (i.e., evaluative priming score and warmth score: 
r[131] = -.09, p = .29; evaluative priming score and liking score: r[131] = .07, p = 
.40). The difference between the two groups’ correlational coefficients was 
significant for the IAT and warmth score, Z = 2.58, p = .010, but not for the IAT 
and liking score, Z = 1.00, p = .32. Separate correlations for participants 
instructed to approach Niffites and participants instructed to approach Luupites 
did not reveal significant differences between correlations, ps > .55. 
Third, we compared the instruction effect for participants who thought 
that a purpose of the experiment was to change their attitudes towards the 
social groups (Niffites/Luupites: 46.9%, Whites/Blacks: 20.7%) and participants 
who did not believe this. Additionally, we included the time when participants 
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first believed that a purpose of the experiment was to change their attitudes 
(Niffites/Luupites: during the instructions: 20.6%, during the evaluative priming 
task: 22.2%, after the evaluative priming task or never: 57.2%; Whites/Blacks: 
during the instructions: 11.6%, during the evaluative priming task: 7.2%, after the 
evaluative priming task or never: 81.2%) in the analysis as well as participants’ 
ratings about their belief that the experiment could have changed their attitudes 
(Niffites/Luupites: M = 2.0 , SD = 1.1; Whites/Blacks: M = 1.5, SD = 0.7). For 
participants in both the Niffites/Luupites and Blacks/Whites conditions, main and 
interaction effects including the first two hypothesis awareness factors were not 
significant, ps > .49. Also, participants in the Niffites/Luupites condition still 
displayed an instruction effect on the evaluative priming score, t(133) = 2.62, p = 
.010, d = 0.45, and on both explicit measures, ps < .001, if they had indicated that 
they did not think that a purpose of the experiment was to change their 
attitudes. However, participants’ belief ratings were related to the instruction-
based AA effect for participants in the Niffites/ Luupites condition. We observed 
an effect of belief on liking ratings, F(1,321) = 3.88, p = .050, warmth ratings, 
F(1,321) = 7.44, p = .007, and evaluative priming scores, F(1,254) = 7.99, p = .005.  
Finally, mediational analyses indicated that changes in implicit evaluations 
in the Niffites/Luupites condition were not significantly mediated by 
corresponding changes in explicit evaluations, Z = 0.81, p = .42. The effect of AA 
instructions on implicit evaluations remained significant after controlling for 
explicit evaluations, Z = 3.60, p < .001. Similarly, changes in explicit evaluations 
weren’t significantly mediated by corresponding changes in implicit evaluations, 
Z = 0.80, p = .42, and the effect of AA instructions on explicit evaluations 
remained significant after controlling for implicit evaluations, Z = 6.53, p < .001. 
In the Whites/Blacks condition no direct or indirect effects of instructions were 
observed, Zs < 0.67, ps > .50. 
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INSTRUCTING IMPLICIT PROCESSES: WHEN 
INSTRUCTIONS TO APPROACH OR AVOID 





Previous research has shown that linking approach or avoidance actions to 
novel stimuli through mere instructions causes changes in the implicit evaluation 
of these stimuli even when the actions are never performed. In two high-powered 
experiments (total N = 1147), we examined whether effects of approach-
avoidance instructions on implicit evaluations are mediated by changes in explicit 
evaluation. Participants first received information about the evaluative properties 
of two fictitious social groups (e.g., Niffites are good; Luupites are bad) and then 
received instructions to approach one group and avoid the other group. We 
observed an effect of approach-avoidance instructions on implicit but not explicit 
evaluations of the groups, even when these instructions were incompatible with 
the previously obtained evaluative information. These results indicate that 
approach-avoidance instructions allow for unintentional changes in implicit 
evaluations. We discuss implications for current theories of implicit evaluation. 
                                                      
1
 Based on Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., Gast, A., Smith, C. T., & De Schryver, M. (2016). 
Instructing Implicit Processes: When Instructions to Approach or Avoid Influence Implicit but not 
Explicit Evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 63, 1-9. doi:  
10.1016/j.jesp.2015.11.002 
3
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INTRODUCTION 
The way in which humans evaluate stimuli as good or bad has long been a 
central research topic in various sub-disciplines of psychology (Allport, 1935). In 
contemporary research on evaluations, researchers often contrast deliberate, 
explicit evaluations and spontaneous, implicit evaluations (see De Houwer, 
2009a; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). Typically, theorists have postulated 
distinct underlying processes, with explicit evaluations resulting from belief-
based processes that involve the validation of propositional information, and 
implicit evaluations being the product of processes involving the automatic 
activation of associations in memory (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011, 
2014). 
Given the unique relation between implicit evaluations and behavior 
(Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009), it is vital to understand how 
implicit stimulus evaluations are acquired and can be changed. Because implicit 
evaluation is traditionally attributed to the activation of associations between 
representations in memory and because associations are typically thought to 
develop gradually over many experiences, it is sometimes assumed that implicit 
evaluations of stimuli arise exclusively as the result of repeated experiences, 
such as recurrent pairings of physical stimuli (Rydell & McConnell, 2006). 
Evaluative conditioning (EC) research provides ample evidence that changes in 
the implicit evaluation of a stimulus (conditioned stimulus; CS) occur when it is 
paired with a valenced stimulus (unconditioned stimulus; US; for a review see 
Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). Moreover, research 
on approach and avoidance (AA) training has suggested that changes in implicit 
evaluations can be obtained by pairing a stimulus with a valenced action (i.e., 
approach or avoidance). Typically, the repeated approaching of one stimulus and 
avoiding of another stimulus leads to more positive implicit evaluations for the 
former stimuli (e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Woud, Maas, 
Becker, & Rinck, 2013; but see Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011). 
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Recent research has, however, shown that implicit evaluations change 
even when pairings are not experienced directly, but are implied by the verbal 
presentation of relational information via instructions. For instance, studies on 
instructed EC have shown that changes in the implicit evaluation of a CS occur 
when verbal instructions link a CS with a valenced US even when the CS-US 
pairings are not experienced directly (De Houwer, 2006; Gast & De Houwer, 
2012). Similarly, in a recent study we observed typical AA training effects when 
participants did not actually perform AA actions, but were merely instructed that 
they would later have to perform these actions (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, & 
Smith, 2015). That is, participants who received instructions to approach one 
fictitious social group (e.g., Niffites) and avoid another fictitious social group 
(e.g., Luupites) showed a preference for the former group both on implicit 
measures (i.e., the Implicit Association Test, IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwarz, 1998; and the evaluative priming task, Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986) and explicit measures of evaluation. 
These findings pose a challenge to associative and dual-process models of 
evaluation which assume that implicit evaluations result from the gradual 
formation of associations in memory as the result of actual pairings (Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). In contrast, contemporary dual-
process models in which association formation processes can interact with 
propositional learning processes allow one to explain effects of instructions on 
implicit evaluations. For instance, the Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) 
model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 2011; 2014) postulates that 
associations may sometimes arise as the result of the generation and validation 
of propositions. More specifically, when people determine in a propositional 
manner that a stimulus is either positive or negative this may instigate the 
proactive construction of new associations between representations of the 
stimulus and representations of positivity or negativity. As a result, any 
information that allows participants to consciously entertain the proposition that 
a stimulus is positive or negative may influence implicit evaluations. In line with 
this idea, changes in implicit evaluations have been observed when participants 
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are provided with information about the valenced properties of a stimulus 
(Castelli, Zogmaister, Smith & Arcuri, 2004; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; 
Whitfield & Jordan, 2009; Cone & Ferguson, 2015). 
Importantly, these models predict a specific pattern of mediation such that 
instruction effects on explicit evaluation should mediate effects on implicit 
evaluation (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Case 4). That is, instructions 
should first influence whether participants consider a stimulus positive or 
negative (which is reflected in explicit evaluations) before this may lead to the 
formation of novel associations (which is reflected in implicit evaluations). 
Support for this idea was found by Whitfield and Jordan (2009), who observed 
that receiving information about the behavior of unknown individuals caused 
changes in implicit evaluations of these individuals that were fully mediated by 
changes in explicit evaluations. 
Contrasting this result, our previous study on AA instruction effects 
provided evidence that changes in explicit evaluations do not fully mediate 
effects of AA instructions on implicit evaluations. Statistical mediation analyses 
indicated that the impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluations was partly 
mediated by changes in explicit evaluations, but an effect remained after 
controlling for changes in explicit evaluation (Van Dessel et al., 2015). This is an 
intriguing finding because it suggests that mere (AA) instructions may sometimes 
cause unintentional changes in (implicit) stimulus evaluations. Instructions may 
have a direct effect on implicit evaluation (i.e., unmediated by changes in explicit 
evaluation) and may therefore cause changes in implicit evaluations even when 
participants do not consider the instructions as a valid basis for their (explicit) 
evaluation. 
However, on the basis of the available evidence it is premature to conclude 
that AA instructions can influence implicit evaluation without any mediation by 
changes in explicit evaluation. Most importantly, our earlier AA instruction study 
(Van Dessel et al., 2015) included only statistical analyses of mediation. This 
measurement-of-mediation approach, however, is ultimately correlational in 
nature, and is thus problematic for establishing a causal chain (Spencer, Zanna, & 
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Fong, 2005). This is especially the case when examining patterns of mediation 
between implicit and explicit evaluations. When a manipulation affects both 
implicit and explicit measures of evaluation, the particular direction of the 
obtained mediation pattern is strongly influenced by the internal consistency of 
the employed measure (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). Moreover, when 
implicit and explicit evaluations are strongly correlated (as was the case in our 
previous study), this creates multicollinearity which inflates the standard error of 
all variables in the mediation model and compromises the estimation of the 
indirect effect (Alin, 2010). Hence, when examining mediation of implicit and 
explicit evaluations, it is strongly recommended to supplement statistical 
mediation analyses with experimental manipulations (De Houwer, Gawronski, & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2013). This is particularly true if, as in our case, a theoretical 
debate requires the precise understanding of the causal relation. 
In the current studies, we used both a statistical and an experimental 
approach to test the extent to which the impact of AA instructions on implicit 
evaluation is mediated by changes in explicit evaluation. We manipulated the 
proposed mediating variable (i.e., changes in explicit evaluation) by providing 
participants with ‘trait instructions’ that should prevent an impact of AA 
instructions on explicit evaluation. In line with Gregg et al. (2006), we asked 
participants to imagine that the members of one fictitious social group had very 
positive traits and the members of another fictitious social group had very 
negative traits (e.g., Niffites are peaceful, civilized, benevolent, and law-abiding; 
Luupites are violent, savage, malicious, and lawless). Subsequently, participants 
received instructions to approach or avoid these social groups. Whereas trait 
instructions directly specify the evaluative properties of the social group, AA 
instructions only provide evaluative information if participants infer that the task 
to approach or avoid members of a group tells something about the evaluative 
properties of that group. Participants might rely on this inference when they 
have no other information about the evaluative properties of the group, but 
even then they will probably be aware that this inference rests on shaky grounds. 
Prior research indeed suggests that participants are likely to refrain from using 
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information that has a low diagnostic validity (such as AA instructions) when 
more valid information (such as instructions about evaluative traits) is available 
(Lynch, 2005; Cone & Ferguson, 2015). For these reasons, we expected that 
participants who received trait instructions would not take the AA instructions 
into account when explicitly evaluating the stimuli. We examined whether, under 
these circumstances, AA instructions would still cause changes in implicit 
evaluation. That is, we examined whether an AA instruction effect on implicit 
evaluation would be observed not only in the absence of mediation by changes 
in explicit evaluation, but even when there is no impact on explicit evaluation. 
The latter result would not only confirm that AA instructions can have a direct 
effect on implicit evaluation (because mediation via changes in explicit 
evaluation can occur only if there are changes in explicit evaluation) but would 
also support the novel conclusion that this direct effect can arise even when 
participants do not have the intention to use the AA instructions for evaluating 
the stimuli. 
If we would find that AA instructions influence implicit evaluation in the 
absence of (mediation by) changes in explicit evaluation, this is bound to have 
important theoretical implications. First, it would strongly constrain current and 
future models of (implicit) evaluation. For instance, it would contradict dual-
process models that assume that (1) only directly experienced repeated pairings 
can influence implicit evaluations (Smith & DeCoster, 2000), and it would 
contradict dual-process models that assume that (2) instructions can only 
influence implicit evaluation via the mediation of explicit evaluation (Gawronski 
& Bodenhausen, 2006). To accommodate these findings, dual-process accounts 
would need to make additional assumptions (e.g., that strong associations can 
form as the result of a single pairing of a valenced word and a stimulus even in 
the absence of changes in explicit evaluation). 
Finding an impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluation but not on 
explicit evaluation would also constrain single-process propositional models of 
evaluation (De Houwer, 2009b; 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). 
These models postulate that both implicit and explicit evaluations arise 
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exclusively as the result of propositional processes. Prima facie, these models 
seem less equipped to explain dissociations between implicit and explicit 
evaluations (e.g., a change in implicit evaluation in the absence of a similar 
change in explicit evaluation). However, dissociations do not necessarily mean 
that different processes underlie these different types of evaluation. Rather, 
dissociations may arise because implicit and explicit measures of evaluation are 
differentially sensitive to the truth evaluation of propositional information. For 
example, when participants are told that a specific stimulus has to be 
approached, they might consider the possibility that this stimulus is good 
because it has to be approached. If this newly formed proposition can be 
activated automatically (e.g., in the sense of unintentional) then it may influence 
implicit evaluation even when the proposition is not considered valid (De 
Houwer, 2014). In contrast, explicit evaluation may be more contingent on the 
outcome of truth validation processes. 
Second, finding an AA instruction effect on implicit but not explicit 
evaluation would provide valuable information about the mechanisms that 
specifically underlie the acquisition of evaluations by means of AA training, that 
is, by means of the repeated actual performance of approach and avoidance 
responses. Currently, there is ample evidence that training-based effects involve 
changes in implicit evaluation that are not mediated by changes in explicit 
evaluations (Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009). These findings 
have typically been interpreted as evidence that training directly influences 
processes of association formation. However, these effects might also reflect the 
acquisition of propositional information that specifically influences implicit 
evaluation (e.g., because it allows for the automatic activation of propositions) 
but not explicit evaluation (e.g., because the information is not considered a 
valid basis for evaluation). If we observe an impact of AA instructions on implicit 
but not explicit evaluations, this would support the idea that propositional 
information can indeed influence implicit evaluations independently of changes 
in explicit evaluation. 
We conducted two experiments to investigate whether the impact of AA 
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instructions on implicit evaluations is mediated by changes in explicit evaluation. 
In Experiment 1, half of the participants first received instructions that specified 
the traits of the fictitious social groups. Subsequently, participants received 
instructions to approach the names of members of one of the social groups and 
avoid the names of members of the second social group. For half of the 
participants, these AA instructions were supplemented with actual AA training. 
We then assessed implicit and explicit evaluations of the social groups. With this 
design, two tests are possible of the hypothesis that AA instructions allow for a 
direct influence on implicit evaluation. First, it can be tested whether AA 
instructions influence implicit evaluations even after statistically controlling for 
changes in explicit evaluations. Second, it can be tested if AA instructions 
influence implicit evaluations even if trait instructions prevent the effects of AA 
instructions on explicit evaluations. To investigate this issue, we supplemented 
standard significance tests with Bayesian analyses. Bayesian analyses were 
performed according to the procedures outlined by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, and Iverson (2009). These procedures provide a Bayes Factor (BF) that 
gives an indication of how strongly the data support either the null hypothesis 
(BF0; reflecting the absence of a significant effect) or the alternative hypothesis 
(BF1; reflecting the presence of a significant effect). BFs smaller than 1, between 
1 and 3, between 3 and 10, respectively designate ‘no evidence’, ‘anecdotal 
evidence’, and ‘substantial evidence’, for either the null or the alternative 
hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961). We examined whether, in the presence of trait 
instructions, AA instructions do not cause changes in explicit evaluation (i.e., 
analyses provide substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, BF0 > 3) yet still 
cause changes in implicit evaluation (i.e., analyses provide substantial evidence 
for the alternative hypothesis, BF1 > 3). 
In Experiment 2, all participants received trait instructions and 
subsequently received either AA instructions that were compatible with these 
instructions (e.g., instructions to approach Niffites when participants had been 
asked to imagine that Niffites have positive traits), AA instructions that were 
incompatible with these instructions (e.g., instructions to avoid Niffites when 
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participants had been asked to imagine that Niffites have positive traits), or no 
AA instructions. We examined whether changes in implicit evaluations arise in 
the absence of changes in explicit evaluations when AA instructions are 
compatible with the trait instructions (and thus strengthen the previously 
acquired evaluations) or when they are incompatible with the trait instructions 
(and thus revise the previously acquired evaluations). 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants and Design 
In Experiment 1, 1121 English-speaking volunteers participated online via 
the Project Implicit research website (https://implicit.harvard.edu). We 
employed a 2 (Presence of Trait instructions: yes, no) x 2 (Content of AA 
Instructions: approach Niffites, approach Luupites) x 2 (Presence of AA Training: 
yes, no) between-subjects design (Table 1). Data-exclusion involved removing 
participants who (a) did not fully complete all questions and tasks (257 
participants; i.e., 22.9%), or (b) made at least one error on the memory questions 
that probed memory for valence or AA instructions (189 participants; i.e., 21.9 
%).
1
 After removing participants based on the previous two criteria, there were 
no additional participants who needed to be removed because of IAT error rates 
above 30% across the entire task, or above 40% for any one of the four critical 
blocks (Smith, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2013). Analyses were performed on the data 
of 675 participants (440 women, mean age = 32, SD = 13).  
 
                                                      
1 
We excluded participants with incorrect memory because we expected that, in line with 
previous results (Van Dessel et al., 2015), instructions would impact evaluations only if 
participants correctly remembered these instructions. Importantly, including the data from all 
participants in the analyses weakened the main effect of Content of AA Instructions and the main 
effect of Content of Trait instructions on implicit and explicit evaluations, but did not result in any 
shift in significance for any of the reported effects. 
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Table 1.  
Experimental Design of Experiment 1. 
3 between participants variables: 
Trait Instructions AA instructions AA training 
  Approach Niffites (12.5%) Yes (6.25%) 
No (6.25%) 
 Niffites are 
good (25%) 
  
  Approach Luupites (12.5%) Yes(6.25%) 
No (6.25%) 
Present (50 %)    
  Approach Niffites (12.5%) Yes (6.25%) 
No (6.25%) 
 Niffites are 
bad (25 %) 
  
  Approach Luupites (12.5%) Yes (6.25%) 
No (6.25%) 
  Approach Niffites (25%) Yes (12.5%) 
No (12.5%) 
Absent (50%)  
(50%) 
   
  Approach Luupites (25%) Yes (12.5%) 
No (12.5%) 
Procedure 
All participants were first familiarized with the two fictitious social groups 
(i.e., Luupites and Niffites). They read that all the names of Luupites have two 
consecutive vowels in them and end with “lup”. Then they were shown two 
examples of Luupites’ names (i.e., Loomalup, Ageelup). Subsequently, 
participants read that all the names of Niffites would contain two consecutive 
consonants and end with “nif.” This statement was followed by two Niffites 
names (i.e., Borrinif, Kennunif). 
 Half of the participants were then given trait instructions. Similar to Gregg 
et al. (2006), participants were asked to imagine that these two social groups 
actually exist and to suppose that the two groups have very different characters. 
They were instructed that one group ‘are very good people; they are peaceful, 
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civilized, benevolent, and law-abiding, whereas the other group ‘are very bad 
people; they are violent, savage, malicious, and lawless.’ Participants were also 
instructed to suppose that the two groups consistently behave in ways that 
justified these descriptions when they interact with each other and with other 
groups. Participants were asked to try and keep clear in their minds which group 
is which and which group possesses which characteristics as they would later be 
asked questions about the groups. Half of the participants who received trait 
instructions learned that Niffites are good and Luupites are bad, whereas the 
other half received instructions that conveyed the idea that Luupites are good 
and Niffites are bad. 
Subsequently, all participants received AA instructions. Half of the 
participants were told that they would have to approach each name of a Luupite 
and avoid each name of a Niffite. The other participants were given the opposite 
instruction. These AA instructions were followed by the information that we 
would later on explain exactly how they would be able to perform these actions, 
but that for now it was very important to remember which action they would 
have to perform with each type of name as they would need this information to 
complete the task successfully. 
  Following the AA instructions, only half of the participants actually 
performed the AA training task. This manipulation was orthogonal to (1) the 
manipulation of the content of trait instructions (Niffites are good and Luupites 
are bad / Niffites are bad and Luupites are good) and (2) the content of AA 
instructions (approach Niffites and avoid Luupites / avoid Luupites and approach 
Niffites). Participants in the AA training condition performed 80 trials of the AA 
training task in which 4 Niffites’ names (i.e., Cellanif, Eskannif, Lebbunif, Zallunif) 
and 4 Luupites’ names (i.e., Meesolup, Naanolup, Omeelup, Wenaalup) were 
each presented ten times. Participants pushed away names by pressing the up 
arrow on the keyboard (i.e., avoided) and pulled names towards them by 
pressing the down arrow on the keyboard (i.e., approached). A zoom effect 
enhanced the visual experience of approaching or avoiding; names that were 
avoided became smaller and moved off into the perceptual distance, whereas 
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names that were approached became larger and appeared to move toward the 
participant. Only actions that were in line with the AA instructions were 
registered as correct and resulted in the zoom effect. Incorrect responses were 
not registered. Participants always had to perform the correct response to 
proceed to the following trial. The other half of the participants did not receive 
AA training and they were instructed that they would complete a reaction time 
task which would last approximately 10 minutes before they could start the AA 
task. 
The reaction time task that followed was an IAT in which participants 
categorized positive words, negative words, and the names of members of both 
social groups into one of four categories: positive, negative, Niffites, or Luupites. 
The IAT followed the procedure described in more detail in Van Dessel et al. 
(2015). It consisted of three practice blocks and two experimental blocks. 
Participants began the IAT with 20 practice trials sorting the names of Niffites 
and Luupites and 20 practice trials sorting positive and negative stimuli. Next, 
participants completed 56 trials in which stimuli related to Niffites and positive 
shared a single response key and stimuli related to Luupites and negative shared 
a single response key (half of the participants completed the IAT in this way, 
while the other participants began by sorting Luupites and positive with the 
same key). Participants then practiced sorting Niffites and Luupites names with 
the response key assignment reversed for 40 trials and finally participants 
completed a second set of 56 trials in which Niffites shared a response key with 
negative and Luupites shared a response key with positive (or vice versa). If the 
participant made an error in categorizing, a red “X” appeared on the screen and 
the participant corrected their mistake in order to continue. Latencies were 
recorded until a correct response was made. IAT-scores were calculated using 
the D2-algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) so that positive scores 
indicate a preference for Niffites over Luupites. The Spearman-Brown corrected 
split-half reliability of the IAT score, calculated on the basis of an odd-even split, 
was r(675) = .84. 
After the implicit evaluation task, participants rated their liking of each of 
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the social groups by answering two questions: “To what extent do you like 
Niffites/Luupites?” and “To what extent do you have warm feelings for Niffites 
and Luupites?”. Participants gave their ratings by selecting an option on a 9-point 
Likert scale (1= not warm/liked at all; 9 = completely warm/liked). Rating scores 
(i.e., warmth scores and liking scores) were calculated by subtracting the score 
rating for Luupites from the corresponding score rating for Niffites so that 
positive scores indicate a preference for Niffites over Luupites. Because of high 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .94), we collapsed these score ratings 
into one explicit evaluation score by averaging the respective scores. This explicit 
evaluation score correlated significantly with the IAT score, r(673) = .43, p < .001. 
Finally, participants completed two types of manipulation check questions. 
The first question was completed only by participants who had received trait 
instructions. Participants were asked to remember which trait instructions were 
presented at the start of the study and to answer by selecting an option on a 
dropdown menu with “That Niffites are good and Luupites are bad”, “That 
Luupites are good and Niffites are bad”, and “I don’t remember” as possible 
answers. The next two questions asked what action they would have to perform 
(or had performed in the case of actual training) according to the instructions 
when the name of a Niffite/Luupite was presented. Participants answered by 
selecting an option on a dropdown menu with “Approach”, “Avoid” and “I don’t 
remember” as possible answers.  
Results 
We split up the analyses for participants who did not receive trait 
instructions and participants who did receive trait instructions to separately 
address (1) whether AA instruction and AA training effects on implicit evaluations 
are fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluations, and (2) whether AA 
instructions and AA training cause changes in implicit evaluations even when 
trait instructions are provided. 
No trait instructions condition 
We performed a 2 (Content of AA Instructions: approach Niffites, approach 
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Luupites) x 2 (Presence of AA Training: yes, no) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on 
the IAT scores. Because there was an unequal number of participants per 
condition (no AA training: N = 96 for approach Niffites, N = 97 for approach 
Luupites; AA training: N = 84 for approach Niffites, N = 87 for approach Luupites), 
we used type III sums of squares in this and all subsequent statistical analyses. 
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Content of AA Instructions, F(1,360) = 
135.93, p < .001. Participants who had been instructed to approach Niffites and 
avoid Luupites (M = 0.13, SD = 0.43) preferred Niffites more than participants 
who had been instructed to approach Luupites and avoid Niffites (M = -0.27, SD = 
0.55), d = 1.22, 95% confidence interval (CI) [1.00, 1.45], BF1 > 10000. Neither the 
main effect of Presence of AA Training nor the interaction with Content of AA 
Instructions was significant, Fs < 0.93, ps > .33. 
An ANOVA on the explicit rating scores revealed a similar pattern. We 
observed only a main effect of Content of AA Instructions, F(1,360) = 52.49, p < 
.001, indicating that participants who had been instructed to approach Niffites 
and avoid Luupites preferred Niffites (M = 0.52, SD = 1.63) more than 
participants who had been instructed to avoid Niffites and approach Luupites (M 
= -0.99, SD = 2.29), d = 0.76, 95% CI [0.54, 0.97], BF1 > 10000. We observed no 
main or interaction effects involving the Presence of AA Training factor, Fs < 
1.33, ps > .24. 
To investigate the extent to which changes in implicit evaluation are 
mediated by changes in explicit evaluations we performed mediation analyses 
with the LAVAAN package (version 0.5-16; Rosseel, 2012). We used the bootstrap 
method to estimate standard errors for the effects. Results indicated that 
changes in implicit evaluations were mediated by corresponding changes in 
explicit evaluations, both when participants received only AA instructions (Z = 
2.31, p = .021), and when they received AA instructions and subsequent AA 
training (Z = 2.03, p = .042). Importantly, however, the AA effect on implicit 
evaluations remained significant after controlling for changes in explicit 
evaluations for participants without (Z = 5.65, p < .001) and with actual training 
(Z = 8.78, p < .001). Regression coefficients of the performed mediation analyses 
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are provided in Appendix.  
Trait instructions condition 
To examine AA effects in the context of trait instructions we performed a 2 
(Content of AA Instructions: approach Niffites, approach Luupites) x 2 (Presence 
of AA Training: yes, no) x 2 (Content of Trait Instructions: Niffites are good, 
Luupites are good) ANOVA on the IAT scores of participants who had received 
trait instructions. We included the Content of Trait Instructions factor to 
estimate the effect of trait instructions on evaluations and control for the 
variance attributable to this factor. We observed a main effect of Content of 
Trait Instructions, F(1,303) = 183.27, p < .001, indicating that participants 
preferred Niffites more when Niffites were presented as positive and Luupites as 
negative (M = 0.23, SD = 0.48) than when Niffites were presented as negative 
and Luupites as positive (M = -0.45, SD = 0.46), d = 1.45, 95% CI [1.20, 1.70], BF1 > 
10000. This analysis also revealed a main effect of Content of AA Instructions, 
F(1,303) = 36.78, p < .001, but this effect was qualified by an interaction effect of 
Content of AA Instructions x Presence of AA Training, F(1,303) = 5.02, p = .026 
(Table 2). Importantly, a significant effect of Content of AA Instructions was 
observed for participants who had merely received AA instructions, F(1,150) = 
7.44, p = .007, d = 0.44, 95% CI [0.12, 0.77], BF1 = 5.36. This effect was larger for 
participants who had received additional AA training, F(1,153) = 33.48, p < .001, 
d = 0.74, 95% CI [0.41, 1.06], BF1 = 1961.39. Finally, an interaction effect of 
Content of AA Instructions and Content of Trait Instructions, F(1,303) = 13.22, p 
<.001, indicated that the effect of Content of AA Instructions was stronger when 
trait instructions conveyed that Niffites are good and Luupites are bad than 




                                                      
2
 This finding relates to the observation that, even in the absence of trait instructions, 
participants preferred Luupites over Niffites, and may indicate that AA effects are reduced if 
participants have clearly univalent positive or negative implicit evaluations (e.g., because they 
find Luupites’ names more appealing and they learned that Luupites are positive). Please consult 
Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, and Fazio (2013), and Woud, Becker, Lange, and Rinck (2013) for reasons 
why stimuli that have a non-ambivalent valence might be less susceptible to AA effects. 
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Table 2.  
Mean IAT and Explicit Scores in Experiment 1 for participants who received trait 
instructions as a function of Content of Trait Instructions and Content of AA Instructions. 
 Content of Trait Instructions 





















Explicit score:   










Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Scores reflect a relative preference for 
Niffites over Luupites. 
An ANOVA on the explicit rating scores revealed a main effect of Content of 
Trait Instructions, F(1,303) = 222.10, p < .001. This effect was qualified by an 
interaction effect with Presence of AA Training, F(1,303) = 5.60, p = .019, which 
indicated that the effect of trait instructions was smaller for participants who 
received AA training, d = 1.47, 95% CI [1.11, 1.83], than for participants who 
received no AA training, d = 1.91, 95% CI [1.53, 2.30].
3
 Most importantly, we 
observed no main effect of Content of AA instructions, F(1,303) = 0.01, p = .90, d
 
= 0.05, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.28]. The BF score provided substantial evidence in favor 
of the null hypothesis (BF0 = 7.19). We also observed no other main or interaction 
effects, Fs < 2.66, ps > .10. 
Mediation analyses showed that changes in implicit evaluations were not 
                                                      
3
 One possible explanation for this is that participants who received actual training may 
have been distracted from the trait instructions (e.g., because there was a longer delay between 
receiving these instructions and completing the evaluative rating task) and therefore used these 
trait instructions to a lesser extent for their evaluative ratings. Receiving the trait instructions, 
however, still discouraged participants from considering the AA information as a valid source of 
evaluative information. 
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significantly mediated by corresponding changes in explicit evaluations, both for 
participants who received only AA instructions, Z = 0.70, p = .49, and participants 
who received AA instructions in addition to AA training, Z = -0.07, p = .95. The 
effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluations remained significant after 
controlling for changes in explicit evaluations (no training: Z = 2.66, p = .008; 
training: Z = 5.71, p < .001). 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provided both correlational and experimental evidence that 
the impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluation is not fully mediated by 
changes in explicit evaluation. First, correlational analyses show that changes in 
explicit evaluation only partly mediated the effects of AA instructions on implicit 
evaluation. That is, AA instructions (and AA training) caused effects on implicit 
evaluations that remained significant after controlling for the mediating impact 
of explicit evaluations. This finding corroborates the correlational results of Van 
Dessel et al. (2015). Second, and most importantly, we found an experimental 
dissociation on implicit and explicit evaluations with regard to the impact of AA 
instructions (and AA training). More specifically, when trait instructions were 
presented, AA instructions and AA training caused changes in implicit but not 
explicit evaluations. Participants who received information about the evaluative 
traits of the social groups did not take the AA instructions or training into 
account when expressing their explicit evaluation, yet still exhibited an implicit 
preference for the approached group. This resembles previous findings of 
changes in implicit, but not explicit evaluations as a result of the repeated pairing 
of stimuli (e.g., Gawronski & LeBel, 2008) and indicates that both AA instructions 
and AA training can cause changes in implicit evaluation even when participants 
do not consider this information as a valid source of evaluative information. 
Given the well-known limitations of correlational mediation analyses, our 
experimental results provide important new evidence for the conclusion that AA 
instructions can influence implicit evaluations directly, that is, without first 
changing explicit evaluations. These findings contradict the idea that instructions 
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influence implicit evaluations only if these instructions are considered a valid 
basis for evaluation and, hence, are incorporated in explicit evaluations 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009).  
In addition to showing that instructions can influence implicit evaluations 
even when they are not considered a valid basis for evaluation, the present 
findings also provide information about another important research question 
that has informed research on the nature of implicit evaluation. Specifically, they 
inform us on whether the formation and change of implicit evaluations can occur 
rapidly. In line with Van Dessel et al. (2015) and other studies (e.g., De Houwer, 
2006; Peters & Gawronski, 2011) our findings challenge the widespread 
assumption (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006) that implicit evaluations are slow to 
build. Additionally, and more importantly, these findings indicate that existing 
implicit evaluations can also be altered rapidly, as the result of AA instructions. 
When participants’ evaluations were biased in favor of one of the two social 
groups as the result of trait instructions, subsequent AA instructions still caused 
changes in the implicit evaluation of these groups. This contrasts with previous 
findings suggesting that, once established, implicit evaluations cannot be easily 
changed (Gregg et al., 2006; Rydell, McConnell, Strain, Claypool, & Hugenberg, 
2007). Recently, however, research has shown that new valenced information 
about a stimulus can lead to a rapid revision of implicit evaluations, but only 
when this information is considered highly diagnostic about the evaluative 
properties of this stimulus (Mann, Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Cone & Ferguson, 
2015). Our findings go beyond this previous research by showing that rapid 
alterations in implicit evaluations can occur in the absence of changes in explicit 
evaluations. AA instructions may thus rapidly alter existing implicit evaluations 
even if these instructions are not considered diagnostic of the valence of the 
stimulus.  
Experiment 1, however, did not include a control condition to estimate 
effects of trait instructions and AA instructions separately. Hence, although the 
results of Experiment 1 confirm our main hypothesis that instructions can cause 
changes in implicit evaluations in the absence of changes in explicit evaluations, 
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they do not demonstrate conclusively that instructions can also counteract 
existing implicit evaluations directly. For instance, because of a lack of a control 
condition, it is theoretically possible that our results were due to the fact that 
compatible AA instructions strengthened the previously acquired implicit 
evaluations rather than that incompatible AA instructions revised them. To 
examine this question and to ascertain that the finding of a direct influence of AA 
instructions on implicit evaluations in Experiment 1 was not a chance finding, we 
performed Experiment 2. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2 we further explored AA instruction effects in the context of 
trait instructions. The aim of this experiment was two-fold. First, we aimed to 
replicate the finding that AA instructions cause a direct influence on implicit 
evaluation in the absence of changes in explicit evaluation. In contrast to 
Experiment 1, we counterbalanced the order of the IAT and the explicit rating 
task to exclude the possibility that performing the implicit evaluation task first, 
changed the effects on explicit evaluations (see Perugini, Richetin & Zogmaister, 
2014). Second, we extended the previous findings by addressing whether AA 
instructions cause changes in implicit evaluation when AA instructions are 
compatible or incompatible with the trait instructions. To this end, participants 
were provided with either compatible AA and trait instructions, incompatible AA 
and trait instructions or only trait instructions. Including a condition with only 
trait instructions allowed us to estimate the effect of trait instructions on 
evaluations (i.e., the preference for the group that is presented as positive) and 




Participants were 823 English-speaking volunteers who participated online 
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via the Project Implicit research website. Data-exclusion involved removing 195 
participants who did not complete all tasks (23.7%), and 156 participants who did 
not correctly answer the memory questions (24.8%), leaving data from 472 
participants (307 women, mean age = 38, SD = 13). None of the participants had 
previously participated in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except for the following points. 
First, participants were randomly assigned to start with the IAT and then perform 
the explicit rating task or to perform tasks in the opposite order. Second, 
participants never received actual AA training. Third, all of the participants 
received trait instructions. Fourth, not all of the participants received AA 
instructions. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either (1) no AA 
instructions, (2) instructions to approach Niffites and avoid Luupites, or (3) 
instructions to approach Luupites and avoid Niffites. Hence, this experiment 
employed a 2 (Content of Trait Instructions: Niffites are good, Luupites are good) 
x 3 (AA Instructions: approach Niffites, approach Luupites, no AA instructions) 
between-subjects design (Table 3).  
Table 3. 
Experimental Design of Experiment 2. 
2 between participants variables: 
Trait Instructions AA instructions 
 Compatible: Approach Niffites (16.7%) 
Niffites are good (50 %) Incompatible: Approach Luupites (16.7%) 
 No AA instructions (16.7%) 
 Incompatible: Approach Niffites (16.7%) 
Luupites are good (50 %) Compatible: Approach Luupites (16.7%) 
 No AA instructions (16.7%) 
Split-half reliability of the IAT score was r(472) = .92. Internal consistency of 
the explicit evaluation score was high (Cronbach’s Alpha = .96), and this score 
correlated significantly with the IAT score, r(470) = .59, p < .001. 
Results 
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A 3 (AA Instructions: Approach Niffites, Approach Luupites, no AA 
instructions) x 2 (Content of Trait Instructions: Niffites are good, Luupites are 
good) ANOVA on the IAT scores revealed a main effect of Content of Trait 
Instructions, F(1,466) = 377.50, p < .001, indicating that participants preferred 
Niffites more when Niffites were presented as positive and Luupites as negative 
(M = 0.26, SD = 0.48) than when Niffites were presented as negative and 
Luupites as positive (M = -0.54, SD = 0.39), d
 
= 1.82, 95% CI [1.60, 2.04], BF1 > 
10000. Most importantly, we also observed a main effect of AA Instructions, 
F(2,466) = 4.59, p = .011 (Table 4). In line with Experiment 1, participants who 
had been instructed to approach Niffites and avoid Luupites (M = -0.02, SD = 
0.58) preferred Niffites more than participants who had been instructed to 
approach Luupites and avoid Niffites (M = -0.27, SD = 0.55), F(1,309) = 9.24, p = 
.003, d
 
= 0.44, 95% CI [0.21, 0.66], BF1 = 131.22. Compared to participants who 
had not received AA instructions (M = -0.08, SD = 0.62), participants who had 
received instructions to approach Luupites preferred Luupites more, F(1,313) = 
4.98, p = .026, but we observed no significant difference for participants who had 
received approach Niffites instructions, F(1,310) = 0.41, p = .52.  
Table 4.  
Mean IAT and Explicit Scores in Experiment 2 as a function of Content of Trait 
Instructions and AA Instructions. 
 Content of Trait Instructions 







































Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Scores reflect a relative preference for 
Niffites over Luupites. 
To examine whether compatible or incompatible AA instructions cause 
changes in evaluations we performed planned tests comparing the main effect of 
Content of Trait Instructions for participants who received no AA instructions, 
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participants who received compatible AA instructions and participants who 
received incompatible AA instructions. Importantly, the main effect of Content of 
Trait Instructions was reduced when AA instructions were incompatible with the 
trait instructions, d
 
= 1.39, 95% CI [1.01, 1.78], compared to when no AA 
instructions were provided, d
 
= 1.85, 95% CI [1.47, 2.23], F(1,291) = 5.24, p = 
.023, indicating that incompatible AA instructions influenced implicit evaluations. 
In contrast, the main effect of Content of Trait Instructions was not significantly 
different for participants who received compatible AA instructions, d
 
= 2.15, 95% 
CI [1.78, 2.53] compared to participants who received no AA instructions, 
F(1,332) = 0.34, p = .56. 
The 3 x 2 ANOVA on explicit ratings revealed only the main effect of 
Content of Trait Instructions, F(1,466) = 370.73, p < .001, d
 
= 1.80, 95% CI [1.58, 
2.01], indicating a larger preference for Niffites when they were presented as 
positive (M = 2.76, SD = 3.37) than when they were presented as negative (M = -
3.34, SD = 3.42). We did not observe a significant main effect of AA Instructions, 
F(1,466) = 0.36, p = .70, nor an interaction effect with Content of Trait 
Instructions, F(1,466) = 0.47, p = .63. Also, the main effect of Content of Trait 
Instructions did not differ significantly between participants who received 
compatible, incompatible or no AA Instructions, Fs < 0.37, ps > .54, BF0s > 7.00.  
AA instructions condition 
In line with Experiment 1, mediation analyses on the data of participants 
who received both AA and trait instructions showed that AA instruction effects 
on implicit evaluations were not significantly mediated by corresponding 
changes in explicit evaluations, Z = 1.87, p = .062. The effect of AA instructions on 
implicit evaluations remained significant after controlling for explicit evaluations, 
Z = 2.92, p = .003. 
Discussion 
Results from Experiment 2 provide further support for the idea that the 
impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluations is not fully mediated by changes 
in explicit evaluations. Replicating the pattern obtained in Experiment 1, 
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participants who received AA instructions exhibited an implicit, but not an 
explicit preference for the approached group over the avoided group when prior 
instructions specified the valence of these groups. Mediation analyses indicated 
that AA instruction effects on implicit evaluation were not fully mediated by 
changes in explicit evaluation in the context of trait instructions. 
Additionally, results indicated that AA instructions caused changes in 
implicit evaluation even when the valence implied by the approach or avoidance 
action was incompatible with the evaluative information provided in the trait 
instructions. This suggests that AA instructions can (partly) undo recently 
established implicit evaluations, even in the absence of changes in explicit 
evaluations. This contrasts evidence that implicit evaluations are more difficult to 
change than explicit evaluations with verbally presented counter-attitudinal 
information (Gregg et al., 2006). We found no evidence that AA instructions 
caused changes in implicit evaluations when these instructions were compatible 
with the trait instructions. This is consistent with previous findings that AA 
training causes changes in implicit evaluations of social groups only when the 
training is incompatible with participants’ evaluations (Kawakami et al., 2007). It 
suggests that AA effects may be strongly reduced when participants have clearly 
univalent positive or negative implicit evaluations and corroborates previous 
evidence that the effectiveness of instructions to approach or avoid a stimulus 
may critically depend on specific stimulus properties (e.g., whether a stimulus is 
novel or well-known; see Van Dessel et al., 2015). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In two experiments, we observed that instructions to approach or avoid 
members of a fictitious group impact implicit evaluations of these groups. Our 
results indicate that these changes in implicit evaluation are not fully mediated 
by changes in explicit evaluations. Experiment 1 provided evidence that 
participants who merely received AA instructions and participants who received 
additional AA training exhibited a direct effect on implicit evaluations. Moreover, 
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both procedures caused changes in implicit evaluations even when trait 
instructions clearly specified the valence of the groups which canceled any AA 
effect on explicit evaluative ratings. Experiment 2 corroborated that AA 
instructions influenced implicit, but not explicit evaluations in the context of trait 
instructions and extended these findings by showing that AA instructions caused 
changes in implicit evaluations when AA instructions were incompatible with the 
trait instructions. 
These findings have meaningful theoretical and practical implications. We 
first discuss implications for theories on the mental processes that underlie 
implicit evaluation. Afterwards, we discuss implications for mental process 
theories that account for AA instruction and AA training effects. Finally, we 
discuss practical implications of the present research. 
Implications for theories of implicit evaluation 
The current experiments provide important information that constrains 
current and future models of implicit evaluation. First, the observation that AA 
instructions have a direct influence on implicit evaluation (i.e., independent of 
changes in explicit evaluation) is difficult to reconcile with associative and dual-
process models of evaluation that only allow for evaluative associations to form 
(1) gradually as the result of many pairings (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Rydell 
& McConnell, 2006) or (2) rapidly when consciously entertaining the proposition 
that a stimulus is positive or negative (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). 
However, dual-process models can accommodate these findings if they allow for 
the immediate formation of associations even on the basis of information that is 
not considered to be valid. Also propositional single-process accounts of 
evaluation can account for our results if they assume that the automatic 
activation of propositional information underlies implicit evaluation (De Houwer, 
2014). More specifically, receiving AA instructions may allow participants to 
consider the proposition that the approached social group is positive. A 
dissociation between implicit and explicit evaluation will arise when this 
proposition is judged to be invalid (and thus dismissed when making an explicit 
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evaluation) but still automatically retrieved when the social group is implicitly 
evaluated. 
Second, the observation that incompatible AA instructions reduce effects 
of trait instructions on implicit, but not on explicit evaluations suggests that 
implicit evaluations can be updated rapidly. It provides direct evidence against 
the often entertained idea that implicit evaluations are more difficult to change 
than explicit evaluations via counter-attitudinal information (Gregg et al., 2006; 
Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Rather, changes in explicit evaluation seem to 
critically depend on the perceived validity of the obtained evaluative information 
(Peters & Gawronski, 2011). When information directly contradicts previous 
valence information, this causes an immediate reversal of participants’ explicit 
liking of the stimulus (Gregg et al., 2006). Because AA instructions do not 
invalidate the more diagnostic evaluative trait information, they do not influence 
explicit evaluation when they contradict trait instructions. In contrast, changes in 
implicit evaluations may arise as the result of any information that links a 
stimulus with a specific valence, such as information about its relation with 
another valenced stimulus (see Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014) or with 
a valenced action (Van Dessel et al., 2015). Immediate changes in implicit 
evaluation may occur, even when participants do not consider the obtained 
information as valid.  
Note that the present findings do not contradict the idea that the impact of 
counter-attitudinal information strongly depends on the diagnosticity of this 
information (Cone & Ferguson, 2015). In fact, our data also suggest that AA 
instructions have a stronger influence on implicit evaluation if they are more 
diagnostic. This can be inferred from the fact that we observed a bigger AA 
instruction effect in the absence of trait instructions, that is, when the AA 
instructions were the most diagnostic piece of information that was available to 
the participants. However, our results extend the previous research by showing 
that changes in implicit evaluations may occur as the result of instructions even 
when these instructions provide information that is not considered highly 
diagnostic of the evaluative properties of the stimulus and therefore do not 
110  CHAPTER 3  
influence explicit evaluations. This effect is automatic in the sense that, in all 
likelihood, our participants did not intend to use this information for their 
evaluation. 
In sum, the current findings provide important information for theories 
that explain how implicit evaluations arise and can be changed. Although our 
results cannot distinguish between the broad class of single-process 
propositional and the broad class of dual-process models, they do force these 
models into adopting specific assumptions without which they cannot account 
for our effects. In general, we believe that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
distinguish between broad classes of models like dual-process or single-process 
models that have such a high degree of flexibility. Therefore, we believe that, in 
order to further advance research on evaluation, it is necessary to (1) define 
specific models (e.g., propositional or association formation models of AA 
effects) that make testable predictions and (2) perform research to test these 
predictions. The data produced by such research will allow us to further 
constrain these models and to have greater confidence in the assumptions that 
survive this process. 
Implications for accounts of AA instruction and AA training effects  
First, the current findings indicate that instructions that link a valenced 
action and a fictitious social group cause unintentional changes in the implicit 
evaluation of these groups. This extends knowledge about the effects of AA 
instructions by showing that these effects are not necessarily the result of 
controlled, non-automatic processes that involve the intentional use of this 
information for evaluation (e.g., as the result of demand compliance) (Van Dessel 
et al., 2015). 
Second, our results also constrain ideas about the processes that underlie 
AA training effects. More specifically, they reveal important similarities between 
the effects of AA training and those of AA instructions. Not only can both 
interventions lead to changes in implicit evaluations, they both can have direct 
effects on implicit evaluations, that is, effects that are not mediated by changes 
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in explicit evaluations. Although these similarities do not prove that both types of 
effects are due to the same mental processes (e.g., the formation and activation 
of propositions), they are in line with this idea and hence undermine the position 
that AA training effects can be due only to low level processes such as the 
gradual, performance-driven formation of associations in memory (e.g., Woud et 
al., 2013; Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011). Future studies are 
required to establish whether instructions and pairings are also similar regarding 
other features, for example regarding uncontrollability (see Gawronski, Balas, & 
Creighton, 2014). 
Finally, our findings suggest that actually performing AA behavior may, 
under certain conditions, add to the effect of AA instructions on implicit 
evaluations. Experiment 1 included a direct comparison of AA instruction and AA 
training effects on implicit and explicit evaluations. For participants who did not 
receive trait instructions, additional AA training did not have an added effect 
even though we had sufficient statistical power to detect even a small effect 
(power = .77 to detect an effect size of d = 0.25). In contrast, participants who 
received trait instructions exhibited a stronger AA effect on implicit evaluation 
when AA instructions were supplemented with AA training. Whether this added 
effect of AA training involves the strengthening of the previously obtained 
knowledge structures (i.e., associations or propositions) or the acquisition of 
entirely different knowledge structures requires further research. 
Practical Implications 
AA training is considered an important procedure for the modification of 
pathological biases in cognitive functioning (see Woud & Becker, 2014). 
Repeatedly performing AA movements in response to specific stimuli has proven 
effective in a number of therapeutic contexts such as the treatment of alcohol 
addiction (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011), social anxiety 
(Taylor & Amir, 2012), or contamination-related fear (Amir, Kuckertz, & Najmi, 
2013). Given the important relation between implicit evaluation and the 
dysfunctional behavioral responses under investigation (see Houben, 
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Havermans, & Wiers, 2010), it can be argued that changes in implicit evaluation 
may (partly) underlie therapeutic effects of AA training. Following this reasoning, 
our current results may indicate that AA instructions could play an important role 
in these AA training effects. Preliminary evidence supporting this idea was found 
in a recent study by Wiers et al. (2014) where therapeutic effects of ‘avoid 
alcohol’ training at one month follow-up were more robust if participants had 
received explicit instructions to push alcohol away in addition to the re-training 
procedure. Future research might consider whether replacing or complementing 
AA training with AA instructions may improve the therapeutic effectiveness of AA 
training. 
Concluding remarks 
In sum, the present results extend past findings that verbal instructions 
influence implicit evaluation by showing that AA instruction effects on implicit 
evaluations occur in the absence of mediation by changes in explicit evaluation. 
These findings provide insight into the mechanisms underlying implicit 
evaluation and open up important new avenues for changing implicit 
evaluations. 
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(β = .41*** after controlling for mediator) 
β = .18* β = .37*** 
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β = .58*** 
(β = .53*** after controlling for mediator) 
β = .30** β = .06 
β = .17** 
(β = .19** after controlling for mediator) 
APPENDIX 
Mediation Analyses Experiment 1 
 No trait instructions condition 
 
Content of AA instructions                                   IAT score 
 
          Explicit score 
Figure A1. Standardized Estimates of mediation coefficients for participants in 
Experiment 1 who received no trait instructions and no AA training.  
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001. 
 
 
Content of AA instructions             IAT score 
  
Explicit score 
Figure A2. Standardized Estimates of mediation coefficients for participants in 
Experiment 1 who received no trait instructions and received AA training.  
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001. 
 
Trait instructions condition. 
 
Content of AA instructions              IAT score 
       
 Explicit score 
Figure A3. Standardized Estimates of mediation coefficients for participants in 
Experiment 1 who received trait instructions and no AA training.  
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001. 
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β = .19* β < .01 
β = .34*** 
(β = .36*** after controlling for mediator) 
β = .24*** β = .11 
β = .13* 
(β = .13* after controlling for mediator) 
 
Content of AA instructions                          IAT score 
 
Explicit score 
Figure A4. Standardized Estimates of mediation coefficients for participants in 
Experiment 1 who received trait instructions and AA training.  
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001. 
Mediation Analyses Experiment 2. 
AA instruction condition. 
 
Content of AA instructions                                     IAT score 
        
  Explicit score 
Figure A5. Standardized Estimates of mediation coefficients for participants in 
Experiment 2 who received AA instructions.  
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001. 
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Prior research suggests that repeatedly approaching or avoiding a stimulus 
changes the liking of that stimulus. In two experiments, we investigated the 
relationship between, on the one hand, effects of approach-avoidance (AA) 
training on implicit and explicit evaluations of novel faces and, on the other hand, 
contingency awareness as indexed by participants’ memory for the relation 
between stimulus and action. We observed stronger effects for faces that were 
classified as contingency aware and found no evidence that AA training caused 
changes in stimulus evaluations in the absence of contingency awareness. These 
findings challenge the standard view that AA training effects are (exclusively) the 
product of implicit learning processes, such as the automatic formation of 
associations in memory 
                                                      
1
 Based on Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., & Gast, A. (2016). Approach-Avoidance Training 
effects are Moderated by Awareness of Stimulus-Action Contingencies. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 42, 81-93. doi: 10.1177/0146167215615335 
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INTRODUCTION 
Actions of approach and avoidance (AA) are assumed to be closely linked 
to the evaluation of a stimulus as good or bad. First, evaluative stimuli are 
thought to automatically evoke approach (in the case of positive stimuli) or 
avoidance responses (in the case of negative stimuli; e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; 
but see Rotteveel et al., 2015). Second, AA movements have also been used to 
change the evaluation of stimuli. For instance, Kawakami, Phills, Steele, and 
Dovidio (2007) demonstrated that participants who repeatedly approached 
photographs of Black people exhibited more positive evaluations of Black people 
on the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) 
than participants who repeatedly avoided photographs of Black people. Recent 
research indicates that AA training can cause changes in the evaluations of a 
variety of well-known stimuli, such as familiar alcoholic drinks (Wiers, Eberl, 
Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011), insects and spiders (Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, 
& Fazio, 2013), or contamination-related objects (Amir, Kuckertz, &  Najmi, 
2013).  
Researchers have considered whether AA training procedures can also be 
used to establish evaluations of novel stimuli. Woud, Becker, and Rinck (2008) 
reported that participants who repeatedly performed AA movements in 
response to pictures of faces with neutral emotional expressions exhibited a 
preference for approached faces on an implicit measure of evaluation (the 
evaluative priming task; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). A growing 
number of studies have provided evidence that AA training causes changes in 
implicit (e.g., Woud, Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 2013) and explicit evaluations (e.g., 
Huijding, Muris, Lester, Field, & Joosse, 2011; Laham, Kashima, Dix, Wheeler, & 
Levis, 2014) of novel stimuli. Vandenbosch and De Houwer (2011), however, 
failed to find any evidence for AA training effects on evaluations of novel faces in 
five experiments and failed to reproduce the effect reported by Woud et al. 
(2008) when reanalyzing their data, suggesting that AA training effects may be 
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subject to subtle boundary conditions or moderators that yet have to be 
identified. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of one possible 
moderator, namely contingency awareness. The role of contingency awareness 
has been an important topic in research on the acquisition of preferences via 
conditioning procedures. In evaluative conditioning (EC) studies, neutral 
conditioned stimuli (CSs) are repeatedly paired with positive or negative 
unconditioned stimuli (USs), resulting in changes in liking of the CSs. Some have 
argued that EC differs from other variants of conditioning in that EC can occur in 
the absence of conscious awareness of the contingency between CS and US (e.g., 
Baeyens, Eelen, & van den Bergh, 1990; Olson & Fazio, 2001). However, a 
number of studies have challenged this view and provided evidence that EC 
effects can be observed only when participants are able to report the 
contingency between CS and US (e.g., Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 
2007; Gast, De Houwer, & De Schryver, 2012). Though there is still debate about 
the necessity of the awareness of the CS-US contingencies in EC effects (see for 
instance, Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012), there is general 
consensus that contingency awareness is an important moderator of EC effects 
(Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010; Sweldens, Corneille, 
& Yzerbyt, 2014).  
AA training effects resemble EC effects in that a change in liking is observed 
that results from a contingency between a neutral stimulus and a valenced 
event. Whereas in EC studies, the valenced event is typically conceived of as the 
presentation of a stimulus (De Houwer, 2007; but see Gast & Rothermund, 
2011), in AA studies the valenced event corresponds to the execution of a 
valenced action (De Houwer, 2007). Hence, the role of contingency awareness 
can be studied also in AA training research. Examining this issue is bound to have 
important theoretical implications. Most importantly, traditional associative 
theories of AA training imply that contingency awareness might not be critical. 
These accounts postulate that AA behavior activates specific AA motivational 
orientations (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Markman & Brendl, 2005; 
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Neumann & Strack, 2000). AA training effects are thought to arise as a result of 
the gradual formation of an association between the activated motivational state 
and the stimulus representation (Woud et al., 2013). In line with the idea that 
approach and avoidance are primitive behavioral tendencies that are tightly 
linked with an impulsive, associative system (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), these 
accounts attribute AA training effects to automatic associative processes. From 
this perspective, the processes underlying AA training effects might differ from 
those involved in EC in that they provide a more low-level route to changing 
stimulus evaluations. Attesting to the dominance of this low-level associative 
view on AA training, factors that indicate the involvement of high-level 
controlled processes, such as participants’ awareness of the contingency 
between the AA action and the stimulus, have received little or no attention in 
AA training research. 
There are, however, reasons to believe that contingency awareness is a key 
factor in establishing AA training effects. First, AA training procedures that allow 
participants to become aware of the stimulus-action contingencies typically 
produce more robust AA training effects. Effects of AA training are consistently 
reported when participants receive instructions about the crucial stimulus-action 
contingencies (e.g., Kawakami et al., 2007) or when the target stimuli or stimulus 
features (i.e., the stimuli or stimulus features whose valence is registered and 
targeted for change) are specified in the instructions (e.g., Wiers et al., 2011). In 
contrast, when targets are not specified in the instructions, effects sizes tend to 
be small at best. In the studies by Vandenbosch and De Houwer (2011), for 
instance, AA training consisted of the repeated approach or avoidance of 
individual stimuli (i.e., pictures of 12 novel faces). Importantly, these faces had a 
subtle brown or red filter placed over them and participants were instructed to 
approach or avoid on the basis of the color of the presented face. Unbeknownst 
to the participants, some stimuli were always presented in the to-be-approached 
color whereas other stimuli were always presented in the to-be-avoided color. 
The fact that the target feature of the stimuli (i.e., stimulus identity) was not 
specified in the instructions probably reduced the chance that participants 
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realized that there were specific stimulus-action contingencies and thus that they 
identified those contingencies (e.g., approach Face 1, avoid Face 2, …). The lack 
of contingency awareness could have been responsible for the lack of AA training 
effects. Finally, in a recent study by Laham et al. (2014), participants repeatedly 
performed AA actions in response to unfamiliar shapes, which resulted in a 
preference for the approached stimuli. Importantly, this effect was observed 
only if participants performed the AA movements in a motivating context (i.e., 
collecting or discarding fruits in a foraging context). As a possible explanation for 
their results, the authors suggested that elaborated framing instructions 
increased the likelihood that participants became aware of the stimulus-action 
contingencies.  
A second line of research that points at the importance of contingency 
awareness in AA training focused on the effects of instructions. In a recent set of 
studies that were conducted at our laboratory, we observed typical AA training 
effects even when participants did not perform AA actions but were merely 
instructed that they would later on have to perform these actions (Van Dessel, 
De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2015). Participants who received instructions to 
approach one fictitious social group (e.g., the group Niffites) and avoid another 
fictitious social group (e.g., the group Luupites) exhibited a preference for the 
former group both on implicit and explicit measures of evaluation. These findings 
suggest that the acquisition of conscious propositional knowledge about 
stimulus-action regularities can cause changes in liking. Although these findings 
do not allow for the conclusion that all AA training effects are based on 
conscious propositional knowledge, they at least support the idea that the 
acquisition of contingency information can be an important factor also during 
regular AA training. 
In the present studies, we used a variant of the procedure introduced by 
Woud et al. (2008) that allowed us to investigate effects of AA training on 
implicit and explicit evaluations of novel faces. More specifically, we used both a 
correlational and an experimental approach to address the importance of 
contingency awareness in AA training effects. First, we tried to capture 
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participants’ awareness of the experienced face-action contingencies by 
measuring participants’ memory about the relation between faces and actions. 
We compared AA training effects for faces that were correctly linked to the 
action they were paired with, faces that were linked to the incorrect action, and 
faces for which participants did not remember the correct action. Second, in our 
first study, we manipulated contingency awareness by providing one group of 
participants with instructions that specified the face-action contingencies 
whereas a second group did not receive these instructions. We examined 
whether this manipulation caused changes in contingency awareness and 




Sixty-three native Dutch-speaking undergraduates (51 women) participated 
in exchange for a monetary reward of 5 euros.
 
All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were naive with respect to the purpose of the 
experiment. We excluded the data from one participant whose error rate in the 
evaluative priming task was more than 2.5 standard deviations above the 
population mean (population mean = 5.41 %, SD = 4.01%). 
Apparatus and Materials 
Eight photographs of faces (four men and four women) served as stimuli
1
. 
Pictures were selected from the Radboud Faces Database on the basis of a 
validation study conducted by Langner et al. (2010) in which participants 
indicated the emotional expression of the face by choosing between nine 
possible expressions and provided ratings for valence of the face on a five-point 
                                                      
1
 To increase the possibility that participants would identify some of the stimulus-action 
contingences we used a smaller number of evaluative stimuli than Woud et al. (2008).  
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Likert scale ranging from “1” (negative) to “5” (positive). Two selection criteria 
were used. First, the emotional expression of the face was correctly identified as 
neutral (i.e., more than 85 % correct identifications) in the validation study. 
Second, the mean rating for the valence of the face was near the nominal 
midpoint of the rating scale (range: 2.85 – 3.25). 
In the evaluative priming task, four positive words (the Dutch words for 
HAPPY, HONEST, NICE, and SINCERE), and four negative words (the Dutch words 
for MEAN, BRUTAL, AGGRESSIVE, and FAKE) were presented as target stimuli. 
The eight faces were used as primes. All words were presented in uppercase 
letters in Arial Black font with font size 36. 
The experiment was programmed in C-language and presented using the C-
library Tscope package (Tscope 1.0.171.) on a Tori PC with a 19-inch monitor (80 
Hz refresh rate), a keyboard and a joystick (Wingman Attack 2) attached to it. 
Procedure 
After participants had given informed consent, they were seated in front of 
a computer screen on which instructions for the AA training task appeared. 
Participants were informed that they would see pictures of different faces and 
that they would have to make a certain action each time a picture was 
presented, depending on the color of the frame that was presented around the 
picture. Half of the participants were told that they would have to approach 
photos that had a blue frame by pulling the joystick towards them and avoid 
photos with a green frame by pushing the joystick away from them. The other 
half received the opposite instructions. Orthogonal to this manipulation, 
participants were randomly assigned to receive instructions about stimulus-
action contingencies or no contingency instructions. Participants in the 
‘contingency instructions group’ were shown the eight faces they would see 
during the task and were told which four faces they would approach and which 
four faces they would avoid. They were asked to make sure that they would not 
forget which action belonged with each face. Participants assigned to the ‘no 
contingency instructions group’ were merely shown the eight faces they would 
see during the AA training task without any information about face–action 
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contingencies.  
The AA training task consisted of two blocks of 96 trials. During each 
training block, each of the eight faces was presented on 12 trials and was always 
presented with either a blue or a green frame, indicating that it had to be 
approached or avoided. For each participant four faces were always approached 
and four faces were always avoided. We randomized the assignment of faces to 
the approach or avoidance action. Each trial started with the presentation of a 
white fixation cross presented in the centre of the screen. After 500 ms the 
fixation cross was replaced by the picture of a face surrounded by a colored 
frame. This picture was randomly presented in four different sizes (i.e., 6.08 cm 
high x 4.56 cm wide; 6.40 cm high x 4.80 cm wide; 6.72 cm high x 5.04 cm wide; 
7.04 cm high x 5.28 cm wide) to prevent participants from performing the task by 
focussing on a specific point on the screen in order to process the color of the 
frame, thereby limiting picture content processing (see Huijding & De Jong, 
2005). The face disappeared as soon as participants responded correctly with the 
joystick by performing a vertical movement towards the screen or away from the 
screen.
2
 After 200 ms the next trial started. Note that Woud et al. (2008) 
included a phase in which participants performed both approach and avoidance 
movements in response to each stimulus. This provided an additional index of 
learning because it allowed Woud et al. to check whether performance was 
better on trials that respected the initial stimulus-action contingencies. We 
decided not to include such a phase in order to allow participants to experience a 
perfect contingency between face and action and to increase the possibility that 
participants would identify these contingencies. 
In the evaluative priming task, participants categorized target words as 
either "positive" or "negative" using the ‘E’ and ‘I keys of a computer keyboard. 
The assignment of the response keys to either the positive or negative category 
                                                      
2
 In contrast to the procedure by Woud et al. (2008), performing the AA action resulted in 
the immediate disappearance of the stimulus. We decided not to include a zoom effect (i.e., an 
effect where pictures become smaller while pushing and larger while pulling the joystick) on the 
basis of an initial study with 20 participants where we observed a significant AA training effect 
only when the training did not involve a zoom effect. 
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was counterbalanced across participants. Participants were instructed to 
perform this categorization task as quickly as possible, while making as few 
mistakes as possible. Participants were further told that they would see pictures 
of faces presented before the words and that they could look at these pictures, 
but that their task was simply to respond on the basis of the valence of the 
positive or negative word. A single trial consisted of a fixation cross presented for 
500 ms, a blank screen for 500 ms, a face for 200 ms (i.e., prime), a post-prime 
pause of 50 ms, and the target word in white font for 1500 ms or until 
participants had given a response. Error feedback was presented on the screen 
(i.e., the Dutch word for ‘Wrong’ presented in red font) for 250 ms if participants 
made an error. The inter-trial interval was set to vary randomly between 500 ms 
and 1500 ms. Participants completed 128 trials separated into four blocks of 32 
trials, each containing two trials with each of the faces as prime and a positive or 
negative word as target presented in random order.  
 After the priming task, we registered explicit evaluations of the faces. 
Participants indicated whether they liked the person in the photo and whether 
they thought the person in the photo was friendly on two nine-point Likert scales 
(0 = not liked at all/not friendly at all; 8 = liked a lot/very friendly). For each face, 
we collapsed these score ratings into one explicit rating score by averaging the 
respective ratings. The internal consistency of this measure was moderate (mean 
Cronbach’s Alpha = .62, SD = 0.12). 
Participants then completed questions assessing awareness of the 
stimulus-action contingencies. Each of the faces was presented in a random 
order. Participants were asked to indicate what action they had performed most 
often in response to this picture by choosing from three options (i.e., approach’, 
‘avoid’, or ‘both actions the same number of times’). Participants were asked to 
report their confidence in each of their answers on a 3-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (i.e., unsure ) to 3 (i.e., very sure). 
Results 
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Contingency awareness 
On average, participants in the contingency instructions group selected the 
correct action for 77% of the faces (SD = 27%). Participants who had not received 
contingency instructions indicated the correct action for fewer faces (M = 54%, 
SD = 27%), t(60) = 3.34, p =.001. In contrast, participants in the no contingency 
instructions group indicated more often that they had performed both actions an 
equal number of times in response to the face stimulus (contingency 
instructions: M = 8%, SD = 12%; no contingency instructions: M = 26%, SD = 27%), 
t(60) = -3.44, p =.001. We observed no significant differences in the number of 
times participants chose the incorrect action (contingency instructions: M = 15%, 
SD = 23%; no contingency instructions: M = 20%, SD = 15%), t(60) = -0.91, p =.37. 
Importantly, participants in both the contingency instructions and the no 
contingency instructions group correctly identified the action more often than 
they chose the incorrect action, ts > 5.68, ps < .001, indicating that they were 
able to identify some of the stimulus-action contingencies. 
Linear mixed effects models analysis 
The analyses of the explicit rating scores and evaluative priming task data 
were performed with item-based linear mixed effects models (multilevel model 
analysis) as implemented in R package lme-4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2014). Linear mixed effects models allow us to base the analyses on items (rather 
than participants’ means) and simultaneously control for random effects of 
participants and items while assessing relevant (fixed) factors of interest 
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Hoffman & Rovine, 2007; Locker, Hoffman, & 
Bovaird, 2007). Linear mixed effects regression (lmer) analyses are preferred 
over standard analyses of variance (ANOVA) in studies that use item-based 
analyses of awareness because they are better able to deal with unbalanced data 
(see also Gast et al., 2012). In our study, they prevent the substantial data loss 
that would result from analysing the influence of the contingency awareness 
factor with a repeated measures ANOVA because for many participants at least 
one of the cells involving the interaction between contingency awareness and AA 
action was empty. 
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Evaluative priming task 
In line with standard procedures for analyzing evaluative priming reaction 
time data (e.g., Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009), trials with an incorrect 
response were dropped (4.8 %) as well as any trials in which reaction times (RTs) 
were at least 2.5 standard deviations removed from an individual’s mean (2.8 %). 
To perform the lmer analysis on evaluative priming task RTs we defined a model 
with the grouping variables Participant and Target Word as random factors. The 
random effect of Face was not included in the model because including this 
factor did not significantly improve model fit, p > .99.  
To find out whether a standard AA training effect was obtained, we tested 
a model that contained Prime Face Type (approached, avoided), Target Type 
(positive, negative) and Contingency Instructions (yes, no) as fixed factors. We 
observed a main effect of Target Type, χ
2
(1) = 4.82, p = .028, indicating that 
participants were faster to respond to positive target words (M = 560, SD = 140) 
than to negative target words (M = 587, SD = 154). More importantly, this main 
effect was qualified by an interaction effect of Prime Face Type and Target Type, 
χ
2
(1) = 8.62, p = .003. RTs on trials with a positive target and approached face 
prime (M = 556, SD = 141) were faster than RTs on trials with a positive target 
and avoided face prime (M = 563, SD = 139), χ
2
(1) = 3.36, p = .067, 95 % 
confidence interval (CI) = [-14.16, 0.47], whereas RTs on trials with a negative 
target were slower when the prime was an approached face (M = 592, SD = 159; 
avoided face: M = 582, SD = 150), χ
2
(1) = 5.40, p = .020, 95% CI = [1.48, 17.37]. 
We observed no main or interaction effects involving the Contingency 
Instructions factor, χ
2
s < 0.59, ps > .44. 
To investigate the role of contingency awareness, we added a Contingency 
Awareness factor to our model. For each participant, we classified each face as 
contingency aware, contingency indiscriminate (i.e., faces for which participants 
had indicated they had performed both actions an equal number of times) or 
contingency reversed
3
. This analysis corroborated the main effect of Target Type, 
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 This classification was based on participants’ responses to the question what action they 
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χ2(1) = 5.18, p = .023. However, we did not observe a significant interaction 
effect of Prime Face Type and Target Type, χ
2
(1) = 1.78, p = .18. Importantly, the 
predicted three-way interaction effect Prime Face Type x Target Type x 
Contingency Awareness was significant, χ
2
(2) = 8.31, p = .016 (Table 1). Further 
inspection of this interaction, showed that the two-way interaction effect of 
Prime Face Type and Target Type was significant only for trials with contingency 
aware faces, χ
2
(1) = 10.91, p < .001, indicating faster RTs on positive target trials 
with approached primes (M = 546, SD = 134) than with avoided primes (M = 554, 
SD = 133), χ
2
(1) = 4.53, p = .033, 95 % CI = [-17.99, -0.74], and slower RTs on 
negative target trials with approached primes (M = 586, SD = 161) than with 
avoided primes (M = 569, SD = 144), χ
2
(1) = 4.63, p = .031, 95 % CI = [0.96, 20.39]. 
This interaction effect was not observed on trials with contingency indiscriminate 
faces, χ
2
(1) = 2.01, p = .16, or contingency reversed faces, χ
2
(1) = 1.72, p = .19. 
For contingency reversed faces, however, we did observe a Prime Face Type x 
Target Type x Contingency Instructions interaction effect, indicating that only 
participants who had received contingency instructions exhibited a Prime Face 
Type x Target Type interaction effect, χ
2
(1) = 4.75, p = .029. However, post-hoc 
tests showed that for these faces participants who had received contingency 
instructions were significantly faster on negative target trials with approached 
primes (M = 614, SD = 153) compared to avoided primes (M = 671, SD = 202), 
χ
2
(1) = 5.49, p = .019, 95 % CI = [-82.70, -7.34], but not on positive target trials 
with approached primes (M = 620, SD = 187; avoided primes: M = 629, SD = 163), 
χ
2
(1) = 0.85, p = .36, 95 % CI = [-58.41, 21.84], indicating a preference for avoided 
faces. This Prime Face Type x Target Type x Contingency Instructions interaction 
effect was observed only for contingency reversed faces, and produced a four-
way interaction effect, χ
2
(2) = 11.06, p = .004. All other main or interaction 
effects were non-significant, χ
2
s < 0.59, ps > .44. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
had performed most often in response to a face. Note that this question actually registers 
participants’ memory of co-occurrences between action and stimuli, which is merely an 
indication of participants’ contingency awareness (see Gast et al., 2012). 
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Table 1. 
Mean RTs and AA effects (in ms) in the evaluative priming task in Experiment 1 as a 
function of Target Type, Prime Face Type and Contingency Awareness. 












546 (134) 554 (133) 586 (161) 569 (144) 13 p < .001 
Contingency 
reversed 
581 (160) 587 (150) 588 (138) 606 (166) -6 p = .19 
Contingency 
indiscriminate 
568 (145) 576 (144) 619 (164) 609 (149) 9 p = .16 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The AA effect was calculated by 
subtracting the mean latency of congruent trials (i.e., trials with positive target and 
approached prime or trials with negative target and avoided prime) from the mean 
latency of incongruent trials (i.e., trials with positive target and avoided prime or trials 
with negative target and approached prime). 
Explicit rating scores 
We defined a model with the grouping variables Participant and Face as 
random factors. To find out whether a standard AA training effect was obtained, 
we tested a model that contained only Face Type (approached, avoided) and 
Contingency Instructions (yes, no) as fixed factors. This revealed a main effect of 
Face Type, χ
2
(1) = 14.30, p < .001, indicating that participants preferred 
approached faces (M = 4.03, SD = 1.28) over avoided faces (M = 3.68, SD = 1.27), 
95 % CI = [0.17, 0.55]. Similar to the results for evaluative priming RTs, we 
observed no main or interaction effects involving the Contingency Instructions 
factor, χ
2
s < 0.07, ps > .79.  
Analyses on the model that included the Contingency Awareness factor did 
not corroborate the main effect of Face Type, χ
2
(1) = 0.09, p = .76, but did show a 
significant interaction effect of Contingency Awareness and Face Type, χ
2
(2) = 
17.74, p < .001 (Table 2). To investigate this interaction, we performed separate 
analyses for faces in each of the three different awareness categories. These 
analyses revealed a significant main effect of Face Type for contingency aware 
faces, χ
2
(1) = 25.34, p < .001, indicating a preference for approached faces (M = 
4.26, SD = 1.31) over avoided faces (M = 3.47, SD = 1.33), 95 % CI = [0.40, 0.90]. 
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The main effect of Face Type was not significant for contingency indiscriminate 
faces, χ
2
(1) = 0.38, p = .54. For contingency reversed faces we observed a 
marginally significant main effect of Face Type, χ
2
(1) = 3.62, p = .057. In contrast 
to the effect for contingency aware faces, participants preferred the avoided 
faces (M = 4.16, SD = 1.04) over approached faces (M = 3.35, SD = 1.19), 95 % CI 
= [-0.81, 0.01]. We observed no other main or interaction effects, χ
2





Mean explicit rating scores and AA effects in Experiment 1 as a function of Face type and 
Contingency Awareness. 
 Approached Face Avoided Face AA effect 
Contingency 
aware 
4.26 (1.31) 3.47 (1.33) 0.79 p < .001 
Contingency 
reversed 
3.35 (1.19) 4.16 (1.04) - 0.81 p = .057 
Contingency 
indiscriminate 
3.89 (0.98) 4.03 (1.06) - 0.14 p = .54 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The AA effect was calculated by 
subtracting explicit rating scores for avoided faces from explicit rating scores for 
approached faces. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provided clear evidence that AA training caused changes in 
implicit and explicit evaluations of novel faces. Most importantly, however, our 
data indicate that contingency awareness is an important moderator of these AA 
training effects. Specifically, item-based analyses of awareness showed that 
participants exhibited a preference for approached faces over avoided faces only 
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 Both the evaluative priming task RTs and explicit rating scores were also analyzed with a 
standard repeated measures ANOVA. The results were similar to the reported effects with the 
exception that the interaction effect of Face Prime Type x Target Type x Contingency Awareness 
was not significant for the evaluative priming task RTs. In contrast to the lmer-analyses, we 
observed a marginally significant AA training effect for contingency indiscriminate faces. 
However, this analysis involved the data of only 25 participants because most participants did not 
have both an approached and an avoided face for which they indicated that both actions were 
performed an equal number of times. Because lmer analyses include all available data, while 
controlling for by-subject and by-item variation, we believe that these analyses provide more 
reliable information about the absence or presence of AA training effects and the factors that 
moderate these effects. 
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if they were able to correctly identify what action the stimulus had been paired 
with. In contrast, our manipulation of contingency awareness, which involved 
providing participants with information about the stimulus-action contingencies, 
failed to produce any evidence that contingency awareness influenced AA 
training effects even though the manipulation did influence measured 
contingency awareness. 
Because our item-based analyses indicated that contingency awareness 
moderated AA training effects, it seems strange that AA training effects were not 
enhanced for participants who received contingency instructions. Some aspects 
of our data provide us with information that may help explain this data pattern. 
First, participants who did not receive contingency information correctly 
identified the face-action contingency above chance level. This indicates that, 
even in AA training studies where the target feature of the stimuli (e.g., identity) 
is task-irrelevant, participants can identify some of the stimulus-action 
contingencies. Consequently, contingency awareness may have influenced AA 
training effects even for participants who did not receive contingency 
information. The between-subjects analyses may simply have lacked the power 
to identify an added effect of instructions. In contrast, our contingency 
awareness analyses allowed us to gain more power because awareness was 
based on items rather than on participants (see Pleyers et al., 2007, for an 
argumentation why such item-based contingency awareness analyses are 
methodologically more sound than participant-based analyses). Second, 
participants who received contingency instructions exhibited an implicit 
preference for avoided faces over approached faces if they had incorrectly 
remembered the face-action contingencies. Because this contrast effect reduces 
the overall AA training effect and because this contrast effect occurred only if 
participants receive contingency instructions, this may have impeded the 
detection of a stronger overall AA training effect for participants who received 
contingency instructions compared to participants who did not receive 
contingency instructions. 
In Experiment 1, we observed a preference for approached faces only if 
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participants indicated correct awareness for the stimulus-action contingencies. 
This suggests that AA training effects occur only in the presence of contingency 
awareness. However, an alternative explanation is that our item-based 
contingency awareness measure was biased towards the conclusion that AA 
training requires awareness because participants relied on their liking of the 
stimulus to answer the contingency awareness questions (see Hütter et al., 
2012). Contingency awareness questions asked participants to indicate whether 
they most often performed (a) approach actions, (b) avoid actions or (c) both 
actions an equal number of times in response to a face stimulus. The questions 
did not include a response option with which participants could indicate that 
they did not remember or had not identified the stimulus-action contingencies. 
In the absence of contingency awareness, this may have encouraged participants 
to search for other information that could help them answer these questions, 
including their liking of the stimuli. Importantly, what participants like could have 
been influenced by the (unconscious effects of) AA training. Hence, participants 
would select the correct response on the contingency awareness questions if 
they would select the response that has the same valence as the stimulus (i.e., 
select “approach” for liked stimuli and “avoid” for disliked stimuli). These 
responses would, however, not indicate actual contingency awareness but 
unconscious effects of AA training on liking (see Bar-Anan, De Houwer, & Nosek, 
2010, and Hütter et al., 2012, for a similar argument in the context of EC). 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2, we sought to extend the findings in Experiment 1 in three 
ways. First, to reduce the possibility that participants base their answers to the 
contingency awareness questions on other information, we provided participants 
with the opportunity to indicate that they did not know the stimulus-action 
contingency. Second, we counterbalanced the order of the evaluative priming 
task and the explicit rating task to exclude the possibility that performing the 
implicit evaluation task first, changed the effects on explicit evaluations (see 
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Perugini, Richetin, & Zogmaister, 2014). Third, to focus and allocate test power 
to the question whether contingency awareness moderates AA training effects 
even if participants are never told that contingencies between stimuli and 
actions exist, none of the participants received any contingency information.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 64 native Dutch-speaking undergraduates participated in 
Experiment 2 (51 women). The data from two participants were discarded 
because their error rate in the evaluative priming task was more than 2.5 
standard deviations above the population mean (population mean = 4.44 %, SD = 
3.01%). 
Procedure 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except for the following 
changes. First, none of the participants received instructions specifying the 
stimulus-action contingencies. Second, subsequent to performing the AA training 
task, half of the participants first performed the evaluative priming task and then 
completed the explicit ratings. The other participants completed the explicit 
rating task before the evaluative priming task. Third, participants could choose 
between four response options for answering the contingency awareness 
questions (i.e., ‘approach’, ‘avoid’, ‘I don’t know’, or ‘both actions the same 
number of times’). 
Results 
Contingency awareness 
In line with Experiment 1, participants selected the correct action (M = 
49%, SD = 27%) more often than the incorrect action (M = 19%, SD = 17%), t(61) 
= 6.58, p < .001. On average, participants indicated they did not know the correct 
action for 9% of the faces (SD = 14%) and indicated they had performed both 
actions an equal number of times for 22% of the faces (SD = 27%). 
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Evaluative priming task 
We first performed an lmer analysis on RTs in the evaluative priming task. 
We defined a base model that included Target Type, Prime Face Type, and Task 
Order as fixed factors and target word and subject as random effects. In line with 
Experiment 1, we observed a main effect of Target Type, χ
2
(1) = 4.72, p = .030, 
indicating that participants were faster to respond to a positive target, as well as 
the crucial interaction effect of Prime Face Type x Target Type, χ
2
(1) = 5.75, p = 
.017. Participants were faster on trials with positive target and approached face 
(M = 531, SD = 115) than on trials with positive target and avoided face (M = 538, 
SD = 125), χ
2
(1) = 4.72, p = .030, 95% CI = [-12.97, -0.67], whereas no significant 
differences were found for trials with negative targets (approached face: M = 
563, SD = 129, avoided face: M = 560, SD =129), χ
2
(1) = 1.77, p = .18, 95% CI = [-
2.17, 11.33]. We observed no other effects, χ
2
s < 1.29, ps > .25. 
In our second model, we included the Contingency Awareness factor 
(contingency aware, contingency reversed, contingency indiscriminate). Faces for 
which participants had indicated that both actions were performed an equal 
number of times and faces for which they had indicated that they did not know 
which action the face had been paired with, were collapsed in these analyses to 
reduce the number of empty cells for ‘contingency indiscriminate’ faces. The 
main effect of Target Type remained significant, χ
2
(1) = 5.00, p = .025, whereas 
the interaction effect of Target Type and Prime Face Type, χ
2
(1) = 3.07, p = .080, 
was only marginally significant. We observed an interaction effect of Target Type 
and Contingency Awareness, χ
2
(2) = 6.24, p = .044, indicating that the main effect 
of Target Type was larger for contingency reversed and contingency doubt faces 
than for contingency aware faces. Most importantly, we also found a marginally 
significant three-way interaction effect Target Type x Prime Face Type x 
Contingency Awareness, χ
2
(2) = 5.17, p = .075 (Table 3). Similar to Experiment 1, 
separate analyses revealed a significant Target x Prime interaction effect for 
contingency aware faces, χ
2
(1) = 9.74, p =.002, indicating faster RTs on positive 
target trials with approached primes (M = 529, SD = 116) than with avoided 
primes (M = 539, SD = 131), χ
2
(1) = 6.41, p = .011, 95% CI = [-22.10, -2.82], and 
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slower RTs on negative target trials with approached primes (M = 551, SD = 119) 
than with avoided primes (M = 561, SD = 121), χ
2
(1) = 2.64, p = .10, 95% CI = [-
1.66, 17.77]. We did not observe a significant interaction effect for contingency 
indiscriminate faces, χ2(1) = 0.20, p = .65, or contingency reversed faces, χ
2
(1) = 
0.55, p = .46. We observed no other main or interaction effects, χ
2
s < 0.50, ps > 
.47. 
Table 3. 
Mean RTs and AA effects (in ms) in the evaluative priming task in Experiment 2 as a 
function of Target Type, Prime Face Type and Contingency Awareness. 












529 (116) 539 (131) 561 (121) 551 (119) 0 p = .002 
Contingency 
reversed 
534 (116) 529 (113) 563 (126) 550 (113) 4 p = .46 
Contingency 
indiscriminate 
532 (113) 541 (122) 565 (142) 581 (149) -4 p = .65 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The AA effect was calculated by 
subtracting the mean latency of congruent trials from the mean latency of incongruent 
trials. 
Explicit rating scores 
The base model for analyzing participants’ explicit rating scores (internal 
consistency: mean Cronbach’s Alpha = .84, SD = 0.04) included Face and 
Participant as random factors and Face Type (approached, avoided) and Task 
Order (evaluative priming task first, explicit rating task first) as fixed factors. This 
revealed only a main effect of Face Type, χ
2
(1) = 7.41, p = .007. Participants liked 
approached faces (M = 3.87, SD = 1.31) better than they liked avoided faces (M = 
3.61, SD = 1.27), 95% CI = [0.08, 0.46]. No other effects were observed, χ
2
s < 
0.96, ps > .32. 
When we added the Contingency Awareness factor to the model, the main 
effect of Face Type was not significant, χ
2
(1) = 1.46, p = .23. Importantly, we 
again observed a significant interaction effect of Face Type and Contingency 
Awareness, χ
2
(2) = 23.13, p < .001 (Table 4). A significant effect of Face Type was 
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observed for contingency aware faces, χ
2
(1) = 25.00, p < .001, showing that 
approached faces were preferred (M = 4.28, SD = 1.29) over avoided faces (M = 
3.44, SD = 1.31), 95% CI = [0.47, 1.07], but not for faces that participants did not 
indicate a specific action for, χ
2
(1) = 1.66, p = .20. In line with Experiment 1, a 
(non-significant) trend for a contrast effect was found for faces participants had 
indicated the incorrect action for, χ
2
(1) = 2.64, p = .10. We also observed a main 
effect of Contingency Awareness, χ
2
(2) = 6.13, p = .047, indicating that 
contingency aware faces were liked more than contingency reversed or 
contingency indiscriminate faces. No other effects were observed, χ
2
s < 2.61, ps 
> .27.  
Table 4. 
Mean explicit rating scores and AA effects in Experiment 2 as a function of Face type and 
Contingency Awareness. 
 Approached Face Avoided Face AA effect 
Contingency aware 4.28 (1.29) 3.44 (1.31) 0.84 p < .001 
Contingency 
reversed 
3.54 (1.31) 3.93 (1.33) - 0.39 p = .10 
Contingency 
indiscriminate 
3.45 (1.16) 3.70 (1.15) - 0.25 p = .20 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The AA effect was calculated by 
subtracting explicit rating scores for avoided face from explicit rating scores for 
approached face. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 corroborated that training to approach or avoid novel faces 
causes changes in implicit and explicit evaluations of these faces, and that these 
effects are strongly related to participants’ awareness of the stimulus-action 
contingencies. Even though participants never received any information that the 
AA training procedure involved specific stimulus-action contingencies, they 
detected these contingencies at an above chance level. More importantly, AA 
training effects were observed only for contingency aware stimuli. This data 
pattern was observed even though participants had the opportunity to indicate 
that they did not know the contingencies, which renders it less likely that these 
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effects are the result of biases in our contingency awareness measure. 
In line with Experiment 1, we found no evidence that AA training effects 
can arise in the absence of awareness. To further corroborate this, we performed 
an lmer analysis on the data from both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The 
overall analysis showed the Prime Face Type x Target Type x Contingency 
Awareness interaction effect for evaluative priming task RTs, χ
2
(2) = 8.25, p = 
.016, and the Face Type x Contingency Awareness interaction effect for explicit 
rating scores, χ
2
(2) = 38.53, p < .001. To examine these interactions, we 
calculated indices of the AA effects for contingency aware, contingency reversed 
and contingency indiscriminate faces. For each type of face an index of the AA 
effect on implicit evaluation was calculated by subtracting participants’ mean 
response latency for congruent trials (i.e., trials with positive target and 
approached prime or trials with negative target and avoided prime) from their 
mean response latency for incongruent trials (i.e., trials with positive target and 
avoided prime or trials with negative target and approached prime) and an index 
of AA effects on explicit evaluation was calculated by subtracting participants’ 
mean explicit rating score for avoided faces from their mean explicit rating score 
for approached faces. In order to test whether these indices differed significantly 
from zero, we performed one-sample t-tests supplemented with Bayesian 
analyses. Bayesian analyses were performed according to the procedures 
outlined by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009). They provide a 
Bayes Factor that gives an indication of how strongly the data support either the 
null hypothesis (BF0; reflecting the absence of a significant effect) or the 
alternative hypothesis (BF1; reflecting the presence of a significant effect). BFs 
smaller than 1, between 1 and 3, between 3 and 10, and larger than 10, 
respectively designate ‘no evidence’, ‘anecdotal evidence’, ‘substantial 
evidence’, and ‘strong evidence’ for either the null or the alternative hypothesis 
(Jeffreys, 1961). We observed a significant AA effect for contingency aware faces 
on implicit, t(103) = 3.97, p < .001, d = 0.39, BF1 = 164, and explicit evaluations, 
t(103) = 6.52, p < .001, d = 0.64, BF1 = 3861013, and a contrast AA effect for 
contingency reversed faces on explicit, t(47) = -3.08, p = .003, d = -0.44, BF1 = 11, 
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but not implicit evaluations, t(48) = 0.06, p = .95, d = 0.01, BF0 = 5. Importantly, 
we observed no significant AA effect for contingency indiscriminate faces on 
implicit, t(48) = 1.07, p = .29, d = 0.15, BF0 = 3, nor explicit evaluations, t(48) = -
0.72, p = .48, d = -0.10, BF0 = 4, even though we had sufficient statistical power 






In two experiments, we observed more positive evaluations of novel faces 
that were approached compared to faces that were avoided. We consistently 
found that contingency awareness, assessed by participants’ memory for 
stimulus-action relations, moderated AA training effects on implicit and explicit 
evaluations. Both participants who received information specifying the stimulus-
action contingencies and participants who did not receive contingency 
information preferred approached faces over avoided faces only if they were 
able to correctly identify what action they had performed most often in response 
to the specific face. Providing participants with contingency information via 
instructions, however, did not significantly influence AA training effects. 
The role of contingency awareness in AA training effects 
Our data provide the first evidence that contingency awareness moderates 
effects of AA training. Even though an imperfect measure was used to estimate 
contingency awareness (i.e., participants’ memory for the stimulus-action 
contingencies), AA training effects were larger when participants reported 
awareness of the contingencies. This strongly resembles findings in the EC 
                                                      
5
 We report power estimates for the t-test analyses and not the lmer analyses because for 
mixed model analyses the required analytical tools for calculating the sampling distributions in 
situations where the null hypothesis is false are currently lacking. Because lmer analyses included 
the data of a larger number of participants who had expressed doubt about at least one of the 
stimulus-action contingencies (N = 82) and because these analyses control for by-subject and by-
item variation, these analyses had more power to detect a significant effect of small effect size. 
These analyses also did not reveal a significant AA effect for contingency indiscriminate faces, χ2s 
< 1.26, ps > .26. 
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literature that contingency awareness is a potent moderator of EC (see Hofmann 
et al., 2010; Sweldens et al., 2014). We also found no evidence for unaware 
effects of AA training. When participants did not identify the stimulus-action 
contingencies correctly or expressed doubt about the contingencies we did not 
find a preference for approached faces over avoided faces even though our 
statistical tests had sufficient power to detect a small to medium sized effect. 
Bayesian analyses indicated that our data provided substantial evidence that AA 
training effects do not arise for contingency indiscriminate faces. Nevertheless, 
caution is warranted when drawing conclusions about the role of contingency 
awareness in AA training on the basis of our results. Importantly, our evidence is 
essentially correlational in nature. The liking of a stimulus was influenced by AA 
training only if participants could report the action that they performed in the 
presence of that stimulus during training. However, an experimental 
manipulation of contingency awareness did not influence AA training effects in 
the expected direction. Correlations do not reveal the direction of causality. 
Thus, although it is possible that AA training was related to contingency 
awareness because contingency awareness mediates the impact of training on 
liking, it is also possible that learning mediates the impact of training on 
contingency awareness. We will now consider two ways in which AA training 
could have mediated the changes in contingency awareness. 
First, it is possible that the relation between contingency awareness and 
AA training effects in our study arose because our contingency awareness 
measure was influenced by the effects of AA training on liking. In EC research, 
there is a lot of discussion about the usefulness of contingency awareness 
measures and correlational approaches in general to address questions about 
contingency awareness (Gawronski & Walther, 2012; Dedonder, Corneille, 
Bertinchamps, & Yzerbyt, 2014). Most importantly, contingency awareness 
measures may be contaminated by reconstructive memory processes. That is, 
participants may complete these measures on the basis of other information, 
such as their liking of the stimulus (Hütter et al., 2012). Although we cannot 
completely exclude this alternative explanation, we did try to minimize guessing 
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in Experiment 2 by giving participants the opportunity to indicate that they do 
not know the contingency. Importantly, we observed a strong relation between 
AA training effects and contingency awareness also in Experiment 2. 
Second, even if the contingency awareness measure did capture 
contingency awareness rather than changes in liking, it is possible that 
contingency awareness itself was produced by the same processes that lead to 
changes in liking. For instance, one could assume that AA training leads to the 
formation of associations that in their turn produce both changes in liking and 
contingency awareness (see Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). In such a scenario, any 
factor that leads to variations in the strength of associations would lead to 
corresponding changes in both liking and contingency awareness, thus resulting 
in a correlation between AA training effects and contingency awareness. For 
instance, participants might have differed in the extent to which they attended 
the identity of the faces. Participants were asked to respond to the color of the 
frame surrounding face pictures. Hence, the task did not require that they 
processed face identity. Assuming that the formation of associations requires 
attention to the elements that are paired (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Wagner, 
1981), participants who did pay attention to face identity might have formed 
stronger face-action associations in memory than participants who did not 
attend face identity. If association strength determines both changes in liking 
and contingency awareness, then inter-individual differences in attention to face 
identity might have resulted in a correlation between AA training effects and 
contingency awareness. Note, however, that this explanation is at odds with the 
observation that contingency instructions, which draw attention to the identity 
of the stimuli, did not cause stronger AA training effects in Experiment 1. Also, 
Vandenbosch and De Houwer (2011) included a manipulation designed to draw 
attention to the identity of the faces in four AA training studies, but did not 
observe an overall effect of training, suggesting that AA training effects critically 
depend on other boundary conditions. 
Although alternative explanations are possible, the fact remains that our 
results are compatible with the view that AA training effects are mediated by 
CONTINGENCY AWARENESS AND APPROACH-AVOIDANCE TRAINING EFFECTS 145 
contingency awareness. Contingency awareness might not only be sufficient for 
AA effects (as indicated by the fact that AA instructions alone can produce 
changes in liking; Van Dessel et al., 2015), it might also be necessary (as indicated 
by the fact that, in the current study, we observed changes in evaluations only 
when participants were able to consciously report the relation between face and 
action). Nevertheless, the idea that contingency awareness is necessary for AA 
training effects seems to contradict earlier studies in which AA training effects 
were observed when AA actions were performed in response to subliminally 
presented stimuli (Kawakami et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2011). However, in a 
recent attempt to replicate and extend these findings we failed to find any 
evidence for subliminal AA training effects (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Roets, & 
Gast, in press). Moreover, Bayesian analyses indicated that the original studies 
provided only anecdotal evidence for subliminal AA training effects while our 
results consistently provided substantial evidence for the absence of subliminal 
AA training effects. However, given the paucity of studies on this matter, more 
research is warranted to establish if and under what circumstances AA training 
causes changes in evaluation in the absence of conscious knowledge of stimulus-
action contingencies 
Importantly, we did not observe an overall effect of our experimental 
manipulation of contingency awareness on stimulus evaluations which seems 
difficult to reconcile with the interpretation of our results as evidence that 
contingency awareness causes AA training effects. As we previously contended, 
however, the absence of an effect of contingency instructions may have resulted 
from (a) a lack of power to detect such an effect in the between-subjects 
analysis, or (b) the fact that a larger proportion of participants revealed a 
reversed AA training effect in the contingency instruction group than in the no 
contingency instructions group. Another explanation might be that contingency 
instructions have effects other than making participants aware of the 
contingencies, effects that actually reduce the impact of AA training. For 
instance, some participants (e.g., participants with high levels of psychological 
reactance) may follow the goal to control against influences of these 
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contingencies on evaluations. It seems possible that reactant responses might be 
more common after such instructed compared to merely observed 
contingencies. 
Implications for mental process theories of AA training 
The observation that contingency awareness moderates AA training effects 
seems to contradict the idea that AA training effects depend exclusively on 
implicit learning processes and does not fit well with current associative accounts 
of AA training effects. According to these accounts, the gradual formation of 
associations during action performance influences stimulus liking (e.g., Woud et 
al., 2013; Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011). Because association 
formation is often considered an automatic process, there is no reason to 
assume that AA training effects should depend on participants’ awareness of the 
contingencies (Kawakami et al., 2007). To accommodate our results, these 
traditional accounts of AA training would need to make a number of additional 
assumptions. First, in addition to automatic association formation, it seems 
necessary to postulate that another process, which critically depends on 
contingency awareness, also contributes to AA training effects. Demand 
compliance may serve as a likely candidate. However, the observation that 
contingency awareness moderated changes also in implicit evaluations, suggests 
that participants acquired a genuine preference for the approached stimuli 
which required contingency awareness (but see De Houwer, Beckers, & Moors, 
2007). Second, it seems necessary to assume that the specific AA training 
procedure we used did not activate the implicit learning process sufficiently (and 
therefore impeded the detection of AA training effects for stimuli participants 
did not know the correct action for). For instance, AA training may cause changes 
in evaluations for contingency indiscriminate stimuli only when the training 
involves a sufficiently large number of training trials (e.g., because associative 
learning is a slow and gradual process; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Support for 
this was found by Woud et al. (2011) who observed that AA training effects were 
stronger the more often faces were trained. However, because the addition of 
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training trials may increase the likelihood that participants become aware of the 
stimulus-action contingencies, these findings could also reflect that AA training 
effects critically depend on contingency awareness. Also note that in our studies, 
we used a number of training trials that was comparable to that used in previous 
studies. 
Alternatively, the strong impact that contingency awareness seems to have 
on AA training effects may be more easily explained by an alternative, 
propositional account of AA training effects. In line with propositional models of 
EC (De Houwer, 2009; Hofmann et al., 2010; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 
2009), AA training may influence the liking of a stimulus only after participants 
acquired conscious propositional knowledge about the relation between action 
and stimulus. Participants may elaborate on this information and infer that the 
approached stimulus is positive (because they typically approach good things). 
Once this proposition is formed, this may influence both explicit and implicit 
stimulus evaluation (see De Houwer, 2014). From this perspective, AA training 
effects are driven by the acquisition of propositional information rather than by a 
‘training’ mechanism that changes evaluations by gradually installing action 
tendencies to approach or avoid. It is important to note, however, that the 
current study used only neutral, unfamiliar faces as stimuli. In contrast to these 
novel stimuli, tendencies to approach or avoid specific well-known stimuli may 
have been acquired over a long learning history (e.g., spider phobics may have 
ample experience in avoiding spiders). To change evaluations of well-known 
stimuli, it may therefore be necessary to repeatedly perform AA actions in 
response to the stimulus such that the acquired tendencies are gradually re-
trained (see Eberl et al., 2014). In line with this idea, we previously found that AA 
instruction effects were restricted to novel stimuli (Van Dessel et al., 2015). We 
hope that future research will explore whether contingency awareness is a 
critical factor also for studies that use AA training as a means of changing 
stimulus evaluation (e.g., in the treatment of alcohol addiction, Wiers et al., 
2011; or social anxiety, Taylor & Amir, 2012). 
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Concluding remarks 
This study indicates that AA training is an important procedure for the 
acquisition of evaluations of novel stimuli and provides the first evidence that 
contingency awareness is an important moderator of AA training effects. This 
conclusion contradicts the prevailing view concerning the automaticity of AA 
training effects and challenges theories that attribute AA training effects to the 
automatic acquisition of associations. These results add to recent work showing 
that various evaluative learning effects which were traditionally assumed to rely 
on automatic processes, strongly depend on awareness (e.g., EC: Hofmann et al., 
2010; the mere exposure effect: de Zilva, Vu, Newell, & Pearson, 2013; mimetic 
desires: Bry, Treinen, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2011). They provide support for 
recent theoretical accounts that question the involvement of an automatic 
association formation mechanism in evaluative learning (e.g., De Houwer, 2009, 
Mitchell et al., 2009). It should be clear, however, that the issue of (evaluative) 
learning in the absence of awareness is still far from settled. In order for progress 
to be made, it is important to continue to carefully validate and replicate findings 
that do seem to provide evidence for unaware learning (e.g., Rydell, McConnell, 
Mackie, & Strain, 2006; Hu, Antony, Creery, Vargas, Bodenhausen, & Pallar, 
2015). Once reliable evidence has been observed across multiple labs, efforts can 
start to identify the moderators that determine if and when awareness 
moderates learning. 
However, it is important to repeat that our results provide only 
correlational evidence for a relation between contingency awareness and AA 
training. As such, it would be premature to make any conclusive statements 
about the causal role of contingency awareness in AA training effects. We hope, 
however, that our findings pave the way for additional AA training studies on the 
role of contingency awareness in AA training effects. Moreover, our findings 
point at the possibility that AA training effects are non-automatic in ways other 
than the need for contingency awareness. For instance, it would be interesting to 
examine the extent to which AA training effects can be controlled or depend on 
the availability of attentional resources. Future research on the automaticity 
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features of AA training will provide important new information about the 
moderators of AA training effects and the mental processes that mediate those 
effects.  
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FAILURES TO CHANGE STIMULUS EVALUATIONS BY 




Previous research suggests that the repeated performance of approach and 
avoidance (AA) actions in response to a stimulus causes changes in stimulus 
evaluations. Kawakami, Phills, Steele, and Dovidio (2007) and Jones, Vilensky, 
Vasey, and Fazio (2013) provided evidence that these AA training effects occur 
even when stimuli are presented only subliminally. We also examined whether 
reliable AA training effects can be observed with subliminal stimulus 
presentations but added more sensitive checks of perceptual stimulus 
discriminability. Three experiments, including a direct replication of the study by 
Kawakami et al. (2007), failed to provide any evidence for effects of subliminal AA 
training on implicit or explicit evaluations. Bayesian analyses indicated that our 
data provide robust evidence that subliminal AA training does not cause changes 
in evaluations. In contrast, we observed changes in evaluations when participants 
were provided with (either correct or incorrect) information about the stimulus-
action contingencies in the subliminal AA training task and when participants 
performed a supraliminal AA training task that allowed participants to detect 
these contingencies. These findings support the idea that contingency awareness 
is necessary for the occurrence of AA training effects.
                                                      
1
 Based on Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., Roets, A., & Gast, A. (2016). Failures to Change 
Stimulus Evaluations by means of Subliminal Approach and Avoidance Training. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 110, e1-e15. doi: 10.1037/pspa0000039  
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been recognized for many decades that a person’s behavior is largely 
determined by his/her likes or dislikes (Allport, 1935). Accordingly, 
understanding how preferences are formed and how they can be influenced is a 
fundamental research area in psychological science. Prior research showed that 
the repeated execution of approach and avoidance (AA) actions in response to a 
stimulus can cause changes in stimulus evaluations. When participants 
repeatedly approach one stimulus and avoid another stimulus, one typically 
observes a preference for the approached stimulus over the avoided stimulus 
(e.g., Kawakami, Steele, Cifa, Phills, & Dovidio, 2008; Laham, Kashima, Dix, 
Wheeler, & Levis, 2014, Woud, Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 2013; but see 
Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011). The first demonstration of this effect was 
provided by Kawakami, Phills, Steele, and Dovidio (2007). They found that 
participants who repeatedly approached photographs of Black people and 
avoided photographs of White people exhibited more positive evaluations of 
Black relative to White people on the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
In two of the four experiments reported by Kawakami et al. (2007), 
participants performed the AA movements in response to the words ‘approach’ 
or ‘avoid’. Immediately preceding the presentation of these words, photographs 
of Black and White people were presented under conditions that limited the 
conscious detection of these stimuli (i.e., presentation in between two masking 
stimuli and for a duration of 23 ms). When photographs of Black people were 
consistently paired with approach movements and photographs of White people 
with avoidance movements, participants reported more positive implicit 
evaluations of Black relative to White people (Experiment 2) and showed more 
immediacy and openness for communication when interacting with a Black 
confederate (Experiment 4). The authors concluded that AA training effects may 
occur outside of participants’ awareness of the contingencies in the training task. 
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Recently, a study by Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, and Fazio (2013) provided 
corroborative evidence for effects of AA training with subliminally presented 
stimuli. They observed changes in participants’ explicit evaluations of insects 
when approach behaviors, performed in response to the presentation of the 
word ‘TOWARD’, were repeatedly paired with masked images of insects, 
presented for 13 ms (Experiment 1). Moreover, when participants’ repeatedly 
performed approach behaviors in response to subliminally presented images of 
spiders, they exhibited more positive implicit evaluations of spiders (Experiment 
2) and reported reduced anxiety ratings when encountering live spiders 
(Experiment 3). 
The observation of subliminal AA training effects is in line with the idea 
that AA training effects are due to automatic association formation mechanisms. 
This idea entails that the repeated pairing of an AA action and a stimulus 
automatically results in the gradual formation of associative links between the 
representations of the stimulus and positively or negatively valenced 
representations (Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011; Woud et al., 
2013). 
Recent evidence has, however, challenged the idea that AA training effects 
are (exclusively) the result of automatic associative learning processes. In two 
studies that were conducted at our laboratory, we provided evidence that AA 
training effects are moderated by awareness of the stimulus-action 
contingencies (Van Dessel, De Houwer, & Gast, 2015). When participants 
repeatedly performed AA actions in response to novel face stimuli, they 
exhibited a preference for the approached stimuli on implicit and explicit 
measures of evaluation – but only when they were able to correctly identify what 
action they had performed most often in response to the stimuli. We obtained 
no evidence that AA training caused changes in stimulus evaluations in the 
absence of contingency awareness. 
The observation that contingency awareness moderates AA training effects 
does not fit well with the idea that automatic association formation underlies 
these effects. To accommodate these findings it seems necessary that traditional 
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association formation accounts make a number of additional assumptions (e.g., 
that the formation of associations depends on specific boundary conditions such 
as whether sufficient attention is attributed to the identity of the stimulus; see 
Van Dessel, De Houwer, & Gast, 2015). In contrast, alternative, propositional 
accounts of AA training may more easily explain these results. These accounts 
might, for instance, entail that participants who acquire stimulus-action 
contingency information may elaborate on this information and infer that the 
approached stimulus is positive (because they typically approach good things). 
Once this proposition is formed, this may influence both explicit and implicit 
stimulus evaluation (see De Houwer, 2014). In line with this account, a recent set 
of studies showed that typical AA training effects occurred even when 
participants did not perform AA actions but were merely instructed that they 
would later on have to perform these actions (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, & 
Smith, 2015). Participants who received instructions to approach one fictitious 
social group (e.g., Niffites) and avoid another fictitious social group (e.g., 
Luupites) exhibited a preference for the former group both on implicit and 
explicit measures of evaluation. 
Although AA learning via instructions suggests that conscious knowledge of 
stimulus-action contingencies is sufficient for acquiring AA effects, it does not 
exclude the possibility that, under certain circumstances, AA training effects may 
occur in the absence of contingency awareness (e.g., as the result of the 
automatic formation of associations). Therefore, it is important to actively 
establish evidence or seek to confirm potential evidence for AA training effects 
that occur in the absence of contingency awareness. Demonstrating that AA 
training effects can occur after subliminal stimulus presentations provides the 
strongest case that contingency awareness is not a necessary condition for these 
effects to occur. Hence, subliminal AA training effects are theoretically important 
because they provide strong evidence for automatic association formation 
models of AA training. Such evidence would strongly constrain propositional 
accounts of AA training. For instance, to explain subliminal AA training effects, 
these accounts would have to assume that propositions (e.g., ‘I’d like to 
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approach Black people’) can be formed even if one is unaware of the perceptual 
stimulation that initiated the formation of this proposition (e.g., photographs of 
Black people). 
As we noted above, two sets of studies provided support for the existence 
of subliminal AA training effects (Kawakami et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2013). If the 
conclusion drawn from these studies (i.e., that AA training effects can occur after 
subliminal presentations) is valid, these studies present a very strong case for the 
possibility of AA training effects in the absence of contingency awareness and 
hence for automatic association formation as an underlying mechanism. In our 
opinion, however, there are two reasons why this conclusion can currently not 
be drawn. 
First, both studies suffer from an important methodological limitation: 
because they did not include objective measures of stimulus visibility they could 
not assure that every presentation of the stimulus was indeed presented below 
the threshold of conscious awareness (‘sub-liminally’). To establish whether 
participants were aware of the rapidly presented stimuli, Kawakami et al. 
(Experiments 2 and 4), and Jones et al. (Experiment 1) used a funnel debriefing 
procedure to question participants for stimulus awareness after the experiment. 
When participants expressed any awareness of the identity of the stimuli, their 
data were excluded from the analyses. In the subliminal perception literature, 
however, there is a lot of debate about whether such subjective self-report 
measures provide an accurate and reliable method to determine awareness (for 
a summary of this discussion, see Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004). For 
instance, a simple lack of confidence may contribute to someone's reluctance to 
report having been aware of a particular stimulus, despite having some 
subjective experience of it (Cleeremans, 2001). Jones et al. did not use any 
awareness tests in Experiments 2 and 3, but they did conduct a pilot test in 
which 12 participants first completed the approach spiders training and then 
indicated for 40 stimuli, 10 of which were spider pictures, whether they had seen 
these stimuli during the training task. None of the participants reported seeing 
any of the spider pictures, suggesting that the pictures had not been perceived 
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consciously. This procedure, however, may suffer from the same limitations as 
the funnel debriefing procedure (e.g., issues related to memory recall or a lack of 
confidence). Moreover, it does not take into account that there may be 
individual differences in people’s ability to detect rapidly presented pictures. The 
authors address this limitation in their discussion section where they state that 
they “cannot rule out the possibility that some presentations of images were 
correctly identified or that any awareness that occurred contributed to the effect 
on attitude change.” (p.995).  
Second, even if one assumes that the method is suitable to exclude 
conscious awareness of the stimuli, the empirical support provided by the two 
studies might not be sufficient to yield substantial evidence for the hypothesis 
that AA training is indeed possible with subliminal stimulus presentation. In 
order to investigate this issue, we performed Bayesian analyses. Bayesian 
analyses provide a Bayes Factor that denotes the weight of evidence provided by 
the data for competing hypotheses. As such, Bayes Factors can provide an 
indication of how strongly the data support either the null hypothesis (BF0; 
reflecting the absence of a significant effect) or the alternative hypothesis (BF1; 
reflecting the presence of a significant effect). BF scores can be computed for 
both the null and the alternative hypothesis. BF scores smaller than 1, between 1 
and 3, and between 3 and 10, respectively designate ‘no evidence’, ‘anecdotal 
evidence’, and ‘substantial evidence’ for either the null or the alternative 
hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961). For instance, when BF0 = 10 (and BF1= 1/10 = .10) the 
observed data are 10 times as likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis 
than under the alternative hypothesis, providing substantial evidence for the null 
hypothesis. When BF1 = 2.5 (and BF0 = 1/2.5 = .40) the observed data are 2.5 
times as likely to have occurred under the alternative hypothesis than under the 
null hypothesis, providing anecdotal evidence for the alternative hypothesis. We 
reanalyzed the critical t-tests reported in Jones et al. (2011), and Kawakami et al. 
(2007) for all experiments that showed effects of subliminal AA training on 
stimulus evaluations by computing a Bayes factor (BF) according to the 
procedures outlined by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009). 
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Though the obtained BF scores always provided evidence in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis (that subliminal AA training causes significant changes in 
implicit evaluations), the evidence was only anecdotal (Kawakami et al. 
Experiment 2: BF1 = 2.31; Jones et al. Experiment 1: BF1 = 1.64; Jones et al. 
Experiment 2: BF1 = 1.26). This attests that replication is warranted to establish 
the robustness of the subliminal AA training effect. We also assessed the 
available evidence across these experiments by performing a Bayes factor meta-
analysis (Rouder & Morey, 2011). This analysis did provide strong evidence for 
subliminal AA training effects, BF1 = 46.46 (Table 1). However, this value may be 
artificially inflated because no unsuccessful attempts have ever been reported, 
possibly due to the file-drawer problem. 
Table 1. 





N Test statistic Bayesian  
t-test 
Kawakami et al.  
(2007, Exp. 2) 
Black 
people 
IAT 50 t(47) = 2.28,  
p = .027 
BF1 = 2.31,  
Anecdotal (H1) 
Jones et al.  
(2011, Exp. 1) 
Insects Rating task 42 t(40) = 2.08,  
p = .044 
BF1 = 1.64,  
Anecdotal (H1) 
Jones et al.  
(2011, Exp. 2) 
Spiders Personalized 
IAT 
118 t(116) = 2.04,  
p= .044 




  210  BF1 = 46.46,  
Strong (H1) 







t(60) = -0.21,  
p = .83 
t(60) = 0.19,  
p = .85 
BF0 = 4.49,  
Substantial (H0) 
BF0 = 3.34,  
Substantial (H0) 





76 t(74) = -0.17,  
p = .87 
t(74) = -0.28,  
p = .78 
BF0 = 6.49,  
Substantial (H0) 







96 t(95) = -0.52, 
p = .60 
t(95) = -0.91,  
p = .37 
BF0 = 9.14,  
Substantial (H0) 
BF0 = 11.38,  
Strong (H0) 





234  BF0 = 10.34,  
Strong (H0) 
  Explicit 
evaluation 











 BF0 = 3.64,  
Substantial (H0) 
BF0 = 6.51,  
Substantial (H0) 
We performed the current research in order to gain more information on 
whether AA training effects can be observed with subliminal stimulus 
presentations. Most importantly, we included more sensitive checks of 
perceptual stimulus discriminability that are based on participants' forced-choice 
decisions regarding the identity of the stimulus by using d′ measures. These 
measures are widely used in studies with subliminal stimulus presentations 
because they provide an objective assessment of stimulus discriminability 
(Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001). If we would find robust AA training effects 
also when these measures indicate that participants are unable to discriminate 
the stimuli, this would constitute important evidence that AA training can change 
evaluations in the absence of awareness of the stimuli and thus stimulus-action 
contingencies. If, on the other hand, AA training effects strongly depend on 
participants’ ability to discriminate the stimuli, this would be consistent with the 
idea that AA training effects necessarily involve stimulus awareness. 
In this paper, we report three experiments. Experiments 2 and 3 examined 
subliminal AA training effects for evaluations of novel stimuli, whereas 
Experiment 1 was an exact replication of the experiment by Kawakami et al. 
(2007, Experiment 2) who found subliminal AA training effects on evaluations of 
Black and White social groups. This experiment was selected for replication 
because it provided the ‘strongest’ evidence in favor of subliminal AA training 
effects (BF1 = 2.31). We used Kawakami et al.‘s exact procedures and materials 
and extended upon Kawakami et al. by (1) including a d’ measure of stimulus 
perceptibility to examine whether stimulus presentations were indeed 
subliminal, (2) including also explicit measures of evaluations to assess subliminal 
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AA training effects, and (3) supplementing the data analytic strategies that 





Sixty-two native Dutch-speaking undergraduates (49 women) participated 
in exchange for a monetary reward of 7 euros. This sample size was determined 
by performing a power analysis according to the procedures recommended by 
Cohen (1988) with the aid of G-Power software (version 3.1.). We ensured that 
the power to obtain an effect size of d = 0.67 (the effect size observed by 
Kawakami et al., 2007) was greater than .80 (achieved power = .84). All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive with 
respect to the purpose of the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned 
to an approach Blacks training condition where they received training to 
approach subliminally presented photographs of Black people and avoid 
subliminally presented photographs of White people or to a control condition 
where they received training to make a leftward or rightward movement in 




Apparatus and Materials 
The experiment was programmed and presented using the Direct RT 
Empirisoft Software package (DirectRTv2012) on a Tori PC with a 19-inch monitor 
(85 Hz refresh rate). The stimuli for the AA training task and the IAT (i.e., black-
                                                      
1
 In contrast to the procedure by Kawakami et al. (2007), we decided not to include a 
condition where participants received training to avoid photographs of Black people and 
approach photographs of White people. This was done out of ethical concerns and because 
participants in the control condition and avoid Blacks condition typically do not exhibit significant 
changes in their evaluations (see Kawakami et al.; Phills et al., 2011). 
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and-white photographs of 30 Black faces, 30 White faces, and 48 moonscapes) 
and the script for the subliminal AA training task were provided to us by one of 
the authors of Kawakami et al. (2007). 
Procedure 
Participants were seated at a desk in an individual cubicle in front of a 
computer with a keyboard and joystick (Logitech Wingman) attached to it. After 
participants had given informed consent, they were informed that they would 
perform a series of unrelated tasks. Participants in the approach Blacks training 
condition were instructed to pull the joystick toward themselves when the word 
‘approach’ was presented and to push the joystick away from themselves when 
the word ‘avoid’ was presented. Participants in the control condition were 
instructed to push the joystick to the right when presented with the word ‘right’ 
and to push the joystick to the left when presented with the word ‘left’. 
 The AA training task consisted of ten blocks of 48 trials. On each trial, a 
forward mask consisting of a photograph of a moonscape was presented for 300 
ms and followed by a photograph of a Black or White person’s face presented for 
23.52 ms (two refresh cycles). A backward moonscape mask was then presented 
for 35.29 ms (three refresh cycles) and followed by the word “approach” or the 
word “avoid” (in the approach Blacks training condition) or the word “left” or the 
word “right” (in the control condition)
2
. In the approach Blacks training 
condition, a Black face was always followed by the word approach and a White 
face was followed by the word avoid. In the control condition, for half the 
participants, the word “left” followed a Black face and the word “right” followed 
a White face. For the other half of the participants of the control condition, the 
contingencies of left/right word and Black/White face were reversed. The word 
remained on screen until participants responded by moving the joystick. After 
participants made a correct response, a blank screen was presented for 1000 ms 
before the start of the next trial. After incorrect responses, participants were 
                                                      
2
 We ensured by careful pre-testing that presentation times of photographs and backward 
masks, as registered by the Direct RT program, were exactly 23.52 ms and 35.29 ms on each 
presentation. 
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presented with a blank screen for 100 ms, followed by the presentation of a red 
X in the middle of the screen for 800 ms. Another blank screen was presented for 
100 ms before the start of the next trial. 
 Participants then performed an IAT where they categorized photographs 
of six Black and six White faces which had not been used in the AA training task 
along with positive and negative words. In accordance with standard IAT 
procedures (Greenwald et al., 1998), participants were presented with five 
blocks of trials. Participants started with two practice blocks, one in which they 
categorized the photographs into the categories Black or White and one in which 
they categorized words as positive or negative. Categorization was done by 
pushing a left (‘Q’) or right key (‘M’) on an AZERTY keyboard. The practice blocks 
were followed by a critical block in which participants categorized both words 
and photographs. The practice block with Black and White faces was then 
repeated, but the response assignments were reversed. Finally, the critical block 
was repeated with the reversed response assignment for the Black and White 
faces. Each critical block consisted of 60 trials in which a word or photograph was 
presented in the center of the screen until the participant pressed one of the two 
valid keys. If the response was correct, the word disappeared and the next trial 
started 400 ms later. If the response was incorrect, the word was replaced by a 
red “X” for 400 ms. The next trial started 400 ms after the red “X” was removed 
from the screen. 
After the IAT, we assessed participants’ explicit evaluations of Black and 
White people. First, participants completed liking ratings and thermometer 
ratings of self-reported feelings of warmth towards Black and White people on 
two 9-point Likert scales (1 = not liked/warm at all; 9 = completely liked/warm). 
Second, participants completed a ten-item version of Pettigrew and Meertens’ 
(1995) questionnaire assessing subtle and blatant racial prejudice, adapted to a 
Belgian context (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005). 
Subsequently, a funnel debriefing procedure was used to question 
participants for awareness of the stimuli, stimulus-action contingencies and 
research hypotheses. Participants indicated: (1) what the purpose of the 
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experiment and of the joystick task was, (2) what the relationship was between 
the joystick task and the categorization task, (3) whether they had noticed 
anything suspicious about the background in the joystick task, and (4) what the 
specific content of the background flashes was. We also asked participants to 
indicate what the stimulus-action contingencies were, but only if they had 
correctly identified the nature of the stimuli. 
Finally, participants performed a perceptibility task in which they 
categorized the photographs of Black and White persons’ faces masked under 
the same conditions as in the AA training task. The task consisted of two blocks 
of 48 trials. Trials were identical to the AA training trials with the exception that 
(1) target words were replaced with strings of ‘XXXX’ and (2) participants did not 
perform AA actions but responded to the photographs that were presented 
before these strings. They responded by pushing the ‘Z’ key when the 
photograph depicted the face of a Black person and the ‘B’ key when the 
photograph depicted the face of a White person. Participants did not receive 
feedback about the accuracy of their responses. 
Results 
Awareness and Perceptibility 
Thirteen participants (21 %) indicated that photographs of faces had been 
presented during the AA training task. Seven participants (11%), 6 of which were 
in the approach Blacks training condition, indicated that these were faces of 
Black and White people. Of these participants, six (10%) expressed suspicion that 
the purpose of performing the AA training task was related to the purpose of 
performing the IAT and four (6%), all in the approach Blacks training condition, 
indicated that the purpose of the AA training task was to target racial prejudice 
by approaching faces of Black people. 
The overall accuracy in the perceptibility task was 54% (SD = 6%). We 
computed the signal detection sensitivity measure d’ with hits defined as ‘Black’ 
responses on trials with photographs of Blacks, and false alarms as ‘Black’ 
responses on trials with photographs of Whites. The d’ score indicated that 
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participants’ detection performance was (marginally significantly) above chance 
level (M = 0.17, SD = 0.67), t(61) = 1.98, p =.053. Twenty-two participants (35%), 
12 in the approach Blacks training condition, including 6 of the participants who 
indicated they had seen faces of Black and White people, had an individual d’ 
score above the 95% confidence interval (d’ > 0.34), which indicates a potential 
capability to see the masked prime (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Performance 
of two of these participants was very high (d’ > 1) even though they had not 
reported awareness of the stimuli in the debriefing questions. 
Implicit evaluation 
IAT D4 scores were calculated following the procedure by Greenwald, 
Nosek and Banaji (2003). Positive scores reflect a preference for White people 
over Black people. Similar to Kawakami et al. (2007), a one-sample t-test 
revealed that participants displayed a strong implicit preference for White 
people (M = 0.23, SD = 0.40), t(61) = 4.47, p < .001, d = 0.58, BF1 = 595.87. 
However, contrasting Kawakami et al.’s findings, a between-subjects t-test did 
not reveal a significant difference in IAT scores for participants who approached 
Blacks and avoided Whites (M = 0.24, SD = 0.38) compared to participants in the 
left/right control condition (M = 0.22, SD = 0.42), t(60) = -0.21, p =.83, d = 0.05. 
The BF score provided substantial evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (BF0 = 
4.49). We performed an additional t-test excluding the data of the 13 
participants who expressed awareness of the presentation of subliminal 
presentation of faces. Again, we observed no subliminal AA training effect, t(47) 
= 0.29, p =.78, d = 0.07, BF0 = 3.01. We also did not observe significantly reduced 
IAT scores for those participants in the approach Blacks training condition who 
had reported seeing photographs of Black and White people, t(5) = 0.83, p =.78, 
BF0 = 1.70, or who had an individual d’ score above the 95% confidence interval, 
t(11) = 0.47, p =.68, BF0 = 2.46. Note that the latter analyses revealed only 
anecdotal evidence in favour of the null hypothesis, which is not surprising given 
that they included only a very small sample of participants. 
Explicit evaluation 
We calculated liking rating scores (M = 0.19, SD = 0.33) and warmth rating 
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scores (M = 0.15, SD = 0.29) by subtracting each participants’ liking and warmth 
ratings for Black people from the corresponding ratings for White people. A 
score for subtle racism (M = 3.77, SD = 0.86, Cronbach’s α = 0.51) and a score for 
blatant racism (M = 1.80, SD =0.69, Cronbach’s α = 0.73) was calculated by 
summing the ratings for the items in the racism scales and dividing this by the 
number of items. The four resulting explicit evaluation scores correlated 
significantly (blatant racism – subtle racism: r[60] = 0.57; blatant racism – liking 
rating: r[60] = 0.32; blatant racism – warmth rating: r[60] = 0.47; subtle racism – 
liking rating: r[60] = 0.39; subtle racism – warmth rating: r[60] = 0.32; liking rating 
– warmth rating: r[60] = 0.70), ps < .012. The IAT score correlated significantly 
with the liking rating score, r(60) = 0.29, p =.020, and warmth rating score, r(60) = 
0.30, p =.016, but not with the blatant racism scale score, r(60) = 0.08, p =.54, or 
the subtle racism scale score, r(60) = 0.18, p =.17. Similar to the IAT score, the 
explicit rating scores indicated a significant preference for White people over 
Black people. Participants’ liking and warmth ratings were higher for White 
people (liking: M = 6.85, SD = 1.34; warmth: M = 6.61, SD = 1.40) than for Black 
people (liking: M = 6.11, SD = 1.48; warmth: M = 6.02, SD = 1.59), ts > 4.03, ps 
<.001, BF1s> 153.60. Most importantly, however, none of the explicit evaluation 
scores revealed significant differences between the approach Blacks training 
group and the control group, ts < 0.32, ps >.74, ds < 0.01, BF0s > 2.99. 
Discussion 
Despite using the same subliminal AA training procedure as Kawakami et 
al. (2007), we were unable to replicate the effect on implicit evaluations (or 
provide evidence for an additional effect on explicit evaluations). To account for 
these discrepant results, a number of explanations can be considered. First, 
though power calculations were used to determine the sample size and ascertain 
that we had sufficient power to detect the effect size observed by Kawakami et 
al., we may have lacked the power to detect an effect of smaller effect size (i.e., 
for a medium effect: power = 0.62; for a small effect: power = 0.25). However, 
Bayesian analyses indicated that our findings already provide substantial 
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evidence that subliminal AA training does not allow for changes in participants’ 
implicit or explicit evaluations. Second, as suggested to us by one of the authors 
of Kawakami et al., the discrepancy between our results and the original results 
may relate to important differences in participants’ baseline levels of racial 
prejudice due to cross-cultural differences. Our participant sample consisted of 
Belgian undergraduates, whereas participants in Kawakami et al.’s study were 
undergraduates from North America. Prejudice towards Black people may be 
more relevant (and more robust) for the latter population (e.g., due to a long 
history of conflict between these two racial groups; see Perlmutter, 1999). 
Because previous evidence suggests that AA training effects are observed only 
when the training is inconsistent with participants’ racial bias (e.g., Phills et al., 
2011), a smaller overall effect of AA training may be observed if a smaller subset 
of participants have this bias in our sample, which may explain why we did not 
find any subliminal AA training effects. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in 
our study, we did observe a strong preference for White people over Black 
people both on implicit and explicit measures of evaluation. To corroborate this, 
we examined the IAT scores of volunteers with Belgian or US nationality who 
completed a race IAT on the Project Implicit research website 
(https://implicit.harvard.edu) in the years 2002-2012 (Xu, Nosek, & Greenwald, 
2014). We observed a significant preference for White people over Black people 
for both Belgian (M = 0.44, SD = 0.39), t(71) = 9.46, p <.001, d = 1.13, and US 
participants (M = 0.37, SD = 0.43), t(30343) = 152.19, p <.001, d = 0.86. 
Importantly, The IAT prejudice score was even slightly lower for US participants 
than for Belgian participants. Hence, the lack of substantial AA effects in this 
study could not be attributed to lower baseline levels of racial prejudice toward 
Black people in the present sample. 
Alternatively, the effect that was observed by Kawakami et al. (2007) may 
have simply been a Type I error. In line with this idea, Bayesian analyses 
indicated that the data obtained by Kawakami et al. provided only anecdotal 
evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis (i.e., that IAT scores differed 
significantly between approach Blacks training and control conditions). In 
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contrast, our data provided substantial evidence for the null hypothesis. Another 
possible explanation is that in the experiment reported by Kawakami et al., some 
participants identified the stimulus-action contingencies and, though they failed 
to report this in the awareness questions, fuelled the effect. In line with this idea, 
our experiment provided evidence that (1) with the reported presentation times, 
participants are sometimes able to discriminate the race of the person presented 
in the photograph, and (2) participants may not always report this in the 
debriefing questions (e.g., the two participants with the best performance in the 
stimulus discriminability task did not report stimulus awareness). Moreover, we 
found that participants who performed the subliminal approach Blacks training 
(but not participants in the control group) sometimes identified the purpose of 
performing the AA training task. This may reduce participants’ implicit prejudice 
if, for instance, participants adapt to the demands of the interpersonal context 
(Castelli & Tomelleri, 2008; Richeson & Ambady, 2003). In our study, however, 
this did not cause any significant differences in evaluations between participants 
in the approach Blacks training group and the control group. More specifically, 
we did not even find AA training effects for participants who were able to 
discriminate the race of the presented persons or reported seeing pictures of 
Black or White persons. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 failed to provide support for the idea that training to 
approach respectively avoid subliminally presented photographs of Black and 
White people causes changes in the evaluations of these well-known social 
groups. In Experiments 2 and 3, we shifted our focus to the investigation of 
subliminal AA training effects for novel stimuli
3
. Subliminal AA training effects 
may be more robust for these stimuli because AA effects are more easily 
                                                      
3
 In both experiments the novel stimuli were introduced shortly before participants 
performed the AA training task to ensure that participants would not have to create a 
representation of the stimulus under conditions of subliminal presentation. 
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established for neutral as compared with initially valenced stimuli (e.g., Priester, 
Cacioppo, & Petty, 1996; Woud, Becker, Lange, & Rinck, 2013; Van Dessel, De 
Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2015). This finding is related to the general idea that 
changing preferences is more difficult than establishing novel preferences (e.g., 
Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). The stimuli we used in Experiment 2 were 
unfamiliar faces. Previous AA training studies have provided robust effects for 
these stimuli (Woud et al., 2008; 2013; Van Dessel, De Houwer, & Gast, 2015; but 
see: Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011) and evidence suggests that AA effects are 
larger for face stimuli compared to other pictorial stimuli (Laham, Kashima, Dix, 
& Wheeler, in press). 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was twofold: (1) to establish whether 
changes in implicit and explicit evaluations of novel face stimuli can arise as the 
result of subliminal AA training, and (2) to compare effects of subliminal AA 
training with effects that result from instructions about stimulus-action 
contingencies. To this end, participants were informed about the contingencies 
between the four face stimuli and the AA actions in the subliminal AA training 
task before they performed the task. Unbeknownst to participants, the 
contingency information was incompatible with the AA training for half of the 
stimuli. Consequently, each face was assigned to one of the following four 
conditions: (1) approach training and approach instructions, (2) approach 
training and avoid instructions, (3) avoid training and approach instructions, or 
(4) avoid training and avoid instructions. Participants’ evaluations of the faces 
were registered with explicit evaluative ratings and an implicit measure of 
evaluation (the evaluative priming task; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 
1986). 
This experimental set-up allowed us to test specific predictions derived 
from associative and propositional accounts of AA training effects. If AA training 
effects arise as the result of the gradual automatic formation of associations, 
then changes in evaluations should reflect the contingencies in the subliminal AA 
training task. These effects may be observed more strongly on implicit 
evaluations because implicit evaluations are considered to reflect the automatic 
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activation of associations in memory (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). If, on 
the other hand, AA training effects critically depend on the acquisition of 
propositional information, then changes in evaluations should always be in line 
with the provided contingency information. Acquiring this information may 
influence both explicit and implicit stimulus evaluations (see De Houwer, 2014). 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-six native Dutch-speaking undergraduates (61 women) 
participated in exchange for a monetary reward of 5 euros. None of the 
participants had previously participated in Experiment 1. 
Apparatus and Materials 
Four photographs of female faces, selected from the set of materials used 
by Van Dessel, De Houwer, and Gast (2015), served as stimuli for the AA training 
task. For the evaluative priming task, seven positive words (the Dutch words for 
happy, pleasant, sweet, kind, friendly, sympathetic, and fun), and seven negative 
words (the Dutch words for unfriendly, irritating, hostile, bad, moody, 
unpleasant, and mean) were selected to serve as target stimuli and the four 
photographs of faces were used as primes. 
The experiment was programmed in C-language and presented using the C-
library Tscope package (Tscope 1.0.171.) on a Tori PC with a 19-inch monitor (80 
Hz refresh rate), a keyboard and a joystick (Wingman Attack 2) attached to it. 
Procedure 
After participants had given informed consent, they were seated in front of 
a computer screen. Half of the participants read the following instructions 
(translated from Dutch): 
In this experiment, you will see photographs of different faces. You will approach 
a specific number of these faces by pulling the joystick towards you. You will 
avoid other faces by pushing the joystick away from you. 
The photographs of faces will be presented in such a way that you will not be able 
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to perceive them consciously. For this reason, we will present a word immediately 
following the presentation of a specific face. This word will indicate whether a 
face was presented that is to be approached or avoided.  
Please respond by moving the joystick forward when the word ‘APPROACH’ is 
presented and respond by moving the joystick backward when the word ‘AVOID’ 
is presented.  
Before we start the task we will teach you which faces you will approach and 
which faces you will avoid. 
These participants thus received instructions to approach by pulling a 
joystick towards them (an arm flexion movement) and to avoid by pushing the 
joystick away from them (an arm extension movement). The other half of the 
participants received identical instructions except that they were instructed to 
approach by moving themselves towards the screen with the joystick (an arm 
extension movement) and to avoid by moving themselves away from the screen 
with the joystick (an arm flexion movement).
4
  
Subsequently, participants were shown the four faces that would be 
presented during the AA training task. Above two faces approach instructions 
were presented: “These are the faces you will have to approach” (‘approach 
instruction faces’) and avoid instructions were presented above the other two 
faces: “These are the faces you will have to avoid” (‘avoid instruction faces’). 
Participants were asked to make sure that they would not forget which action 
belonged with each face. 
The AA training task consisted of two blocks of 160 trials. During each 
training block, each of the four faces was presented on 40 occasions and was 
always presented with either the word ‘approach’ or the word ‘avoid’. For each 
                                                      
4
 Some theories have argued that AA effects depend on whether the AA action consists of 
arm flexion or arm extension (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993), or on the specific 
instructions that are used to frame these actions as approach or avoidance (e.g., Laham et al., 
2014). Because Kawakami et al. (2007) and Jones et al. (2013) used different action framing 
instructions (and incongruent mappings of movement to AA action label), we decided to include 
both action framing instructions in our experiment. 
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participant, one of the approach instruction and one of the avoid instruction 
faces was always paired with approach (‘approach training faces’) and the other 
faces were always paired with avoid (‘avoid training faces’). To avoid biases, we 
randomized the assignment of faces to the AA training action and AA instruction 
action. Similar to Experiment 1, on each trial of the AA training task a moonscape 
mask was presented for 300 ms, followed by a photograph presented for 23 ms 
and a backward moonscape mask presented for 33 ms. Then the word approach 
or avoid was presented until participants responded correctly with the joystick 
by performing a vertical movement towards the screen or away from the screen. 
After 200 ms the next trial started. 
For half the participants, the AA training task was immediately followed by 
an evaluative priming task. The other half of the participants first completed 
explicit ratings. In the evaluative priming task, participants categorized target 
words as either positive or negative using the E and I keys of a computer 
keyboard. The assignment of the response keys to either the positive or negative 
category was counterbalanced across participants and across task order and 
action framing conditions. Participants were instructed to perform this 
categorization task as quickly as possible, while making as few mistakes as 
possible. Participants were further told that they would see photographs of faces 
presented before the words and that they could look at these photographs, but 
that their task was simply to respond to the positive and negative words. In line 
with standard procedures at our lab (Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 
2007), a single trial consisted of a fixation cross presented for 500 ms, a blank 
screen for 500 ms, a prime for 200 ms, a post-prime pause for 50 ms and the 
target word in white font for 1500 ms or until the participant had given a 
response. Error feedback was presented on the screen (i.e., the Dutch word for 
‘wrong’ presented in red font) for 250 ms if participants made an error. The 
inter-trial interval was set to vary randomly between 500 ms and 1500 ms. 
Participants completed 224 trials separated into two blocks, each containing 14 
trials with each of the faces as prime and a positive or negative word as target, 
presented in random order. 
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The explicit ratings consisted of two questions for each of the faces. 
Participants indicated whether they liked the person in the photograph and 
whether they thought the person in the photograph was friendly on two eight-
point Likert scales (0 = not liked at all/not friendly at all; 7 = liked a lot/very 
friendly). For each face, we collapsed these score ratings into one explicit rating 
score by averaging the respective ratings. The internal consistency of this score 
was good (mean Cronbach’s α = 0.76, SD = 0.04). 
After the implicit and explicit evaluation tasks, participants completed 
questions assessing their memory for the instructed stimulus-action 
contingencies. Each of the faces was presented in a random order and 
participants were asked to indicate what action they had performed in response 
to this face according to the instructions. Participants answered by selecting an 
option on a dropdown menu with “Approach”, “Avoid”, and “I don’t remember” 
as possible answers. 
Subsequently, participants indicated whether they had ever seen any face 
during the joystick task by choosing from three options (i.e., “Yes, clearly”, “Yes, 
but I couldn’t identify which face”, and “No, never”). Then each of the faces was 
presented again and participants reported on how many occasions they had seen 
this face during the subliminal training task by entering a number between 0 and 
320. 
Finally, participants performed a perceptibility task which consisted of 80 
trials. Trials were identical to the subliminal AA training trials with the exception 
that (1) the words approach and avoid were replaced with strings of ‘XXXX’, and 
(2) participants indicated which of the four faces was presented on each trial by 
pushing one of four keys on the numeric keypad (1-4). 
Results 
Awareness and Perceptibility 
On average, participants selected the correct instructed action for the faces 
82% of the time (SD = 32%). The number of correct instructed action 
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identifications was identical for faces with compatible instruction and training 
(e.g., approach instructions and approach training; M = 82%, SD = 34%) and faces 
with incompatible instruction and training (e.g., approach instructions and avoid 
training; M = 82%, SD = 34%). 
In response to the question whether they had ever seen any face during 
the joystick task, one participant (1%) indicated ‘yes, clearly’, eleven participants 
(15%) indicated ‘yes, but I couldn’t identify which face’, and 64 participants (84%) 
indicated they had not seen any of the faces. 
Participants’ overall detection accuracy in the perceptibility task was 
26.17% (SD = 4.85%), which was significantly above the chance level of 25%, t(75) 
= 2.10, p = .039. Individual accuracy scores of 27 participants (36%) were above 
the 95% confidence interval (> 27.28%). 
Implicit Evaluation 
For the analysis of the evaluative priming task reaction time data, trials 
with an incorrect response were dropped (4.6%) as well as trials in which 
reaction times (RTs) were at least 2.5 standard deviations removed from an 
individual’s mean (2.9%)
5
 (Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007). RTs 
were subjected to a mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) that contained 3 within-
subject factors: Prime AA Instructions (approach, avoidance), Prime AA Training 
(approach, avoidance), Target Valence (positive, negative), and 2 between-
subject factors: Order (evaluative priming task first, explicit rating task first) and 
Action Framing (approach by pulling, approach by moving towards the screen). 
We observed a main effect of Target Valence, F(1,72) = 56.64, p < .001, η
2
p = 
0.44, indicating that participants were faster to detect a positive target (M = 569, 
SD = 82) than to detect a negative target (M = 590, SD = 85). We also observed a 
main effect of Action Framing, F(1,72) = 6.14, p = .016, η
2
p = 0.08, indicating that, 
overall, participants were faster if they had approached faces by pulling the 
joystick in the subliminal AA training task. More importantly, we observed an 
                                                      
5
 Including these trials did not result in any shift in significance for any of the reported 
effects. 
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interaction effect of Target Valence and Prime AA Instructions, F(1,72) = 5.68, p = 
.020, η
2
p = 0.07 (Table 2). Participants were faster when the valence of the target 
word was compatible with the valence of the AA instruction for the face prime 
(i.e., positive target and approach instruction face [M = 565, SD = 88], or negative 
target and avoid instruction face [M = 588, SD = 83]), than when they were 
incompatible (i.e., positive target and avoid instruction face [M = 572, SD = 77], 
or negative target and approach instruction face [M = 593, SD = 87]). In contrast, 
the interaction of Target Valence and Prime AA Training was not significant, 
F(1,72) = 0.03, p = .87, η
2
p < 0.01, nor were any other main or interaction effects, 
Fs < 1.44., ps > .23. 
Table 2. 
Mean RTs in the evaluative priming task in Experiment 2 as a function of Prime AA 
Instructions, Prime AA Training, and Target Valence. 









Positive Target 565 (83) 565 (93) 571 (77) 572 (78) 
Negative Target 593 (84) 593 (90) 586 (83) 589 (84) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
To further examine participants’ implicit preference for approach training 
and approach instruction faces, we calculated two indices of AA effects. An index 
of the AA training effect was calculated by subtracting evaluative priming RTs for 
trials where target valence was compatible with the valence of the AA training 
for the face prime (i.e., trials with approach training face and positive target or 
avoid training face and negative target) from RTs for trials where target valence 
was incompatible with the valence of the AA training for the face prime (i.e., 
trials with avoid training face and positive target or approach training face and 
negative target). An index of the AA instruction effect was calculated in the same 
manner for trials where target valence and valence of the AA instructions for the 
face prime were compatible or incompatible. One-sample t-tests indicated a 
significant effect of AA instructions (M = 23, SD = 83), t(75) = 2.40, p = .019, d = 
0.28, BF1 = 4.58, but no effect of AA training (M = -2, SD = 94), t(75) = -0.17, p = 
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.87, d = 0.02, BF0 = 6.49. 
We performed a linear regression of participants’ detection scores in the 
perceptibility task on the index of the AA training effect. We did not observe a 
significant positive intercept, b1 = -23.27, t(74) = -0.39, p = .70, indicating that 
participants whose detection performance was at chance level did not exhibit a 
significant AA training effect. The slope was also not significant, b2 = 81.98, t(74) 
= 0.37, p = .72, which indicates that the AA training effect was not a function of 
stimulus visibility. 
Explicit evaluation 
The explicit rating scores were subjected to a mixed ANOVA that included 
AA Instructions and AA Training as within-subjects factors, and Order and Action 
Framing as between-subjects factors. The analysis revealed a main effect of AA 
Instructions, F(1,72) = 16.19, p < .001, η
2
p = 0.19 (Table 3). Participants preferred 
faces they were instructed to approach (M = 3.88, SD = 1.50) over faces they 
were instructed to avoid (M = 2.93, SD = 1.44). The main effect of Action Framing 
was also significant, indicating that participants who approached by pulling and 
avoided by pushing evaluated the faces more positively compared to participants 
where the framing was reversed, F(1,72) = 7.18, p = .009, η
2
p = 0.09. No other 
effects reached significance, Fs < 1.94, ps >.16. 
Table 3. 
Mean explicit rating scores in Experiment 2 as a function of AA Instructions and AA 
Training. 









Explicit Rating score 3.91 (1.62) 3.86 (1.38) 2.87 (1.41) 2.99 (1.43) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
We calculated indices of the AA training and AA instruction effect by 
subtracting the explicit rating scores for avoid training faces from explicit rating 
scores for approach training faces and explicit rating scores for avoid instruction 
faces from explicit rating scores for approach instruction faces. These indices 
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correlated significantly with the corresponding indices of AA effects on implicit 
evaluations, rs > 0.39, ps <.001. Similar to the results for implicit evaluations, we 
observed a significant effect of AA instructions (M = 1.90, SD = 4.06), t(74) = 4.09, 
p < .001, d = 0.47, BF1 = 412.97, but no significant effect of AA training (M = -
0.07, SD = 2.26), t(74) = -0.28, p = .78, d = 0.03, BF0 = 7.00. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we obtained no evidence that subliminal training to 
approach or avoid face stimuli causes changes in implicit or explicit evaluations 
of these stimuli. In contrast, we observed changes in both implicit and explicit 
evaluations as the result of instructions about the stimulus-action contingencies. 
This corroborates previous findings of AA instruction effects (Van Dessel, De 
Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2015), and extends these findings by showing that AA 
instruction effects occur even if (subliminal) AA training is provided that is 
incompatible with the provided information. These findings are more consistent 
with a propositional account of AA training effects than with associative accounts 
which suggest that AA training effects result from the gradual and automatic 
formation of associations. 
Some aspects of our procedure, however, may have impeded the detection 
of subliminal AA training effects. First, we may have lacked the power to detect a 
small effect (power = .53 to detect an effect-size of d = 0.20). However, Bayesian 
analyses indicated that our data provide substantial evidence that subliminal AA 
training does not cause changes in evaluations. In contrast, these analyses 
indicated strong evidence in favor of AA instruction effects. Second, the mere 
presence of AA instructions might have somehow interfered with the subliminal 
training effect. For instance, subliminal AA training may not work in the presence 
of opposite AA instructions because (1) these instructions allow the stimulus to 
acquire a specific valence (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2015), and (2) 
recently established (implicit) evaluations may not be easily undone (Gregg et al., 
2006). Third, we used Kawakami et al. (2007)’s procedure for the subliminal 
presentation of the face stimuli. Though this procedure may allow participants to 
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identify the race of the depicted person, it may be more difficult to register the 
identity of the face stimulus. Arguing against this explanation, however, research 
with event related brain potentials (ERPs) suggests that participants can process 
the identity of masked face stimuli that are presented for these short durations 
(e.g., Lee, Lim, Lee, & Choi, 2009). Moreover, performance in the detection task 
indicated that participants were able to discriminate the face stimuli better than 
chance level. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In Experiment 3, we changed our set-up to create more optimal 
circumstances for subliminal AA training effects to occur. First, novel non-words 
were used as stimuli. Previous research suggests that AA effects on evaluations 
are weaker for associatively rich stimuli than for associatively-impoverished 
stimuli such as non-words (e.g., Priester et al., 1996). Second, we tried to 
maximize the possibility that participants would be able to register the identity 
of the stimuli during the subliminal training task by modeling the subliminal 
presentation procedure after studies that established subliminal priming effects 
on the basis of the identity of non-words (Holcomb & Grainger, 2006; 
Beyersmann, Castles, & Coltheart, 2009). Third, we tested a larger sample of 
participants (N = 96) to have sufficient statistical power (power = 0.80) to detect 
even a small effect size. Finally, we included a manipulation that might facilitate 
association formation under conditions of subliminal stimulus presentations 
(Custers & Aarts, 2011). 
Custers and Aarts (2011) proposed that association formation strongly 
depends on attentional processes. When people experience specific 
contingencies in the environment this may allow for the formation of 
associations in memory if their attentional system is prepared to process these 
contingencies. Under these circumstances, associative learning effects may arise 
even in the absence of awareness of the contingencies or in the absence of 
stimulus awareness (see also Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 
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2006; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). They further argued that the existence of a 
contingency relationship in the environment may tune participants’ attention to 
detect other such relationships. Thus, when participants experience specific 
contingencies before a learning phase with subliminal stimulus presentations, 
this may facilitate effects of associative learning. They tested this in three 
experiments and obtained evidence that the learning of predictive relations in a 
subliminal priming task was facilitated when participants engaged in predicting 
targets on the basis of cues in an earlier, unrelated task. 
If attention can be tuned to process contingency relations and if this 
facilitates association formation, then participants who experienced specific 
contingencies in an earlier AA training task may show stronger effects of 
subliminal AA training. To test this, we designed an experiment where 
participants performed an AA training task with supraliminal stimulus 
presentations prior to performing the subliminal AA training task. For half the 
participants the supraliminal AA training task involved specific stimulus-action 
contingencies (attention-tuning condition), for the other participants the identity 
of the stimulus did not predict the action: 50% contingency (control condition). 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-six native Dutch-speaking undergraduates (78 women) participated 
in exchange for a monetary reward of 5 euros. None of the participants had 
previously participated in Experiments 1 or 2. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the attention-tuning condition or to the control condition. 
Apparatus and Materials 
Four non-words were selected as evaluation stimuli from previous studies 
that registered Dutch-speaking participants’ evaluations of non-words (Zanon, 
De Houwer, & Gast, 2012). The non-words for the supraliminal AA training task 
were UDIBNON and SARICIK. For the subliminal AA training task the non-words 
were LOKANTA and FEVKANI. The attribute stimuli used in the IAT were four 
positive words (the Dutch words for happy, pleasant, fun, and nice) and four 
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negative words (the Dutch words for mean, unpleasant, irritating, and bad). 
Procedure 
Upon entering, participants were seated at a desk and were informed that 
they would perform a series of tasks. They were asked to remember that some 
of these tasks involved reacting to two non-existing words, specifically LOKANTA 
and FEVKANI (the non-words for the subliminal training task). Participants were 
then instructed that in the first task they would respond to the words 
“approach” and “avoid” by making approach or avoidance movements with the 
joystick. The same action framing instructions were used as in Experiment 2. 
The supraliminal AA training task consisted of 40 trials. The non-words 
SARICIK and UDIBNON were each presented on 20 occasions. For participants in 
the attention-tuning condition, one of the non-words was always presented with 
the word approach and the other non-word was always paired with the word 
avoid. Assignment of the non-words SARICIK and UDIBNON to the approach or 
avoidance action was counterbalanced across participants. For participants in the 
control condition each non-word was equally often followed by the words 
approach and avoid. Each trial started with the presentation of a white fixation 
cross presented in the center of the screen for 500 ms, followed by a forward 
mask of # symbols presented for 500 ms. Then, one of the non-words was 
displayed for 500 ms after which the word approach or avoid was presented until 
participants responded correctly with the joystick by performing a vertical 
movement towards the screen or away from the screen. The inter-trial interval 
was 200 ms. 
Subsequently, participants were informed that they would now perform 
another joystick task. Trials in the subliminal training task were identical to the 
supraliminal training task trials with the following exceptions. First, there were 2 
blocks of 50 trials and in each of the blocks the non-word FEVKANI and the non-
word LOKANTA were each presented on 25 occasions. Second, for participants in 
both conditions one of the non-words was always presented with the word 
approach and the other non-word was always presented with the word avoid. 
Assignment of the non-words FEVKANI and LOKANTA to the approach or 
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avoidance action was counterbalanced across participants and across conditions. 
Third, the presentation time of the non-words was limited to 40 ms. 
In the IAT, participants categorized attribute words as ‘positive’ or 
‘negative’ and target words FEVKANI and LOKANTA as ‘Fevkani’ or ‘Lokanta’ by 
using the E and I keys of a computer keyboard. To avoid that stimuli were 
classified only on the basis of simple perceptual features, each target stimulus 
was presented in four different fonts (lower case Arial Black, upper case Arial 
Black, lower case Fixedsys, and upper case Fixedsys), resulting in 8 different 
target stimuli. All other procedural details of the IAT were identical to 
Experiment 1. 
Participants then completed liking ratings and thermometer ratings of self-
reported warmth feelings towards each of the four non-words on two 8-point 
Likert scales (0 = not liked/warm at all; 7 = completely liked/warm). For each 
non-word, we collapsed these ratings into one explicit rating score by averaging 
the respective ratings. The internal consistency of this measure was good (mean 
Cronbach’s α = 0.76, SD = 0.04). 
Next, participants answered questions about the supraliminal AA training 
task: They indicated (1) whether they had noticed any regularities in the 
presentations of the words approach or avoid and the non-words UDIBNON and 
SARICIK, and (2) what action word had been presented most often with these 
non-words by choosing from four options (i.e., ‘approach’, ‘avoid’, ‘both an equal 
number of times’ or ‘I don’t remember’). For the subliminal training task, 
participants reported whether they had ever seen a stimulus appear before the 
words approach or avoid (yes/no). Then, participants were informed that the 
non-words FEVKANI and LOKANTA had been presented during this task and they 
indicated whether they had ever seen these words and what action word they 
thought had been presented most often with these non-words. 
Finally, participants performed a d’ perceptibility task which consisted of 
50 trials. Trials were identical to trials in the subliminal AA training task with the 
exception that (1) the words approach and avoid were replaced with strings of 
‘XXXX’, and (2) participants indicated whether FEVKANI or LOKANTA had been 
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presented by pushing key 1 or 2 on the numeric keypad. 
Results 
Awareness and Perceptibility 
First, we investigated participants’ awareness of the contingencies in the 
supraliminal AA training task. As expected, participants in the attention-tuning 
condition indicated more often that they had noticed regularities in the 
presentation of action words and non-words (52% of the time) than participants 
in the control condition (25% of the time), t(94) = 2.81, p = .006. Participants in 
the attention-tuning condition selected the correct action for the non-words (M 
= 44%, SD = 48%) more often than the incorrect action (M = 5%, SD = 21%), t(47) 
= 4.79, p < .001. Participants indicated that they did not know the correct action 
for the nonwords 43% of the time (SD = 48%) and that they had performed both 
actions an equal number of times 8% of the time (SD = 24%). 
For the subliminal AA training task, 20 participants (21%) indicated that 
they had noticed that a stimulus was sometimes presented before the 
approach/avoid word and16 participants (17%) indicated that the non-words 
FEVKANI and LOKANTA were presented. Participants did not select the correct 
action for the non-words (M = 6%, SD = 23%) significantly more often than the 
incorrect action (M = 5%, SD = 21%), t(95) = 0.32, p = .75. 
Participants’ overall accuracy in the perceptibility task was 65% (SD = 11%). 
The signal detection sensitivity measure d’ was computed with hits defined as 
LOKANTA responses on trials where LOKANTA was presented, and false alarms as 
LOKANTA responses on trials where FEVKANI was presented. The d’ score 
indicated that participants’ detection performance was above chance level (M = 
0.86, SD = 0.71), t(95) = 11.81, p < .001. 
Supraliminal AA training 
We examined whether supraliminal AA training caused changes in explicit 
rating scores for contingency aware and contingency unaware non-words. Non-
words were classified as contingency aware if participants had indicated the 
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correct action for the non-word (44%) and as contingency unaware if they had 
indicated the incorrect action or if they indicated that they didn’t know the 
correct action or that both actions had been performed an equal number of 
times (56%). Analyses were restricted to the data of participants in the attention-
tuning condition because only these participants experienced specific stimulus-
action contingencies. In line with Van Dessel, De Houwer, and Gast (2015), 
analyses were performed with item-based linear mixed effects models as 
implemented in R package lme-4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). We 
tested for an effect of supraliminal AA training by fitting a model that included 
Participant as a random factor and the fixed factors of Action (approach, avoid), 
Non-word (Saricik, Udibnon), and Contingency Awareness (contingency aware, 
contingency unaware). We observed a main effect of Action, χ
2
(1) = 3.84, p = 
.050, which was qualified by a marginally significant interaction effect of Action 
and Contingency Awareness, χ
2
(1) = 2.88, p = .090. A preference for approached 
non-words (M = 3.48, SD = 1.45) over avoided non-words (M = 2.50, SD = 1.11) 
was observed for contingency aware non-words, χ
2
(1) = 5.80, p = .016, d = 0.67, 
BF1 = 5.81, but not for contingency unaware non-words, χ
2
(1) = 0.03, p = .87, d = 
0.07, BF0 = 3.01. 
Subliminal AA Training 
IAT D4 scores were calculated such that higher scores indicate a preference 
for the approached non-word over the avoided non-word. Importantly, we did 
not observe a significant preference for the approached non-word (M = -0.03, SD 
= 0.51), t(95) = -0.52, p = .60, BF0 = 9.14. An ANOVA on IAT score with Non-word 
(Lokanta, Fevkani), Condition (attention-tuning, control), and Action Framing 
(approach by pulling, approach by moving towards the screen) as between-
subjects factors only revealed a main effect of Non-word, F(1,88) = 15.68, p < 
.001, BF1 = 209.41, indicating that participants preferred LOKANTA over FEVKANI. 
The main effect of Condition was not significant, F(1,88) = 0.41, p = .52, BF0 = 
3.95. We did not observe a significant preference for the approached non-word 
for participants in the attention-tuning or control condition, ts < 0.07, ps > .95, 
BF0s > 4.44. No other main or interaction effects were significant, Fs < 0.98, ps > 
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.32. We performed a linear regression of d’ scores on IAT scores. The intercept, 
b1 = -0.06, t(94) = -0.73, p = .47, and slope were not significant, b2 = 0.04, t(94) = 
0.51, p = .61. 
An explicit preference score for the approached non-word was calculated 
by subtracting participants’ explicit rating score for the avoided non-word, from 
the explicit rating score for the approached non-word (M = -0.39, SD = 4.16). This 
score correlated significantly with the IAT score, r(94) = 0.59, p < .001. 
Importantly, we did not observe a significant preference for the approached non-
word (M = 6.94, SD = 2.45) over the avoided non-word (M = 7.32, SD = 2.43), 
t(95) = -0.91, p =.37, BF0 = 11.38. An ANOVA on the explicit rating score revealed 
only the main effect of Non-Word, F(1,88) = 28.00, p < .001, BF1 = 11261.91, but 
no main effect of Condition, F(1,88) = 0.18, p = .67, BF0 = 4.39, or any interaction 
effect, Fs < 1.35, ps > .24. We did not observe a preference for the approached 
non-word in the attention-tuning or control condition, ts < 0.01, ps > .99, BF0s > 
6.03. 
Discussion 
Despite more optimal conditions for subliminal perception and an 
increased power for detecting small effects we did not obtain evidence for the 
conclusion that subliminal AA training caused changes in evaluations of novel 
non-words. We also did not find more robust subliminal AA training effects when 
participants experienced specific stimulus-action contingencies in an earlier 
supraliminal AA training task. This might indicate that the attention-tuning 
manipulation did not enhance participants attention to contingency relations 
(but note that participants in the attention-tuning condition did indicate 
awareness of the contingencies in the supraliminal AA training task) or that 
tuning participants attention to process these relations does not facilitate 
associative learning (but see Custers & Aarts, 2011). Alternatively, the findings by 
Custers and Aarts (2011) may simply not extend to AA training effects because 
awareness of the specific contingencies is crucial for AA training effects rather 
than attention to contingency relations in general. In line with this idea, we 
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observed effects of supraliminal AA training only when participants indicated 
awareness of the stimulus-action contingencies, corroborating previous findings 
(Van Dessel, De Houwer, & Gast, 2015). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In three experiments with different stimuli and procedures, we tested 
whether subliminal AA training changes stimulus evaluations. Participants 
repeatedly performed AA movements in response to approach or avoidance cues 
that were preceded by subliminally presented stimuli: faces of Black or White 
people (Experiment 1), unfamiliar faces (Experiment 2), or unfamiliar non-words 
(Experiment 3). In contrast to previous findings (Kawakami et al., 2007; Jones et 
al., 2013), we did not observe changes in implicit or explicit evaluations of these 
stimuli that could be attributed to the subliminal AA training. We did, however, 
observe AA effects when participants were provided with correct or incorrect 
information about the stimulus-action contingencies in the subliminal AA training 
task and when participants performed supraliminal AA training and were aware 
of the stimulus-action contingencies. 
How can these results be reconciled with previous findings?  
Kawakami et al. (2007) and Jones et al. (2013) reported effects of 
subliminal AA training in two and three experiments, respectively; we report 
three experiments that do not show these effects. To explain these discrepant 
results two options can be considered. On the one hand, it is possible that AA 
training cannot cause changes in stimulus evaluations when the stimuli are 
presented subliminally during the training phase. Under that assumption, we 
might look at the original findings and suggest that the reported effects are 
simply Type I error, that is, a false rejection of the null hypothesis. In line with 
this idea, Bayesian analyses indicated that these original results provided only 
anecdotal evidence for subliminal AA training effects while our results 
consistently provided more substantial evidence favoring the idea that subliminal 
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AA training does not allow for changes in evaluations. A Bayes Factor meta-
analysis including the data of the successful subliminal AA training studies by 
Kawakami et al. and Jones et al., as well as our studies indicates that the 
available evidence favors the null hypothesis that subliminal AA training does not 
influence implicit evaluations, BF0 = 3.64, or explicit evaluations, BF0 = 6.51 
(Table 1). However, some caution is warranted when interpreting these results, 
most importantly because the subliminal training studies all differed 
substantially in their methodology. Alternatively, it is possible that the effects 
reported by Kawakami et al. and Jones et al. occurred because stimuli were on 
some occasions presented above the perceptual threshold. By using d’ measures 
of stimulus perceptibility, we found evidence that, with the subliminal AA 
training procedure used by Kawakami et al., some participants’ are able to detect 
the presented stimuli. Although we did not observe that this caused changes in 
evaluations in our experiments, this may have contributed to the original reports 
of subliminal AA training. One could object that in three of the experiments 
reported by Kawakami et al. and Jones et al. effects were observed even though 
participants did not report awareness of the stimuli when probed. As previously 
contended, however, the accuracy of these reports may be limited because (1) 
awareness was assessed only after the conditioning and evaluation phase, and 
(2) participants do not always report having been aware of a stimulus despite 
having some subjective experience of it (Cleeremans, 2001). 
On the other hand, it is possible that subliminal AA training effects can be 
reliably observed, but we failed to do so. The detection of these effects, then, 
may require certain methodological idiosyncrasies that we failed to incorporate 
in our experiments. First, for some reason, our procedures might have interfered 
with the perception of the subliminal stimuli (Bargh & Morsella, 2008). It is 
unlikely that this was a problem in our experiments. Not only did we model our 
subliminal presentation procedures after Kawakami et al.’s study and other 
studies that report robust subliminal priming effects, also did the d’ perceptibility 
scores indicate that some participants were even able to consciously identify the 
identity of the presented stimuli. Note, however, that d’ perceptibility scores 
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may overestimate awareness to the stimuli (Vermeiren & Cleeremans, 2012; but 
see Amihai, 2012). For instance, directing participants’ attention to the 
subliminal stimuli during the d’ perceptibility task may lead to higher visibility of 
these stimuli. Second, AA training may cause changes in evaluations only when 
the training involves a sufficiently large number of training trials (e.g., because 
associative learning is a slow and gradual process; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). 
Again we see no reason why this would be a problem in our studies. We matched 
the number of training trials to that in Kawakami et al. (Experiment 1) or to the 
number of training trials recommended by Woud, Becker, and Rinck (2011) for 
AA training with novel stimuli. Third, subliminal AA training effects may be 
limited to well-known stimuli such as spiders and well-known social groups. For 
instance, visual attention may be more strongly directed toward a well-known 
stimulus because the stimulus’ related evaluation is particularly accessible 
(Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio, 1992; Young & Fazio, 2013). However, in both our 
experiments with novel stimuli, we presented the stimuli in the instructions 
directly preceding the subliminal training task to ensure that a representation of 
the stimulus would recently have been made accessible. Moreover, participants 
were asked to remember these stimuli (or stimulus-action contingencies), which 
may even facilitate selective visual attention (Soto, Humphreys, & Heinke, 2006; 
Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005) and thus learning (e.g., Mackintosh, 
1975). 
In sum, although we realized different variations of an AA training task that 
are representative of AA training tasks in the literature, we did not replicate or 
establish effects on subliminally presented stimuli in any of these variations. Of 
course such a set of results can never exclude the possibility that an effect on 
subliminally presented stimuli might occur under a different set of conditions. It 
does, however, indicate that these effects, if they exist, depend on boundary 
conditions that are not yet identified. Further research is necessary to determine 
if and under what circumstances subliminal AA training effects can be reliably 
established. In the absence of this research, one should be cautious in drawing 
strong theoretical conclusions on the basis of previous reports of subliminal AA 
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training effects. This also means that evidence for subliminal AA training is 
currently not reliable enough to be treated as conclusive evidence in the debate 
between association formation versus propositional models of associative 
learning in general and AA training specifically. 
Contingency awareness and AA training 
The current results fit nicely with the idea that awareness of the stimulus-
action contingencies mediates AA training effects (Van Dessel, De Houwer, & 
Gast, 2015). If contingency awareness is necessary to obtain AA training effects, 
then subliminal AA training effects should not occur. Of course, the reversed 
inference does not hold: The fact that we did not observe AA training effects in 
the absence of awareness of the stimuli does not prove that AA training cannot 
cause changes in evaluations in the absence of contingency awareness. However, 
some aspects of our data do support a causal role of contingency information in 
AA training effects. First, in Experiment 2, we obtained evidence that aware 
contingency knowledge can lead to AA effects without actual practice of the AA 
contingencies. When participants were informed about the stimulus-action 
contingencies that would be presented in the subliminal AA training task, they 
exhibited changes in implicit and explicit evaluations in line with this information 
(also see Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2015). This effect occurred even 
when the contingency information contrasted with the contingencies that were 
actually presented in the training task. Second, the results of Experiment 3 
provide evidence that contingency awareness is also a necessary condition for 
AA training effects. When participants were provided with supraliminal AA 
training, a preference for approached non-word stimuli was observed only when 
participants were able to consciously report the relation between non-word and 
action. This corroborates previous findings that AA training influences 
evaluations (of novel faces) only in the presence of contingency awareness (Van 
Dessel, De Houwer, & Gast). 
Theoretical implications 
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The current results have important implications for accounts of AA training 
effects. Most importantly, they pose a challenge to theories that assume that the 
repeated paring of stimuli and AA actions allows for the automatic formation of 
associations that underlie (implicit) evaluations (Woud et al., 2013; Phills et al., 
2011). For our findings to be reconciled with these accounts it seems necessary 
to assume that specific boundary conditions determine when these automatic 
effects may arise. Current association formation theories, however, remain 
unclear on the necessary environmental conditions (Shanks, 2007). In 
Experiment 3, we explored one possible boundary condition of unconscious 
associative learning (i.e., whether attention is tuned to process contingency 
relations; see Custers & Aarts, 2011). However, we failed to find evidence that 
our attention-tuning manipulation moderated subliminal training effects. In the 
absence of a clear description of boundary conditions for association formation, 
the current results may be more easily explained by an alternative, propositional 
account of AA training effects. Because a propositional account suggests that the 
acquisition of information about stimulus-action contingencies directly causes 
changes in implicit and explicit stimulus evaluations, this fits well with the 
observation that contingency awareness plays an important role in establishing 
AA training effects. 
Our findings may also advance the debate about the validity of dual-
process and single-process propositional models of evaluative learning. Dual-
process models assume two routes of evaluative learning: learning on the basis 
of the automatic formation of associations and learning on the basis of conscious 
propositional reasoning (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In 
contrast, single-process propositional theories postulate that all learning 
necessarily involves the conscious acquisition of propositional information (e.g., 
De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Proponents of these 
theories argue that unambiguous evidence in favor of unconscious associative 
learning is scarce and the existence of an automatic association formation 
mechanism can therefore be questioned (see Mitchell et al., 2009, for a review). 
In the evaluative conditioning (EC) literature, for example, investigations which 
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used more fine-grained methodologies often failed to find evidence for 
subliminal EC and for EC without contingency awareness (Pleyers, Corneille, 
Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Gast, De Houwer, & De Schryver, 2012; but see Hütter, 
Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012; see Sweldens, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 
2014, for a recent review). 
In the area of AA training effects, Kawakami et al. (2007) and Jones et al. 
(2013) report evidence for subliminal effects. As we noted in the introduction, 
these findings have the potential to provide strong support for the hypothesis 
that preferences can be learned unconsciously, and hence support the idea that 
an automatic association formation mechanism exists. This is not only relevant 
for understanding AA training effects, but also for the more general debate 
about associative, propositional, and dual-process models. Considering the 
relevance of such findings the reports of unconscious AA training effects, 
however, have not been scrutinized sufficiently, unlike reports of unaware 
learning in other research areas. In the current paper we both evaluate the 
previous evidence for subliminal AA training effects and report three additional 
studies that test it. Across our analyses we consistently failed to find reliable 
evidence for the existence of subliminal AA training effects. We nevertheless 
hope that future studies will further try to establish the empirical validity of 
findings that, if valid, may provide strong evidence for the existence of an 
association formation mechanism. 
 Our results also have important implications for theories of evaluation. 
Evaluation is often explained in terms of dual-process models in which implicit 
and explicit evaluation depend on different systems or processes (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011, 2014; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell, McConnell, 
Mackie, & Strain, 2006; Rydell, McConnell, Strain, Claypool, & Hugenberg, 2007). 
Implicit evaluations are typically thought to emerge from associative mental 
processes that operate through the spreading activation of associations in 
memory. Because associations are assumed to be formed gradually and 
automatically, implicit evaluations may not be easily changed (Gregg et al., 
2006). Explicit evaluations are typically assumed to be governed by propositional 
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processes that operate on the basis of propositional reasoning, and therefore 
may more strongly and immediately reflect new information. In line with this 
idea, Rydell and McConnell (2006) showed that verbal information about a novel 
stimulus caused changes in the explicit, but not implicit evaluation of this 
stimulus, whereas the repeated pairing of the same stimulus with valenced 
primes, presented subliminally, changed only implicit evaluations. In Experiment 
2, we provided evidence that directly contrasts these results. Both implicit and 
explicit evaluations changed as the result of verbal information about the 
contingencies between a stimulus and AA action, but not as the result of the 
repeated pairing of the stimulus with AA actions. This accords with recent 
findings that both implicit evaluations and explicit evaluations can be changed 
even by a single piece of verbal information (Cone & Ferguson, 2015; De Houwer, 
2006; Gast & De Houwer, 2012; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Van Dessel et al., 
2015; Zanon et al., 2014) and fits more easily with theories which assume that 
propositional information influences both implicit and explicit evaluations (De 
Houwer, 2014). Again, further research is required to distinguish between the 
various accounts. A first step in this endeavour can be to try and replicate any 
studies reporting evidence that clearly favors the idea that implicit and explicit 
evaluative change relies on separate processes. 
Concluding Remarks 
On the basis of the available evidence, we believe that there is insufficient 
evidence to conclude that AA training causes changes in evaluations in the 
absence of awareness. If subliminal AA training effects do exist, they must be 
subjected to very stringent boundary conditions. In contrast, evidence seems to 
be accumulating that conscious propositional knowledge about stimulus-action 
contingencies plays an important role in AA training effects. Nevertheless, given 
the important theoretical implications of subliminal AA training effects, we hope 
that future studies will further explore these effects and attempt to replicate 
studies reporting these effects. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In the current dissertation, we examined the effects of approach and 
avoidance (AA) training and instructions on implicit evaluation. Implicit 
evaluation can be defined as the automatic impact of stimuli on evaluative 
responses (De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013) and is most often 
attributed to the activation of associations in memory (for a review, see Hughes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). Our research was inspired by the idea that 
propositions, rather than associations, guide implicit evaluation, as proposed by 
the single-process propositional model of evaluation (De Houwer, 2014). Based 
on this idea, we examined whether propositions mediate the effects of AA 
training on implicit evaluations. Unlike to what is typically assumed on the basis 
of association formation models of AA training (Woud, Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 
2013; Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011), propositional models 
imply that the effects of AA training involve the conscious acquisition of 
propositional knowledge (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 
2009). The focus of my dissertational research was twofold. First, we examined 
whether the acquisition of stimulus-action contingency knowledge via 
instructions can cause changes in implicit evaluations. Second, we examined 
whether effects of AA training on implicit evaluations depend on conscious 
awareness of the stimulus-action contingencies. The results presented in each 
chapter are outlined in detail in the following section. 
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CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES AND FINDINGS 
Research line 1: Effects of AA instructions on implicit evaluation 
In Chapter 2, we investigated whether typical AA effects occur also when 
participants do not perform the AA actions but are merely instructed about the 
contingencies between stimuli and AA actions. Five experiments were conducted 
to answer this question. In each experiment, participants received instructions to 
approach one stimulus and avoid another stimulus. They were asked to 
remember this information well as they would first need to complete a different 
task. Immediately following these instructions, participants’ implicit evaluations 
of the two stimuli were registered. Results showed that AA instructions can 
influence implicit evaluations. Participants exhibited more positive implicit 
evaluations of the stimuli they were instructed to approach than of the stimuli 
they were instructed to avoid. However, these effects were critically dependent 
on the type of stimulus that was used. Though AA instructions clearly influenced 
evaluations of novel stimuli (i.e., fictitious social groups and novel non-words), 
no AA instruction effects were observed on evaluations of well-known stimuli 
(i.e. well-known social groups). This pattern of results was obtained regardless of 
whether implicit evaluations were registered with an Implicit Association Test 
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) or using an evaluative priming task 
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). Similarly, we observed effects of 
AA instructions on explicit evaluations of fictitious social groups but not on 
explicit evaluations of well-known social groups (i.e., self-reported ratings of 
liking and warmth).  
The present results show that changes in implicit (and explicit) stimulus 
evaluations can result not only from extended AA training but also from mere 
instructions about the relations between stimuli and future AA movements. 
These findings support the idea that propositional processes play an important 
role in the learning of implicit evaluations (De Houwer, 2009, 2014; Mitchell et 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  207 
al., 2009). Even AA training effects, which are often considered prototypical 
examples of effects that result from automatic processing in an associative 
system, may (at least partly) result from processes that involve the acquisition of 
propositional information.  
There are, however, several reasons why it would be premature to 
conclude that AA training effects are mediated by propositional processes. First, 
we examined effects of AA instructions rather than effects of AA training. Though 
instructions about stimulus-action contingencies are often included in the 
procedures of AA training studies (e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 
2007), this is not always the case (e.g., Woud et al., 2013). Also, in studies that do 
include AA instructions, effects may result from several distinct processes. For 
instance, changes in liking may arise partly as the result of propositional 
processes that involve the acquisition of propositional contingency information 
via instructions and partly as a result of the (gradual) acquisition of associations 
through actual AA training. Thus, the present research might merely 
demonstrate a second pathway to evaluative change in addition to evaluative 
change via actual AA behaviors. Such an explanation would resonate with dual-
process models that suggest that propositional processes and associative 
processes can produce (distinct) changes in implicit evaluation (e.g., the 
Associative-Propositional Evaluation [APE] model; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006, 2011, 2014).  
Second, even though our statistical tests had sufficient power to detect 
even a small effect, we did not observe AA instruction effects on evaluations of 
well-known stimuli. In contrast, AA training has been known to produce such 
effects (Kawakami et al., 2007). This observation is consistent with a core 
assumption of many evaluation theories that the learning of implicit evaluations 
reflects the gradual buildup of strength of an associative representation as the 
result of repeated pairings (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Because implicit evaluations of well-known 
stimuli should reflect strong associations, these evaluations may change only 
through repeated experiences (e.g., actual AA training). Dual process-models like 
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the APE model can explain why we do find effects on implicit evaluations of 
novel stimuli. Implicit evaluations of novel stimuli may change also when 
externally provided propositions influence participants’ explicit evaluation of the 
stimulus and contribute to the proactive construction of new associations 
(Whitfield & Jordan, 2009). This explanation, however, does not fit well with the 
observation that changes in implicit evaluations were not fully mediated by 
changes in explicit evaluations (Experiments 4 and 5). We explored this issue 
further in the next chapter.  
In Chapter 3, we examined mediation of the effect of AA instructions on 
implicit evaluations by changes in explicit evaluations. The results described in 
Chapter 2 provided preliminary evidence that the impact of AA instructions on 
implicit evaluations is not fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluation. In the 
studies reported in Chapter 3, participants were instructed to approach or avoid 
the names of members of two fictitious social groups. Before presenting these 
AA instructions, we provided participants with information about the evaluative 
traits of these social groups. We observed that trait instructions cancelled the 
effects of AA instructions on explicit evaluations but not on implicit evaluations. 
Participants exhibited an implicit preference for the to-be-approached social 
group over the to-be-avoided social group even though information was 
available that was more diagnostic of the valence of the groups. This pattern of 
results was observed also when AA instructions were supplemented with actual 
AA training. Statistical mediation analyses further corroborated that both AA 
instructions and AA training can have a direct influence on implicit evaluation 
(i.e., unmediated by changes in explicit evaluation).  
These findings reveal important similarities between instruction-based and 
training-based AA effects. Changes in implicit evaluations can occur even when 
the AA instructions (and AA training) provide information that is not considered 
highly diagnostic of the evaluative properties of the stimulus and therefore do 
not influence explicit evaluations. This contrasts with the assumption of the APE 
model that instructions can influence implicit evaluations only if the provided 
information is considered valid and causes deliberate changes in explicit 
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evaluations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Our results suggest that AA 
instruction effects are not entirely the result of controlled, non-automatic 
processes that involve the intentional use of the provided information. For 
instance, effects cannot be exclusively due to the fact that participants infer that 
the experimenter wants them to evaluate the stimulus in a certain way and they 
comply with this demand (De Houwer, Beckers, & Moors, 2007). Rather, the 
acquisition of propositional information about stimulus-action contingencies may 
allow for an automatic effect on implicit evaluation. More specifically, AA 
instructions cause changes in implicit evaluation that seem to occur in the 
absence of participants’ intention that the changes take place. The processes 
underlying this effect thus seem to possess at least one feature of automaticity 
(Moors & De Houwer, 2006). The current results fit well with the idea that 
propositional information can automatically influence implicit evaluation (De 
Houwer, 2014). 
However, it would again be premature to make strong conclusions about 
the causal role of propositional processes in AA effects on the basis of the 
available evidence. Though the current findings reveal important similarities 
between the effects of AA training and those of AA instructions we cannot 
conclude that both types of effects are due to the same mental processes (e.g., 
the formation and activation of propositions). For instance, AA training might still 
provide an additional source for changes in implicit evaluations due to the 
acquisition and strengthening of stimulus-action associations (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). In line with this idea, we found that AA training adds to the 
effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluations. Participants exhibited a stronger 
AA effect on implicit evaluation when AA instructions were supplemented with 
AA training. This added effect was observed only for participants who received 
trait instructions. This observation fits with the idea that the gradual formation 
of associations is necessary for changing evaluations of stimuli that previously 
acquired a specific valence (Rydell & McConnell, 2006). It also fits well with the 
evidence reported in Chapter 2 that AA instructions produce smaller effects on 
evaluations of valenced, well-known, stimuli than on evaluations of entirely 
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novel stimuli. The current results extend these findings by showing that added 
experience in approaching or avoiding the stimuli causes stronger effects on 
evaluations of valenced stimuli. However, they also show that AA instructions 
can influence evaluations of valenced stimuli under certain conditions, indicating 
that propositional processes might also play a role in changing evaluations of 
stimuli that previously acquired a specific valence. Note also that the observation 
of an added effect of actual training does not imply that AA training effects 
necessarily also reflect the operation of association-formation mechanisms. For 
instance, receiving additional training might facilitate the acquisition or 
activation of propositional information which could influence implicit evaluation. 
Future studies are required to examine the (nature of the) mental processes that 
underlie this added effect of AA training. 
In the current studies, all participants received AA instructions (either 
supplemented with AA training or not). It is therefore difficult to make 
conclusions about the processes that underlie AA training effects that do not 
include such instructions. For instance, propositional processes might only play a 
role in AA effects when participants are informed about the stimulus-action 
contingencies. A fundamental question that remains is whether AA training 
effects will depend on propositional contingency information even in the 
absence of AA instructions. In the next research line we provide an answer to 
this question. 
Research line 2: The role of contingency awareness in AA training effects 
The aim of Chapter 4 was to test whether the effect of AA training on 
implicit evaluations depends on participants’ awareness of the stimulus-action 
contingencies. If AA training effects are the result of propositional processes 
then these effects should hinge on participants’ ability to acquire conscious 
propositional contingency information, which should (at least partially) be 
reflected in contingency awareness (Mitchell et al., 2009). In the present studies, 
we used a variant of the procedure introduced by Woud, Becker, and Rinck 
(2008) to examine AA training effects on implicit evaluations of novel face 
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stimuli. In this procedure, participants repeatedly approach or avoid novel faces 
on the basis of a certain stimulus feature (i.e., the color of the frame surrounding 
the face pictures) that is unrelated to the target feature of the stimulus (i.e., the 
identity of the face pictures). Subsequently, implicit evaluations of the faces are 
registered with an evaluative priming task. The previous studies that used this 
procedure produced mixed results. Whereas Woud and colleagues reported 
finding a significant effect of AA training on implicit evaluations of novel faces, 
Vandenbosch and De Houwer (2011) failed to find any evidence for AA training 
effects in five experiments and failed to reproduce the effect reported by Woud 
et al. when reanalyzing their data. For the current studies, we adapted the 
procedure in a number of ways such that the acquisition of information about 
stimulus-action contingencies would be facilitated. For instance, we used a 
smaller number of evaluative stimuli (i.e., pictures of 8 instead of 12 neutral 
faces) and allowed participants to experience a 100% contingency between a 
certain face and AA action. Importantly, we also made adaptations to address 
the importance of contingency awareness in AA training effects. First, we tried to 
capture participants’ awareness of the experienced face-action contingencies by 
measuring participants’ memory about the relation between faces and actions. 
Second, we provided half of the participants with instructions that specified the 
stimulus-action contingencies. 
Results of Experiment 1 indicated that contingency awareness moderated 
AA training effects on implicit (and explicit) evaluations of novel faces. 
Participants exhibited a preference for approached faces over avoided faces only 
if these faces had been correctly identified as an approached or avoided face. In 
contrast, our manipulation of contingency awareness via contingency 
instructions failed to produce any evidence that contingency awareness 
influenced AA training effects even though the manipulation did influence 
measured contingency awareness. Experiment 2 involved the same procedure 
with the exception that none of the participants received any contingency 
information. We observed that AA training caused significant changes in implicit 
and explicit evaluations, and that these effects were moderated by participants’ 
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awareness of the stimulus-action contingencies. 
These results support the idea that AA training influences the liking of a 
stimulus only after participants acquire conscious propositional knowledge about 
the relation between AA action and stimulus. They accord with our previous 
findings that the acquisition of propositional contingency information (via 
instructions) causes changes in implicit (and explicit) stimulus evaluations and 
provide strong evidence that propositional processes play an important role in 
AA training effects.  
The observation that contingency awareness moderates AA training effects 
does not fit well with the idea that an automatic association formation 
mechanism underlies these effects. However, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that associative processes do play some role in AA training effects. On the one 
hand, it is possible that the observed changes in implicit evaluations actually 
resulted from the (gradual) formation and activation of associations. There are 
several reasons why changes in liking that are due to association formation might 
have correlated with contingency awareness. For instance, participants could 
have trusted their feelings toward the stimuli to answer the contingency 
awareness questions, relying on affect-as-information. In such cases, the AA 
training effect on evaluations may be stronger for stimuli classified as 
contingency aware than for stimuli classified as contingency unaware (see 
Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012 for a similar argument in the 
context of evaluative conditioning). Alternatively, both the formation of 
associations during action performance and contingency awareness may critically 
depend on the same boundary conditions (e.g., participants’ attention to the 
identity of the stimuli). Supporting the idea that contingency knowledge does not 
mediate AA training effects, our experimental manipulation of contingency 
awareness (i.e., whether instructions about stimulus-action contingencies were 
also presented) did not significantly influence stimulus evaluations. However, 
given our previous findings, we are confident that AA instructions (which in 
essence also specify stimulus-action contingencies) can influence implicit and 
explicit evaluations of novel stimuli. In fact, we did obtain AA instruction effects 
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with a similar procedure and similar stimuli in another study (see Chapter 5, 
Experiment 2). Failure to find this effect in Experiment 1 may simply be due to a 
lack of power to detect such an effect in the between-subjects analyses. 
On the other hand, our procedures may have interfered with the 
observation of AA effects that result from automatic association formation 
processes. For instance, because participants were aware of most of the 
stimulus-action contingencies in both our experiments, statistical power was 
more strongly reduced for analyses that tested AA effects on evaluations of 
contingency unaware faces than for analyses that tested AA effects on 
evaluations of contingency aware faces. This might explain why we only 
observed significant AA effects for contingency aware faces. However, two types 
of evidence go against this explanation. First, Bayesian analyses indicated that 
our data provided strong evidence that AA training influences evaluations of 
contingency aware faces and already provided substantial evidence that AA 
training does not influence evaluations of contingency indiscriminate faces. 
Second, Vandenbosch and De Houwer (2011) used a similar procedure with the 
exception that they used a larger number of stimuli and less-than-perfect 
contingencies, which is likely to reduce contingency awareness. A high-powered 
analysis including the data of 9 experiments with this procedure did not provide 
any evidence for effects of AA training. Of course, we can never fully exclude the 
possibility that other procedural details impeded the detection of effects due to 
association formation in our studies (and in the studies by Vandenbosch & De 
Houwer). Though it is currently unclear what these procedural details might be, 
some evidence supports this idea and indicates that AA training can, under 
certain conditions, produce effects on implicit evaluations in the absence of 
contingency awareness (i.e., with subliminal stimulus presentations such as in 
the studies of Kawakami et al., 2007). We explored this issue further in the next 
chapter.  
In Chapter 5, we tested whether AA training with subliminal stimulus 
presentations can cause changes in implicit evaluations. Experiment 1 was an 
exact replication of the experiment by Kawakami et al. (2007, Experiment 2) who 
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found subliminal AA training effects on implicit evaluations of Black and White 
social groups. We were unable to replicate this result. In contrast, Bayesian 
analyses of our data provided substantial evidence that training to approach 
subliminally presented photographs of Black people and avoid subliminally 
presented photographs of White people does not produce changes in 
participants’ implicit (or explicit) evaluations of these groups.  
Experiment 2 examined effects of subliminal AA training on evaluations of 
novel face stimuli. In this experiment, participants were informed about the 
contingencies between four face stimuli and the AA actions in the subliminal AA 
training task before they performed the task. Unbeknownst to participants, 
contingency instructions specified the correct contingencies for only two of the 
four face stimuli. Results showed that the contingency instructions influenced 
implicit and explicit evaluations of the stimuli but subliminal AA training did not.  
Finally, Experiment 3 investigated effects of subliminal and supraliminal AA 
training on evaluations of non-existing words. This study included a manipulation 
designed to facilitate participants’ attention to contingencies in the subliminal 
AA training task. As Custers and Aarts (2011) argued, such a manipulation might 
facilitate the formation of associations in memory under conditions of subliminal 
stimulus presentations. Participants performed a supraliminal AA training task in 
which they repeatedly approached or avoided certain non-words. For half the 
participants the supraliminal AA training task involved specific stimulus-action 
contingencies (attention-tuning condition), for the other participants the identity 
of the stimulus did not predict the action (control condition). After performing 
the supraliminal AA training task, participants performed an AA training task with 
subliminal presentations of other non-word stimuli. Even though most 
participants in the attention-tuning condition were aware of the contingencies in 
the supraliminal AA training task and exhibited typical effects of the supraliminal 
AA training, we observed no effects of subliminal AA training on implicit or 
explicit evaluation in this condition or in the control condition. We also found 
that the effects of the supraliminal AA training critically depended on 
contingency awareness. 
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These findings provide further evidence that propositional processes play 
an important role in AA training effects. AA training might produce changes in 
evaluations only when participants are aware of the stimuli and of the stimulus-
action contingencies. A meta-analysis including all the available evidence on 
subliminal AA training currently favors the hypothesis that subliminal AA training 
does not influence implicit or explicit evaluations. This contrasts with the idea 
that the repeated paring of stimuli and AA actions allows for the automatic 
formation of associations that underlie (implicit) evaluations (Woud et al., 2013; 
Phills et al., 2011). Of course, it is still possible that subliminal AA training effects 
can be reliably observed, but that we merely failed to do so in the current 
studies. For instance, subliminal AA training effects may depend on specific 
boundary conditions such as whether participants have had ample previous 
experience with the stimuli (and therefore arise only with well-known stimuli). 
Currently, however, we believe there is insufficient evidence to conclude that 
subliminal AA training can cause changes in evaluations. It will be of particular 
importance to demonstrate the existence of subliminal AA training effects in 
studies that include sensitive checks of perceptual stimulus discriminability and 
contingency awareness.  
To sum up, the experiments reported in the four empirical chapters 
provided strong evidence that the acquisition of propositional contingency 
information plays a crucial role in AA effects. We observed that (1) the 
acquisition of stimulus-action contingency information produces (direct) changes 
in implicit evaluations and (2) that AA training effects on implicit evaluations are 
moderated by awareness of the stimulus-action contingencies. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Now that we have provided a brief overview and discussion of the different 
findings reported in the current thesis, in this section we consider the various 
implications of our findings for current and future theories about the mental 
processes underlying AA effects and implicit evaluation. We first address how 
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our findings fit with current (associative) accounts of AA effects. Next, we 
introduce alternative, propositional, accounts of AA effects. Finally, we discuss 
implications for current theories of stimulus evaluation. 
Associative accounts of AA effects 
As we discussed in the General Introduction, a number of different 
explanations for AA training effects have been put forward that all incorporate 
the assumption that association formation mechanisms underlie these effects. 
The current results strongly constrain these associative accounts. 
First, the finding that typical AA effects can be observed even in the 
absence of actual AA actions does not fit well with the idea that an association 
formation mechanism underlies AA effects. It is most often assumed that 
associations only form gradually as the result of many different experiences and 
therefore require a large number of stimulus-action pairings (Kawakami et al., 
2007; Woud et al., 2008). We see two ways in which AA instruction effects can 
be reconciled with current associative accounts. On the one hand, AA instruction 
effects might differ from AA training effects in that they do not result from the 
same mental processes. For instance, whereas actual AA training might produce 
changes in implicit evaluations that are the result of automatic association 
formation processes, AA instruction effects might depend on other, more 
controlled, processes. One way to test this idea is by comparing the 
(automaticity) features of instruction-based and training-based AA effects. In 
Chapter 3, we reported evidence that both AA instructions and AA training can 
produce unintentional changes in implicit evaluations. Future research is needed 
to establish whether instruction-based and training-based effects are similar also 
regarding other features, for example regarding uncontrollability (see Gawronski, 
Balas, & Creighton, 2014).  
On the other hand, both AA instruction and AA training effects might 
depend on association formation processes. Some theorists have argued that 
strong associations can form even as the result of a single pairing (e.g., Fazio, 
2007; Field, 2006). Though instructions do not involve any pairing of AA action 
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and stimulus, they do involve other pairings. For instance, in AA instructions a 
certain stimulus (e.g., the word UDIBNON) is paired with valenced action words 
(e.g., the word ‘approach’). This one-time pairing might be sufficient to create an 
associative link between the representations of the stimulus and a valenced 
representation. Automatic activation of this association might produce the 
observed changes in implicit evaluation (Woud et al., 2008). Note that 
participants can also engage in mental rehearsal of the instructions. This mental 
rehearsal could allow for multiple (covert) pairings of stimulus and action words 
(through inner speech). Alternatively, AA instruction effects might occur when 
participants engage in mental simulation of AA actions (see Glenberg & Kaschak, 
2002, for an overview of evidence that people engage in the mental simulation 
of actions that are described in instructions). Current associative accounts of AA 
effects can accommodate AA instruction effects if they assume that mental 
simulation allows for the formation of associations between representations of 
the self and stimulus representations (Phills et al., 2011) or between stimulus 
representations and motivational representations (Cacioppo, Priester, & 
Berntson, 1993). Note, however, that in our AA instruction studies participants 
were not informed how they would perform the approach and avoidance 
behavior which makes it is less likely that effects resulted from mentally 
simulated action. 
Second, current associative accounts cannot easily explain why AA training 
effects only seem to arise when participants are aware of stimulus-action 
contingencies. Because association formation is often considered an automatic 
process, AA training effects are typically thought not to depend on contingency 
awareness (Kawakami et al., 2007). As we discussed in the previous section, the 
current results can be reconciled with an association formation mechanism if one 
assumes that specific boundary conditions determine when association 
formation occurs and these conditions also determine contingency awareness. 
Current theories, however, remain unclear on the necessary environmental 
conditions that determine (automatic) association formation (Shanks, 2007) and 
AA training effects (Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011). 
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Propositional accounts of AA effects 
In general, we believe that the current results can be more easily explained 
by alternative, propositional, accounts of AA effects. In line with propositional 
models of EC (De Houwer, 2009; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & 
Crombez, 2010; Mitchell et al., 2009), AA training might influence the liking of a 
stimulus only after participants acquire conscious propositional knowledge about 
the relation between action and stimulus. There a number of possible pathways 
via which the acquisition of this information might lead to changes in implicit 
(and explicit) stimulus evaluations.  
First, when participants acquire propositional contingency information, 
they might generate novel propositions by making specific inferences. For 
instance, participants who learn that they approach a stimulus may infer that 
they like this stimulus, and participants who learn that they avoid a stimulus may 
infer that they do not like this stimulus. These inferences could arise because of 
the knowledge that, typically, positive things are approached and negative things 
are avoided. People may have learned this rule through previous experiences 
during which they approached liked stimuli and avoided disliked stimuli. 
Although this knowledge does not logically imply the reverse (i.e., that 
approached things are good and avoided things are bad), people are known to be 
prone to affirm the consequent (i.e., conclude that A is true on the basis of the 
fact that A implies B and B is present). Note that people make inferences not 
only in a controlled manner but also when they have no intention to make them 
or when they are unaware of the inference itself (Critcher & Risen, 2014; 
Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008; see Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011, for an 
overview of evidence of automatic inferences). The inferences underlying AA 
effects might also occur under certain conditions of automaticity (e.g., because 
the application of the underlying rule is well-practiced, Kruglanski & Gigerenzer). 
Thus, inferential processes might allow for the acquisition of novel propositional 
information in either a more automatic or a more deliberate manner. 
Once participants infer that the approached stimulus is good and the 
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avoided stimulus is bad, they may use this newly acquired propositional 
information for evaluation. The process by which this new information influences 
evaluation might also be automatic to a greater or lesser degree. For instance, 
more deliberate changes in liking may arise when participants regard the AA 
information as a valid source of information or when they believe that the 
experimenter wants them to evaluate the stimulus in a certain way and they 
want to comply with this demand (De Houwer et al., 2007). The observation that 
AA effects on implicit evaluations can occur also in the absence of changes in 
explicit evaluations suggests that the changes in liking are not necessarily 
deliberate. Rather, the newly acquired propositional information might influence 
implicit evaluation in a more automatic manner (De Houwer, 2014). For instance, 
presentation of the approached stimulus during implicit evaluation tasks may 
allow for the automatic (e.g., fast and unintentional) activation of the 
proposition that this stimulus is positive. This might facilitate certain 
spontaneous evaluative responses (e.g., fast categorization responses in IAT 
blocks where the approached stimulus is categorized with the same key as liked 
stimuli).  
A second possible propositional explanation for AA effects centers on the 
idea that the acquisition of propositional contingency information triggers the 
activation of other propositional information through similarity-based retrieval 
principles rather than through inferential processes. For instance, presentation 
of an approached stimulus during an evaluation task may allow for the 
immediate activation of the contingency information (e.g. that stimulus A was 
approached). In turn, this may trigger the activation of other information as a 
function of the similarity between the information and previously acquired 
information (Hintzman, 1986; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997). For instance, 
participants may activate information or memories that relate to the concept 
‘approach’ (e.g., that they consider this concept positive) which might influence 
participants’ immediate response to the stimulus (e.g., evoke a positive feeling or 
facilitate responding ‘positive’ in an implicit evaluation task). 
The described propositional accounts can easily explain the current results. 
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First, these accounts assume that changes in liking can occur only when 
participants obtain stimulus-action contingency information. Because the 
acquisition of contingency information should (at least partly) be reflected in 
contingency awareness, AA effects might critically depend on contingency 
awareness. Note that the relation between measured contingency awareness 
and the (previous) acquisition of contingency information is not necessarily 
perfect. Thus, these accounts do not exclude the possibility that participants 
might exhibit AA effects even when they are unaware of the contingency 
information (a) at the time of contingency measurement, (b) at the time of 
evaluation measurement, or (c) at the time of acquisition of the propositional 
contingency information (but see Mitchell et al., 2009). Each of these questions 
can be addressed in future studies and could provide further information on the 
automatic or controlled nature of these effects. Second, propositional accounts 
assume that acquired propositional information will influence evaluation 
independent of whether this information is acquired on the basis of experience 
or on the basis of instructions (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al.). They therefore 
predict the existence of AA instruction effects a priori and can explain why AA 
instruction effects share important similarities with AA training effects.  
Overall, we believe that the current findings fit better with a propositional 
explanation of AA effects than with current associative explanations. Because 
our results indicate that propositional processes are involved in AA effects, a 
propositional account that can explain these results is to be preferred over an 
account that additionally postulates the existence of an entirely different second 
mechanism (i.e., association formation) for reasons of parsimony. 
Mental process accounts of implicit evaluation 
The current findings also have implications for current and future theories 
of stimulus evaluation. First, our results are difficult to reconcile with single-
process associative models of stimulus evaluation (e.g., Fazio, 2007; Olson & 
Fazio, 2009). These models typically assume that co-occurrences (e.g., stimulus-
action pairings) are automatically encoded in the form of mental associations 
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that mediate implicit evaluation. This assumption strongly contrasts with our 
findings that instructions about pairings influenced implicit evaluation, indicating 
that the formation of implicit evaluations does not necessitate (repeated) 
pairings. It also contrasts with the observation that effects that do involve actual 
pairings depend on contingency awareness rather than on experienced stimulus-
action contingencies. 
Second, most dual-process models of evaluation also assume that 
associations underlie implicit evaluation and that these associations form 
gradually as the result of many pairings (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Rydell & 
McConnell, 2006). These models therefore also have great difficulty in dealing 
with the current results. However, contemporary dual-process models in which 
association formation processes can interact with propositional learning 
processes can better explain our findings. For instance, the APE model developed 
by Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006), assumes that the formation of 
associations can be mediated by the (propositional) encoding of the pairings. As 
a result, this model would predict that AA instructions can influence both implicit 
and explicit evaluations. However, the APE model also assumes that the 
acquisition of propositional information influences implicit evaluations only 
indirectly (i.e., through a mediating influence on explicit evaluation). Participants 
need to consciously consider the evaluative stimulus as positive or negative 
before a change in implicit evaluations may occur (Gawronski & LeBel, 2008). 
This contrasts with the observation that AA instructions can influence implicit 
evaluations even in the absence of changes in explicit evaluations. To 
accommodate the current findings, dual-process models would need to make 
additional assumptions (e.g., that propositional information can have a direct 
influence on implicit evaluation). 
Finally, purely propositional models of evaluation (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; 
Mitchell et al., 2009; De Houwer, 2014) postulate that implicit and explicit 
evaluation depends entirely on propositional processes. Because our findings 
imply that propositional processes play an important role in AA effects, these 
models fit best with the current results. Both AA training and AA instructions 
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may allow for the acquisition of propositional contingency information. As we 
described in the previous section, there are a number of possible pathways via 
which this might influence implicit (and explicit) evaluation in a purely 
propositional manner. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In this final section, we first describe important limitations of our work and 
possible future directions for research on the effects of AA instructions and AA 
training. We then provide recommendations for future research that aims to 
shed light on the mental processes underlying AA effects and implicit evaluation. 
A first issue that necessitates further examination is to what extent AA 
effects depend on the nature of the stimuli. In Chapter 2 we found that the 
nature of the stimulus can be an important boundary condition of AA instruction 
effects. AA instructions influenced evaluations of novel but not well-known social 
groups. This contrasts with findings that AA training can influence evaluations of 
well-known groups (Kawakami et al., 2007). In Chapter 3 we observed that AA 
training adds to the effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluations of stimuli 
that previously acquired a specific valence (through trait instructions) but not of 
entirely novel stimuli. This study also found that, overall, AA instruction and AA 
training effects were strongly reduced for the valenced stimuli, a finding that 
accords with other studies showing that AA effects depend on the valence of the 
stimuli (Centerbar & Clore, 2006; Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, & Fazio, 2013; Woud, 
Becker, Lange, & Rinck, 2013). For instance, Woud et al. found that AA training 
influenced evaluations of faces with neutral but not angry or smiling expressions. 
Further studies are needed to examine the stimulus qualities that determine the 
effectiveness of AA effects and the extent to which the impact of stimulus 
qualities is similar for instruction-based and training-based effects. This issue 
could be addressed by directly comparing effects of AA instructions and AA 
training on evaluations of novel and well-known stimuli (e.g., prejudiced social 
groups) or on evaluations of stimuli that have a positive, negative or neutral 
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valence. Such studies might not only extend knowledge about the moderators of 
AA instruction and AA training effects but might also provide further insight into 
the mental processes that underlie these effects. For instance, if we find that AA 
training but not AA instructions can cause changes in implicit evaluations of well-
known stimuli this would support the idea that distinct processes underlie these 
effects. 
More generally, we hope that future research will further address the 
similarities and differences of AA instruction and AA training effects. Such studies 
can be important also for practical reasons. For instance, if AA instructions and 
AA training produce similar effects, then using instructions would be a more 
cost-effective way to change a person’s evaluations than providing ample AA 
training. If we do find that there are important dissociations between 
instruction-based and training-based AA effects (e.g., for changing evaluations of 
well-known stimuli), follow-up studies could investigate whether observed 
dissociations can be reduced under certain circumstances. This research might 
also provide important information about the nature of the processes underlying 
AA effects. For instance, one could compare effects of AA training and effects of 
AA instructions that are presented repeatedly to examine whether effects 
depend on repeated pairings (of action and stimulus or action word and stimulus 
within an instruction) rather than on actual performance of the actions. It might 
also be interesting to investigate whether dissociations are reduced when 
participants receive (hypnotic) suggestions that they experienced a large number 
of stimulus-action pairings. Under these circumstances, participants acquire 
propositional information that is also acquired with AA training procedures but 
not with typical AA instruction procedures. This allows us to examine whether 
effects depend on the acquisition of this propositional information. 
Another important limitation of the current studies is that implicit 
evaluations were registered only with the IAT or with an evaluative priming task. 
Though these are the two most often used implicit evaluation measures, it may 
be important for future research to extend its scope to other implicit measures 
that we have not considered in the present dissertation (e.g., the Affective 
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Misattribution Procedure, Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 2005; the Extrinsic 
Affective Simon Test, De Houwer, 2003; the Go/No-Go Association Test, Nosek & 
Banaji, 2001). Note that in all our studies the AA effects on evaluations as 
registered with the IAT, evaluative priming task, or explicit evaluation measures, 
revealed similar patterns of results (e.g., AA instructions influence evaluations of 
novel but not well-known stimuli, AA training effects occur only in the presence 
of contingency awareness,…). The only exception is that, in the presence of trait 
instructions, we observed AA instruction and AA training effects on implicit 
evaluations as registered with the IAT but not on explicit ratings of liking. 
Examining whether such a dissociation can be observed also when other 
measures of implicit and explicit evaluation are used might further inform us 
about the automaticity of the processes that underlie AA effects and about the 
extent to which different evaluation measures are sensitive to these processes. 
A related issue is that the current studies only used one specific question to 
capture participants’ awareness of the experienced stimulus-action 
contingencies. In the evaluative conditioning literature a number of different 
approaches have been used for the measurement of contingency awareness (see 
Sweldens, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2014, for an overview). This is important because 
no single measure can accurately capture contingency awareness. For instance, 
one problem with the measure that we used is that it does not satisfy the 
immediacy criterion (i.e., that the test follows the learning episode quickly to 
avoid forgetting or interference, Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). It may be useful in 
future studies to include a measurement of contingency awareness at the time 
of learning (i.e., during performance of the AA training task). However, to 
address whether contingency awareness mediates AA effects the best approach 
would be to use experimental procedures rather than correlational procedures 
(Dedonder, Corneille, Bertinchamps, & Yzerbyt, 2014; Gawronski & Walther, 
2012). The subliminal AA training procedure provides one way to do this because 
the experimental set-up can prevent contingency awareness but this procedure 
has important limitations (see Sweldens et al.). We hope that future studies also 
use other experimental procedures to further examine the issue of contingency 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  225 
awareness (e.g., by relying on parafoveal presentations of stimuli, Dedonder et 
al.). 
We now turn our attention to implications and limitations of our research 
for possible practical applications. One important issue is that all the 
experiments reported in this dissertation restricted investigation to the effects of 
AA procedures on implicit (and explicit) evaluations. Recently, there have been 
many reports that AA training can also influence other (dysfunctional) behaviors 
such as alcohol consumption (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011), 
unhealthy food consumption (Schumacher, Kemps & Tiggeman, 2016), cigarette 
consumption (Wittekind, Feist, Schneider, Moritz, & Fritzsche, 2015), or fear 
responses (Dibbets & Fonteyne, 2015; Amir, Kuckertz, & Najmi, 2013; Huijding, 
Muris, Lester, Field, & Joosse, 2011). These findings are often considered to be 
mediated by training-induced changes in implicit evaluations (Jones et al., 2013; 
Wiers et al.). In line with this idea, some studies have provided evidence that the 
induction of changes in implicit evaluations directly influences some of the 
dysfunctional behaviors under investigation (e.g., Houben, Havermans, & Wiers, 
2010). However, other research has shown that changes in implicit evaluations 
often do not mediate AA training effects on dysfunctional behavior (e.g., Dibbets 
& Fonteyne; Lester et al., 2015; Eberl et al., 2014). It thus seems important to 
further investigate to what extent the effects of AA training on dysfunctional 
behaviors depend on changes in (implicit) evaluation. If these effects are 
mediated by changes in evaluation, then, based on the current findings, it can be 
argued that the acquisition of contingency information may be an important 
factor also for these studies. Comparing the effects of AA instructions and AA 
training on these behaviors could help provide an answer to this question. 
An alternative explanation for AA training effects on certain dysfunctional 
behaviors is that AA training modifies participants’ automatic tendencies to 
approach or avoid specific stimuli which, in turn, influences the behaviors (see 
Sharbanee et al., 2014). In line with this idea, research has shown that (1) people 
exhibit an automatically activated approach-or avoidance tendency for certain 
well-known stimuli (i.e., they are faster to make either approach or avoidance 
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movements in response to these stimuli; see Laham, Kashima, Dix, & Wheeler, 
2015, and Phaf, Mohr, Rotteveel, & Wicherts, 2014, for recent overviews), and 
(2) this bias can be modified via AA training (Eberl et al., 2014; Dibbets & 
Fonteyne, 2015; Schumacher et al., 2016). However, it is unclear precisely how 
this “cognitive bias modification” may cause the observed changes in behavior. 
Moreover, some evidence suggests that automatic AA tendencies do not logically 
relate to the behaviors under investigation (Spruyt et al., 2013; 
Snelleman, Schoenmakers, de Mheen, 2015). For instance, Spruyt and colleagues 
observed that the likelihood of relapse in alcohol-dependent patients increased 
as the relative tendency to avoid alcohol increased. In future studies, it might be 
interesting to investigate the role of propositional processes also in these effects. 
One could test a number of different possible propositional accounts of these 
effects. For instance, when participants repeatedly perform AA actions in 
response to a specific stimulus they might infer that they will now perform these 
actions more easily. In the context of alcohol addiction, an alcoholic patient who 
repeatedly performs avoidance movements to alcoholic stimuli could, for 
instance, make the inference that they will better be able to avoid alcohol in the 
future. This self-efficacy belief might help a person to refrain from alcohol abuse 
such that avoid alcohol training can reduce relapse rates in alcoholic patients 
(Wiers et al., 2011).  
In general, however, the studies we reported in this dissertation provide 
only limited information about possible practical implications. Though we 
observed changes in implicit and explicit evaluations as the result of AA training 
and AA instructions, it is unclear whether these procedures can produce 
‘meaningful’ effects. Future studies are needed to investigate whether (both) 
these procedures can install evaluations that influence other (real-world) 
behaviors and to what extent these effects are robust or fragile and short-lived. 
Finally, we want to end this dissertation by providing recommendations for 
further investigations about the mental processes that underlie AA effects and 
evaluation. First, we believe that, in order to advance research, it is crucial to 
define theoretical models that make clear, testable predictions. For instance, to 
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gain more information about the processes underlying AA effects it might be 
useful to describe a propositional account that specifies the inferences that 
might underlie these effects. Novel predictions can then be derived from this 
account (e.g., that AA effects should be reduced if the invalidity of these 
inferences is highlighted) and testing these predictions in future studies may 
further our knowledge on the processes underlying AA effects. We also 
recommend this approach for testing cognitive theories of evaluation and classes 
of models such as dual-process and propositional models. Because these models 
often have a high degree of flexibility, distinguishing between these models on 
the basis of a single set of data is difficult, if not impossible. Proponents of these 
models can always make post-hoc adaptations to explain obtained results. To 
advance research it seems important that theories clearly specify the boundary 
conditions that determine when these processes will take place. For instance, we 
hope that dual-process theories will further specify the conditions that 
determine when associations are formed and to what extent this association 
formation process occurs automatically. 
The second point we want to raise is that to promote scientific progress it 
seems crucial to clearly separate explanations that are situated at different levels 
of analysis (see De Houwer, 2011). For instance, AA training effects can be 
explained at the functional level of analysis (i.e., by explaining effects in terms of 
the causal impact of elements in the environment) and at the cognitive or mental 
process level (i.e., by explaining effects in terms of mental constructs such as the 
formation of propositions). Because AA training procedures involve pairings (or 
‘associations’) of actions and stimuli these effects were traditionally defined at 
the cognitive level, as training procedures that install associations. Effects were 
assumed to rely on automatic association-formation processes and most studies 
were performed under this (rarely specified) assumption. However, from a 
functional perspective, AA training effects can be defined as changes in behavior 
that are due to the pairing of actions and stimuli and can in principle be due to a 
number of different processes. Accepting the claim that AA training involves 
association-formation might hamper the opportunity for novel theoretical 
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expansion. A similar argumentation can be made for the case of implicit 
evaluation. If implicit evaluations are defined as changes in associations in 
memory (as is often the case, see Hughes et al., 2011), this rules out the 
possibility that changes in implicit evaluations can be due to different 
mechanisms. As we have shown in the current studies, important new insights 
can be obtained by questioning these assumptions and investigating the 
propositional processes underlying AA training effects and implicit evaluation.  
OVERALL CONCLUSION 
In the current dissertation our aim was to learn more about the conditions 
under which AA training causes changes in implicit evaluations and about the 
mental processes that underlie these effects. We obtained clear evidence that 
propositional processes play an important role in AA effects. This conclusion 
raises questions about the prevailing view that these evaluative learning effects 
are due to automatic association formation mechanisms. We believe that 
questioning the assumption that automatic effects of (evaluative) learning 
depend on association formation processes and examining the role of 
propositional processes in these effects may lead to important new discoveries 
and can have important practical implications. As such, the present thesis sets 
the stage for these new developments.  
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Gedrag wordt in sterke mate bepaald door preferenties (Allport, 1935). Zo 
zal iemand bijvoorbeeld sneller een stimulus benaderen die men positief 
evalueert (e.g., een lekker koekje) en een stimulus vermijden die men negatief 
evalueert (e.g., een gevaarlijke spin). De studie van evaluatie neemt dan ook een 
belangrijke rol in binnen psychologisch onderzoek. Evaluatie kan worden 
gedefinieerd als de invloed van stimuli op evaluatieve responsen (De Houwer, 
Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). Onder bepaalde omstandigheden zullen 
stimuli op spontane wijze een evaluatieve respons uitlokken (Zajonc, 1980). 
Dergelijke evaluaties noemen we impliciete evaluaties (De Houwer, 2009a). Ze 
worden gemeten met behulp van zogenaamde impliciete maten van evaluatie 
zoals de Impliciete Associatie Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
Evaluaties die op een meer opzettelijke en gecontroleerde manier ontstaan (e.g., 
iemands antwoord op de vraag in welke mate men een bepaalde stimulus 
aangenaam vindt) noemen we expliciete evaluaties. 
Onderzoek toont aan dat impliciete evaluaties een belangrijke determinant 
zijn van bepaalde (spontane) gedragingen (zie Gawronski & Payne, 2010 voor 
een overzicht). Recent werden dan ook specifieke methoden ontwikkeld om 
impliciete evaluaties te vormen en te veranderen. Deze methoden bestonden 
hoofdzakelijk uit het herhaaldelijk samen aanbieden van een stimulus met een 
andere, positieve of negatieve, stimulus (evaluatieve conditionering: Hofmann, 
De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010) of met positieve of negatieve 
acties (benaderings- en vermijdingstraining: Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 
2007). Deze methodes zijn gebaseerd op het idee dat impliciete evaluaties 
veroorzaakt worden door de automatische activatie van associaties tussen 
representaties in het geheugen. Traditionele theorieën van evaluatie 
veronderstellen dat dergelijke associaties automatisch worden gevormd 
wanneer twee gebeurtenissen (herhaaldelijk) samen voorkomen (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). 
Recent echter werden alternatieve evaluatietheorieën voorgesteld die 
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veronderstellen dat impliciete evaluaties het gevolg zijn van propositionele 
processen zoals de vorming en activatie van proposities (De Houwer, 2009b, 
2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Proposities verschillen van 
associaties omdat ze relationele informatie kunnen bevatten (e.g., ‘gebeurtenis A 
WORDT VEROORZAAKT DOOR gebeurtenis B’). Recente studies bieden evidentie 
voor het idee dat propositionele processen een rol spelen bij impliciete 
evaluatie. Ten eerste tonen recente studies aan dat impliciete evaluaties kunnen 
veranderen wanneer proefpersonen via instructies propositionele informatie 
verkrijgen over de evaluatieve stimuli (Castelli, Zogmaister, Smith, & Arcuri, 
2003; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). Dit gaat rechtstreeks in tegen de 
veronderstelling van traditionele evaluatietheorieën dat impliciete evaluaties 
enkel kunnen veranderen wanneer associaties geleidelijk aan worden gevormd 
aan de hand van herhaaldelijke paringen (Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000). Ten tweede is er evidentie dat herhaaldelijke paringen niet 
automatisch leiden tot een verandering in impliciete evaluaties. Hoewel 
verscheidene studies vonden dat impliciete evaluaties van stimuli positiever 
worden na herhaaldelijke benadering van de stimuli en negatiever na 
herhaaldelijke vermijding van stimuli is dit niet steeds het geval (Becker, 
Jostmann, Wiers, & Holland, 2015; Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011). Dit gaat in 
tegen het idee dat het uitvoeren van deze responsen automatisch leidt tot 
veranderingen in de associaties die impliciete evaluaties onderliggen (Phills, 
Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011). Effecten van benaderings- en 
vermijdingstraining lijken afhankelijk te zijn van omstandigheden die tot op 
heden nog onbekend zijn (Vandenbosch & De Houwer). 
HUIDIGE PHD THESIS 
Het doel van deze thesis was om meer inzicht te krijgen in de 
omstandigheden waaronder benaderings- en vermijdingstraining leidt tot 
veranderingen in impliciete evaluaties en de mentale processen die deze 
effecten onderliggen. Specifiek gingen we na in welke mate deze effecten 
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afhankelijk zijn van propositionele processen die gebaseerd zijn op de bewuste 
verwerving of acquisitie van propositionele informatie. Enerzijds gingen we na of 
het verschaffen van propositionele informatie via instructies over het samen 
voorkomen van stimuli en benaderings- of vermijdingsacties kan leiden tot 
veranderingen in impliciete evaluaties. Anderzijds onderzochten we of de 
effecten van benaderings- en vermijdingstraining op impliciete evaluaties 
afhankelijk zijn van de mate waarin men zich bewust is van de contingenties 
tussen de stimuli en de uitgevoerde acties.  
Onderzoekslijn 1: Effecten van benaderings- en vermijdingsinstructies op 
impliciete evaluatie  
In Hoofdstuk 2 onderzochten we of veranderingen in impliciete evaluaties 
ook kunnen worden geobserveerd wanneer proefpersonen geen benaderings- of 
vermijdingsacties uitvoeren maar enkel instructies krijgen over de contingenties 
tussen stimuli en deze acties. We voerden 5 experimenten uit om deze vraag te 
beantwoorden. In elk experiment kregen proefpersonen instructies om één 
stimulus te benaderen en een andere stimulus te vermijden. Ze werden gevraagd 
om deze informatie goed te onthouden aangezien ze eerst een andere taak 
zouden moeten uitvoeren. Meteen na deze instructies werden de impliciete 
evaluaties van de stimuli gemeten. We observeerden dat benaderings- en 
vermijdingsinstructies impliciete evaluaties kunnen beïnvloeden. Proefpersonen 
vertoonden meer positieve evaluaties van de stimuli die ze volgens de instructies 
zouden benaderen dan van de stimuli die ze zouden vermijden. Deze effecten 
bleken echter afhankelijk van de aard van de stimulus die werd gebruikt. Hoewel 
benaderings- en vermijdingsinstructies een sterke invloed hadden op evaluaties 
van nieuwe, onbekende stimuli (i.e., fictieve sociale groepen of niet-bestaande 
woorden), vonden we geen effecten op evaluaties van bekende stimuli (i.e., 
vertrouwde sociale groepen). We vonden eveneens dat benaderings- en 
vermijdingsinstructies een invloed hadden op expliciete evaluaties van fictieve 
sociale groepen maar niet van vertrouwde sociale groepen.  
Gebaseerd op deze resultaten concludeerden we dat veranderingen in 
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impliciete evaluaties niet noodzakelijk het gevolg zijn van uitgebreide 
benaderings- en vermijdingstraining maar ook kunnen voorkomen als gevolg van 
instructies over de relatie tussen stimuli en toekomstige benaderings- en 
vermijdingsacties. Deze resultaten bieden evidentie voor propositionele 
evaluatietheorieën die veronderstellen dat propositionele processen een 
belangrijke rol spelen in het leren van impliciete evaluaties (De Houwer, 2014). 
Echter, recente duale-proces modellen van evaluatie zoals het associatief-
propositionele evaluatie model (APE model; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) 
kunnen deze resultaten eveneens verklaren. Volgens dit model zouden impliciete 
evaluaties van onbekende stimuli kunnen worden veranderd als gevolg van de 
acquisitie van propositionele informatie indien er eerst een verandering is in 
expliciete evaluaties. Deze verandering zou er namelijk voor zorgen dat er 
nieuwe associaties worden gevormd die een verandering in impliciete evaluaties 
voor onbekende stimuli kan veroorzaken (Whitfield & Jordan, 2009). Echter, deze 
verklaring is niet in overeenstemming met de observatie dat veranderingen in 
impliciete evaluaties als gevolg van benaderings- en vermijdingsinstructies niet 
volledig gemedieerd waren door veranderingen in expliciete evaluaties (in 
Experiment 4 en 5). We onderzochten dit verder in het volgende hoofdstuk.  
 In Hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten we de mediatie van het effect van 
benaderings- en vermijdingsinstructies op impliciete evaluaties via 
veranderingen in expliciete evaluaties. In deze twee experimenten kregen 
proefpersonen instructies om de namen van leden van fictieve sociale groepen 
te benaderen of te vermijden. Voorafgaand aan deze instructies werd informatie 
verschaft over de karaktertrekken van de leden van deze sociale groepen (e.g., 
‘Niffieten zijn vredelievend, beschaafd en behulpzaam en Luupieten zijn 
agressief, woest en kwaadaardig’). We observeerden dat het verschaffen van 
deze informatie de effecten van benaderings- en vermijdingsinstructies teniet 
deed voor expliciete maar niet voor impliciete evaluaties. Proefpersonen 
vertoonden een grotere impliciete voorkeur voor de groep die ze zouden 
benaderen dan voor de groep die ze zouden vermijden ondanks het feit dat ze 
informatie ter beschikking hadden die meer diagnostisch was over de valentie 
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van de stimuli. Dit resultatenpatroon werd eveneens gevonden wanneer de 
benaderings- en vermijdingsinstructies werden aangevuld met benaderings- en 
vermijdingstraining. Statistische mediatie analyses toonden verder aan dat zowel 
benaderings- en vermijdingsinstructies als benaderings- en vermijdingstraining 
een directe invloed hadden op impliciete evaluaties (i.e., niet gemedieerd door 
veranderingen in expliciete evaluaties). 
Deze resultaten tonen aan dat er belangrijke gelijkenissen zijn tussen 
benaderings- en vermijdingseffecten die gebaseerd zijn op instructies en op 
training. Beide procedures lijken een invloed te hebben op impliciete evaluaties 
zelfs indien proefpersonen niet de intentie hebben om de instructies of training 
hun (expliciete) evaluaties te laten beïnvloeden. De processen die onderliggen 
aan instructie-effecten lijken dus, net als de effecten van training, een 
automatische invloed te hebben op impliciete evaluaties. Deze resultaten zijn in 
overeenstemming met het idee dat de acquisitie en activatie van proposities 
impliciete evaluaties op automatische wijze kan beïnvloeden (De Houwer, 2014). 
Bijvoorbeeld, benaderings- en vermijdingsinstructies zouden ertoe kunnen leiden 
dat men de inferentie maakt dat de te-benaderen stimulus positief is en de te-
vermijden stimulus negatief. De automatische (e.g., niet-intentionele) activatie 
van deze nieuwe propositionele informatie zou iemands prestaties in impliciete 
evaluatietaken kunnen beïnvloeden. 
Echter, de huidige bevindingen bewijzen niet dat de effecten van 
benaderings- en vermijdingstraining (altijd) het resultaat zijn van propositionele 
processen. In de huidige studies kregen proefpersonen steeds informatie over de 
contingenties tussen acties en stimuli. Een belangrijke vraag is of de effecten van 
benaderings- en vermijdingstraining op impliciete evaluatie ook afhankelijk zijn 
van propositionele processen wanneer men geen informatie krijgt over deze 
contingenties via instructies. Op deze vraag zochten we een antwoord in de 
volgende hoofstukken. 
Onderzoekslijn 2: De rol van contingentie bewustzijn in de effecten van 
benaderings- en vermijdingstraining 
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Het doel van Hoofdstuk 4 was om na te gaan of de effecten van 
benaderings- en vermijdingstraining afhankelijk zijn van de mate waarin 
proefpersonen zich bewust zijn van de contingenties tussen stimuli en 
benaderings- en vermijdingsacties. Indien deze effecten het resultaat zijn van 
propositionele processen dan zouden ze afhankelijk moeten zijn van de mate 
waarin proefpersonen de mogelijkheid hebben om propositionele contingentie 
informatie te verkrijgen. Dit zou (ten minste gedeeltelijk) gereflecteerd moeten 
zijn in contingentie bewustzijn. In deze studies gebruikten we een variant van de 
procedure die geïntroduceerd werd door Woud, Becker, en Rinck (2008) om 
effecten van benaderings-en vermijdingstraining op impliciete evaluaties van 
onbekende gezichten na te gaan. Hierbij benaderen of vermijden proefpersonen 
herhaaldelijk bepaalde foto’s van gezichten op basis van een kenmerk van de 
stimulus (e.g., de kleur van het kader dat de foto’s omringt) dat niet gerelateerd 
is aan de identiteit van de gezichten. Hierna worden impliciete evaluaties van de 
gezichten gemeten. Voorgaande studies die deze procedure gebruikten vonden 
gemengde resultaten. Hoewel Woud en collega’s een significant effect 
rapporteerden van de benaderings- en vermijdingstraining op impliciete 
evaluaties van de gezichten, vonden Vandenbosch en De Houwer (2011) geen 
enkele evidentie voor een dergelijk effect in vijf experimenten en konden ze de 
effecten van Woud en collega’s niet reproduceren in een her-analyse van hun 
data. Voor de huidige studies hebben we de procedure aangepast zodat de 
acquisitie van informatie over stimulus-actie contingenties makkelijker zou 
worden. We gebruikten bijvoorbeeld een kleiner aantal evaluatieve stimuli (i.e., 
foto’s van 8 in plaats van 12 gezichten). Tevens maakten we aanpassingen zodat 
het belang van contingentie bewustzijn kon worden nagegaan. Ten eerste, 
probeerden we bewustzijn van de ervaren contingenties na te gaan door te 
meten in welke mate proefpersonen de relatie tussen gezichten en acties 
konden rapporteren. Ten tweede, kregen de helft van de proefpersonen 
expliciete informatie over de contingenties en gingen we het effect hiervan na op 
evaluaties. 
De resultaten van Experiment 1 toonden aan dat contingentie bewustzijn 
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de effecten van benaderings- en vermijdingstraining op impliciete (en expliciete 
evaluaties) van gezichten modereert. Proefpersonen vertoonden enkel een 
voorkeur voor benaderde gezichten over vermeden gezichten indien ze voor 
deze gezichten correct konden aangeven of ze deze benaderd of vermeden 
hadden. Onze manipulatie van contingentie bewustzijn via instructies bood geen 
evidentie dat contingentie bewustzijn een invloed had op benaderings- en 
vermijdingsinstructies. Echter, onze voorgaande studies toonden wel een 
dergelijk effect van instructies aan. Het niet vinden van dit effect in Experiment 1 
is dan ook waarschijnlijk te wijten aan beperkte statistische power. In 
Experiment 2 werd dezelfde procedure gebruikt als in Experiment 1 met 
uitzondering dat geen enkele van de proefpersonen informatie kreeg over de 
contingenties. Resultaten toonden aan dat benaderings- en vermijdingstraining 
significante verschillen veroorzaakte in impliciete en expliciete evaluaties, en dat 
deze effecten gemodereerd werden door contingentie bewustzijn. 
Deze resultaten bieden evidentie voor het idee dat benaderings- en 
vermijdingstraining enkel leidt tot veranderingen in evaluaties indien 
proefpersonen propositionele kennis hebben over de relatie tussen actie en 
stimulus. De bevindingen zijn in lijn met onze voorgaande bevindingen dat de 
acquisitie van contingentie informatie via instructies veranderingen in impliciete 
(en expliciete) evaluaties kan veroorzaken. Ze bieden sterke evidentie dat 
propositionele processen een belangrijke rol spelen in benaderings- en 
vermijdingseffecten. De resultaten zijn niet in overeenstemming met het idee 
dat de automatische vorming van associaties effecten van benaderings- en 
vermijdingstraining onderligt (Phills et al., 2011; Woud et al., 2008). Men kan 
deze resultaten wel in overeenstemming brengen met associatieve verklaringen 
voor benaderings- en vermijdingstraining effecten indien men ervan uitgaat dat 
bepaalde procedurele details van deze studie ervoor zorgden dat een 
automatisch effect als gevolg van associatieve processen werd verhinderd. 
Hoewel het onduidelijk is wat deze procedurele details zouden kunnen zijn, is er 
enige evidentie voor dit idee. Namelijk, sommige studies geven aan dat 
benaderings- en vermijdingstraining, onder bepaalde condities, kan leiden tot 
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effecten op impliciete evaluaties in de afwezigheid van contingentie bewustzijn 
(i.e., bij subliminale presentatie van de getrainde stimuli: Kawakami et al., 2007; 
Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, & Fazio, 2013). We onderzochten dit verder in het 
volgende hoofdstuk.  
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzochten we of benaderings- en vermijdingstraining 
kan leiden tot veranderingen in impliciete evaluaties van stimuli die sub-liminaal 
(i.e., onder de perceptuele bewustzijnsdrempel) worden aangeboden. 
Experiment 1 was een exacte replicatie van het experiment van Kawakami en 
collega’s (2007, Experiment 2) dat evidentie bood dat subliminale benaderings- 
en vermijdingstraining een invloed kan hebben op impliciete evaluaties van 
raciale groepen. We konden dit resultaat niet repliceren. In tegenstelling, 
Bayesiaanse analyses van onze data boden substantiële evidentie dat training om 
subliminaal gepresenteerde prenten van personen met zwarte huidskleur te 
benaderen en subliminaal gepresenteerde prenten van blanke personen te 
vermijden niet leidt tot veranderingen in evaluaties van deze groepen. 
Experiment 2 onderzocht de effecten van subliminale benaderings- en 
vermijdingstraining op evaluaties van onbekende gezichten. In dit experiment 
werden proefpersonen eerst geïnformeerd over de contingenties tussen vier 
gezichtsstimuli en benaderings- en vermijdingsacties in de subliminale 
trainingstaak alvorens ze deze taak uitvoerden. Echter, de contingentie-
instructies boden slechts correcte informatie voor twee van de vier stimuli. De 
resultaten boden sterke evidentie dat de contingentie-instructies impliciete en 
expliciete evaluaties van de stimuli beïnvloeden maar niet de subliminale 
benaderings- en vermijdingstraining. Experiment 3 onderzocht de effecten van 
subliminale en supraliminale benaderings- en vermijdingstraining op evaluaties 
van niet-bestaande woorden. Resultaten toonden aan dat supraliminale 
benaderings- en vermijdingstraining een invloed had op stimulus evaluaties maar 
dat deze effecten afhankelijk waren van contingentie bewustzijn. Daarentegen 
observeerden we geen effecten van subliminale benaderings- en 
vermijdingstraining. 
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CONCLUSIE 
De huidige thesis had tot doel om onze kennis uit te breiden over de 
processen die onderliggen aan benaderings- en vermijdingseffecten op impliciete 
evaluaties. Onze resultaten bieden sterke evidentie dat propositionele processen 
zoals de acquisitie van propositionele contingentie informatie een belangrijke rol 
spelen in deze effecten. We vonden dat (1) de acquisitie van informatie over de 
contingenties tussen stimuli en benaderings- en vermijdingsacties via instructies 
(directe) veranderingen in impliciete evaluaties kan veroorzaken en (2) effecten 
van benaderings- en vermijdingstraining op impliciete evaluaties gemodereerd 
worden door bewustzijn van stimulus- actie contingenties. Deze resultaten zijn 
niet in overeenstemming met het idee dat deze effecten veroorzaakt worden 
door de automatische vorming en activatie van associaties in het brein. We 
hopen dat toekomstig onderzoek verder de rol van propositionele processen in 
(automatische effecten op) impliciete evaluatie zal onderzoeken. 
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